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The subject laid out for study is the development of

men's capacity to reason in political life. Most of the
relevant literature in contemporary political science has

adopted a distinctive framework built upon the concept of
"political socialization**. This framework, however, and

even the conceptualization of political socialization, has

been influenced by

a

conformity perspective. This conform-

ity perspective on socialization involves a way of looking
at and talking about human development that omits any

important reference to the exercise of judgment or to the

growth of the capacity to reason. Individual social development is the product of molding forces and pressures.
Our critique of this conformity interpretation is built

upon the idea that the basic point of the term socialization
is to pick out those social processes which lead to the

capacity to use reason in social life, to understand and
care for others in a social order. Political socialization
involves bringing people to the point of being able to

participate intelligently in a society's political practices
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Failure to build upon this point about the
connection
between socialization and the use of reason

has led to

two related developments in the political
science
literature: a potentially harmful focus on conformist
behavior, and a failure to investigate the character
or

conditions of the higher development of political thinking.

We then suggest that the further development of

political reasoning can be understood as political education. Political education covers those processes by which

citizens develop a capacity for reflective political
thought. Politically educated citizens will be capable of

recognizing others as persons, as potentially capable of

citizenship of the highest level. Framing a critical view
of the public interest and acting on the basis of self-

accepted principles will involve promoting the equal

opportunity of all to develop their capacities as citizens.
The researches of cognitive-developmental psychologists

provide one potentially fruitful framework for the understanding and explanation of the successes of political

socialization and political education. But the character
of the higher achievements of political thinking must be

explored further. It is suggested here that the reflectiveness of mature political thought be taken as a central

achievement. And the explanatory framework of the develop-
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mental psychologists must be revised
to include a more
specifically sociological component. For the
developmentalists have failed to recognize the ways
in which
the concepts involved in the development
of socio-political
thought are imbedded in the structure of social
and

political life.
Finally, we argue that political education ought
to be

promoted in complex and changing modern industrial societies.
The task at hand is the exploration of those institutional

and structural transformations which will provide the condi-

tions for political education and a fully developed
citizenry.
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PART I. POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION

AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

CHAPTERI
INTRODUCTION

Freedom and Reason In Modern Society
From the first, this study should be understood as
a contribution within the tradition of critical social

theory. Mention of two characteristics of critical theory

will perhaps clarify part of this broader intent, as well
as suggest certain lines of development I have not pursued

and certain references which have been left more to tacit

understanding than explicit statement. The first characteristic is a committment to seek new possibilities for

freedom and reason in the process of human and social
change.^ A second characteristic of critical social inquiry
is a certain reluctance to pay undue heed to rigid

disciplinary boundaries shaping much academic work today.
In this section of the Introduction

I

will pursue briefly

the themes of freedom and reason in modern society. In the

third section,

I

will return to the question of discipli-

nary boundaries and the approach of political science to
the problems pursued in this study.

A number of significant works appearing in the
post-war period have focused on the social conditions
of personal freedom, integrity, and autonomy - such
as Erich Fromm, Escape From Freedom ?

T. W. Adorno,

et al. The Authoritarian Personalitv i^ Christian Bay,

2

The Structure of Freedo>n; 4
^nd Herbert Marcuse. One
Dlrnenslonal

These studies have begun with
the

problem - often focused
Fascism

m

terms of the experience of

m

the West - of how men can,
apparently willingly,
give up their personal and political
freedom.^ Put
another way, the problem Is how men can
come to use and
recognize the value of freedom. One current
of thought on
this problem, developed here, is that the
capacity to
reason reflectively about the social world is
crucial to
securing and expanding the dimensions of personal
freedom
in the modern world.

Liberal Interpret ations of Reason and Freedom . Any

serious diagnosis of modern society - its structure,

problems and internal dynamics - must at some point come

to grips with the fact of extensive bureacratizatlon

through massive organizational complexes. Such bureaucratization is often viewed in liberal thought as an increasing
"rationalization" of society. Certain assumptions about
the nature of man and his capacities have facilitated

the movement of liberal thought toward a reconciliation

of this vision of increased "rationalization" with the

values supposedly served by a market economy and a

competitive polity.
One primary value to be served by these competitive

institutional arrangements is individual freedom. And one

3

important supporting assumption about the individual
is
his rationality. Freedom is said to be well served when

competitive arrangements offer the individual multiple
options for action in satisfying his wants. And the test
of rationality is often taken to be the degree to which

actions taken are appropriate as means to the end

envisioned - the satisfaction of wants. These goals,

freedom and rationality, are also seen as mutually
reinforcing. Rational action is facilitated by competition
to offer suitable options for individual want satisfaction.
And individuals whose reasoning is finely honed to

instrument their wants are the foundation of progress in
a competitive society. This image of man and society has

been an immensely persuasive one in the modern western
world, shaping the interpretive frameworks of a long line

of liberal thinkers. It has also, no doubt, had some

shaping influence on the manner of development of modern
society. For example, in the logic of this interpretation
it is but a short step from the characterization of the

rational entrepreneur to the vision of the rational

organization and the bureaucratic society. Each is geared
to the efficient selection of means appropriate to its end.
Critique of Liberal Interpretations of Reason and Free

dom . There are at least two critiques of western capital-

4

Ist societies which challenge the adequacy
of this liberal
Interpretative frameworJc. The first, rooted in
Marx's

political economy, points to the dissociation of
human
needs from the goals of production when labor is
exploited
in the profit system. When money is the end and the
means
in the exchange process, the rational calculations of the

capitalist lead to social irrationality through economic
and political crises. The second type of critique also

finds an increasing social irrationality threatening,

rooted in an absence for individuals of important group
ties intermediary between basic social units and the huge

organizations dominating our society. This is the critique
of mass society. The absence of intermediary ties threatens

the individual with pervasive anxiety, and threatens the

society by providing fertile ground for extremist movements.
Both of these critiques hinge to some degree on a

critique of the notion of individual rationality dominant
in liberal thought. That notion is quite clearly stated

by Bertrand Russell
Reason has a perfectly clear and precise meaning. It
signifies the choice of the right means to an end
that you wish to achieve. It has nothing whatever to
do with the choice of ends.
The critique which provides the foundation for my analysis
la not a critique of reason per se . but of this rather

narrow interpretation of rationality. It is inadequate

5

ultimately because It obscures and misconstrues
the places
of reason and passion in the determination
of
action.

Before moving to a formulation of this wider
notion

of rationality, let us see how it figures in a
critical

understanding of modern society.

C.

Wright Mills finds that

men today are increasingly unable to tie their selfconceptions, drawn from a narrow personal milieux, into a

vision of world history - the arena for the social
structural changes which affect their lives. We find

ourselves in a society increasingly "rationalized** by

bureaucratic organizations, which, however, may be "a

means of tyranny and manipulation, a means of expropriating
the very chance to reason, the very capacity to act as a

free man.**
The increasing rationalization of society, the contradiction between rationality and reason, the collapse
of the assumed coincidence of reason and freedom these developments lie back of the rise into view of
the man who is 'with* rationality but without reason,
who is increasingly self -rationalized and also
Increasingly uneasy.

What is it that Mills is trying to formulate by presenting
the apparent paradox of a **contradiction between rationality
and reason** or

•*the

man who is 'with* rationality but

without reason**? What is behind the •*collap8e of the
assumed coincidence of reason and freedom'*?
The first step in clarifying this critique is to

6

note that Mills is contrasting the "formal rationality"

of bureaucratic organizations with the "substantive reason
of men

whose independent reasoning would have structural

consequences for their societies, its history and for

their own life fates, "^ In modern society increasing
numbers of men are "with" the "formal rationality" of

bureaucratic and hierarchical organizations which shape
and dominate them, but without the "substantive reason"

which would allow them to shape their own lives. And it
la the former type of rationality which may stunt the

development of the latter - thus the contradiction between

rationality and reason,
H0W9 then, can we clarify further this notion of

"substantive reason" and relate it to Russell's narrower

definition of reason? The difficulties with the narrow
interpretation arise first of all when we note that any
course of action considered as a means, can from another

perspective be seen also as an end. The goal of my previous
action could have been to make this subsequent course of
action available to me as an option. And, likewise, any
end could also be considered as a means to another end.
That the deliberations of reason have nothing whatever to

do with the goals of human action, as Russell's f emulation
implied. Is less plausible in this light. As John Dewey

has observed!

7

Means and ends are two names for the same reality. The
terms denote not a division in reality but a distinction
in Judgment
'End* is a name for a series of
acts taken collectively - like the term army. •Means*
Is a name for the same series taken distributively like this soldier, that officer. To think of the end
signifies to extend and enlarge our view of the act
to be performed. It means to look at the next act in
perspective, not permitting it to occupy the entire
field of vision. 10

....

This understanding of the relativity of the means-

end distinction allows us to move toward a formulation of
the notion of reason which will be comprehensive of

Russell's definition as well as Mill's idea of "^substantive
reason". As proposed by Dewey, we can distinguish between
a •Vide and narrow use of reason** in deliberation.

The latter holds a fixed end in view and deliberates
only upon the means of reaching it. The former regards
the end in view in deliberation as tentative and
permits, nay encourages the coming into view of
consequences which will transform it and create a new
purpose and plan.H

We can see now that this distinction does not point to a

hard and fast logical feature of the concept of reason,
but brings out certain variable features contained within

the idea. An Inquiry directed toward an understanding of
this distinction will not be purely conceptual clarification^
nor purely empirical research. It will pose a question of
the following typei What is there for us to mean by this

understanding of the variable features of the notion of
reason? Such an inquiry is suggested by some of the

8

important threads of analysis pursued in this
study, it
is proposed that the distinction, the variation
between

narrow and wide uses of reason, be understood developmentally) that the distinction be filled out by attention

to the research of developmental psychologists. Along this
line, we propose, in Part II, that the distinction be

framed as a difference between "instrumental rationality**
(or the cognitive -developmental psychologists* operational

thought) and 'reflective rationality** (or formal thought).
This will be our interpretation of how men could be

**with**

(instrumental) rationality in a bureaucratic ethos, but

without (reflective) '•substantive reason**.
And our interpretation of the **collapse of the

assumed coincidence of reason and freedom** sensed by Mills
is more clearly set now, A characteristic liberal

interpretation of freedom would be that one is free to
the extent that he is not prevented from doing what he
wants. The critique of this formulation often hinges on
the superficial understanding of the relation between

wants and persons embodied in the restrictive or narrow
notion of reason. Mills, in his critique, clearly draws
on his broader idea of

'*

substantive reason**.

Freedom is not merely the chance to do as one pleases;
neither is it merely the opportunity to choose
between set alternatives. Freedom is, first of all,
the chance to formulate the available choices, to
argue over them - and then, the opportunity to

9

choose. That is why freedom cannot exist without an
enlarged role of reason in human affairs. Within an
individual's biography and within a society's history,
the social task of reason is to formulate choices, to
enlarge the scope of human decisions in the makina of
^
hi story, 12

Reason is essential to the expansion of personal freedom

because wants, or the ends of action, are in a sense
shaped in the process of reflecting on different ways of

viewing the alternatives. Obstacles to the development of
the capacity for reflective reasoning are also, then,

constraints on individual freedom.
Human Capacities and Social Practices
This Introductory section should have conveyed to
the reader at this point my dominant concern with the

conditions for the development of reflective reason. How

can we more adequately study the growth of reason as a
central component of personal autonomy and human freedom?
But this is, in a sense, only half of this study. The

whole of Part

I is

devoted to a clarification of the study

of ••socialization" and ••education". What, one might ask,
is the connection?

The matter is quite complex, and the bulk of my

thinking on this is spread through a number of passages in
this study. What

I

would like to do here is to present a

capsule of the argument. We can begin by noting that in
Mills' statement of the relation between "substantive

10

reason- and "freedom" (pp. 8-9), he speaks
of "the social
task s of reason". The tasks he is referring
to are

related to the involvement of the individual in the
shaping of his world, the reflective participation in

activities by which he can have an impact on the course
of social change and thus on the course of his own life.

Thus the "social task of reason" is a task relative to an
achievement; and the achievement is the development of

social projects by which the individual can connect his

personal life to public issues of social structure. The

exploration of this web of connections is,

I

would argue,

one side of an adequate social psychology. The question is,

how are the capacities developed in the course of social
life related to the maintenance or transformation of

social practices. The other side of social-psychological

inquiry revolves around the q[uestion of how the varieties
of prevailing social practices relate to the development
of these human capacities. Before

tie these notions to

I

"socialization" and "education", let me briefly clarify
the ideas of "human capacities" and "social practices".

Questions about human nature

I

take to be questions

about the character of human capacities. And questions

about social structure

I

take to be questions about social

practices. At the root of this terminology is a distinction

between the manner in which the human organism is capable
of performing, and the specific dimensions of the
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performance. This distinction is analogous to that

between talent in dancing and doing a Jig or the tango.
Talent can be expressed in the skilled performance of any

number of specific types of dance. But one with little
talent can still dance. In the same way, there are certain

human capacities which lie behind the specific practices
embodied in a social structure,

A crucial capacity of this sort is the capacity for
rational or intelligent action. At a basic level, this is
the capacity ot organize one's purposes in a coherent way.

With the acquisition of language, children are able to
symbolically represent their goals. And with a higher
development of reason, we can become capable of reflecting

upon a variety of ways of formulating our goals and
conceiving possible activities as related to these goals.
Now how do these ideas figure in the study of
"socialization'* and •education"? The study presented here

pursues the second side of social-psychological inquiry,
the question of how social practices relate to the

development of man^s rational capacities. It is not an
empirical study, but an essay in clarification,

I

propose

and attempt to clarify one approach to this problem.

Toward this end. Part

I

deals with the study of "sociali-

zation" and "education" in contemporary social science.

These two concepts, it is argued, capture the achievement

12

Of certain levels of social reasoning.
Understanding the
concepts this way clarifies what it is that
social practices
promote in the course of human development.
Social

practices are thus conceived of critically, as
potentially
related to the tasks necessary for the achievement
of

socialization and education.
Part II continues the clarification of how social

practices relate to the development of man's rational
capacities. It is proposed that the study of individual

mental growth by the cognitive-developmental approach
helps us to understand what there is for us to mean by
Dewey's distinction between narrow and wide uses of

reason in deliberation. However, a thorough assessment
of the major works by cognitive-developmental psychologists

will show, it is suggested, that they have virtually
ignored the other half of the problem of social psychology.

They have failed to pursue their studies with an adequate
theory of social structure. Such a theory would allow

them to see how levels of mental development are implicated
In the social structure - for example. Mills* idea of a

bureaucratic ethos in which men are "'with* rationality
but without reason".
This failure is reflected,

I

argue, in an inadequate

theory to explain mental development. "Participation",
for example, is mentioned by one prominent developmental

13

psychologist (and by social theorists in
the critical
tradition as well) as a general factor
which promotes
mental development. But "participation"
is far
too

general a notion to explain specific levels
of mental
development. Participation in a culture which
views

dreams as the arrival of spirits will not help
a child
see dreams as mental phenomena. Nor will
participation in

planning his organization's Christmas party help the

bureaucrat develop the capacity to connect his personal
troubles to public issues, to recognize what policies
are in his interest, and thus to understand how he can

affect his own life. What is needed,

I

suggest, is an

understanding of the specific social practices which will
promote mental development, or the development of rational
social and political thought. The categories for the

formulation of such an explanatory theory will be drawn

from a critical theory of social structure. And the
framework for such a study is provided by the concepts of
socialization and education.
Political Science and Human Development
The second characteristic of critical social inquiry

which

I

mentioned as throwing light on the approach of

this study was a committment not to allow too much to be

written into the disciplinary boundaries sanctioned by
contemporary university life. Insofar as these boundaries

14

sanctify presumptions about the institutional autonomy
of the economic or political or social spheres
of life,

they are rejected. And while there can be

a genuine

division of interests among students of social life, the
critical social theorist recognizes the necessity of

drawing together the most fruitful insights in all fields.

My concern here will be with the problem of the bearing
and fruitfulness of studies of individual mental

development as part of a theory of the development of
political thinking.
In particular, this study grew out of a dissatisfaction

with the way the problem of human development has been
handled in political science, under the general rubric
of **political socialization". Most common among these
studies are those which survey specific attitudes and

beliefs of children about surface features of contemporary
political life. When attention is moved from surface

opinion to basic features of political thought, the
approach is usually to simply tie an opinion to the
basic function it serves within the individual psyche.
And when more basic features of political life enter into

the questioning, the focus is generally on simple

measures of approval or disapproval of the government.
What we fail to find, for the most part, is a critical

vision of the conditions, the socio-political practices.

15

which promote the development of citizens'
capacities for
reasoned and reflective political thought.
About the notion of -political thought"
to be

developed here,

I

would argue that our vision of politics

surely ought to extend beyond purely governmental
decisions. Politics includes other institutional and

structural features of society involved in shaping the
lives of broad segments of the population. And when

referring to political practices as prom.oting or hindering

citizen development,

I

will likewise be drawing on a

rather broad notion of politics.
Decisions taken by modern governments do not merely

provide a framework for the operation of autonomous social
forces. Nor are they best viewed as merely regulating or

refining interactions among semi -autonomous economic,
political and social spheres. Instead, we view the sphere
of potential government decision as a crucial element in

the process of creating an institutional life responsive

to (and responsible for) all citizens. And a prime concern
in the development of an institutional life responsive to

human needs and respectful of human rights ought to be
the development of a citizenry capable of taking responsi-

bility and acting responsibly in political life, Urie
Bronf enbrenner, in his study of child rearing in the U.
and the U. S. S. R.

,

S.

has formulated this criterion as "the

16

concern of one generation for the next."
How can we judge the worth of a society? ... If the
children and youth of a nation are afforded opportunity
to develop their capacities to the fullest, if they
are given the knowledge to understand the world and
the wisdom to change it, then the prospects for the
future are bright. In contrast, a society which
neglects its children, however well it may function
in other respects, risks evetual disorganization and
demise. 13
I

begin with the thesis that most academic students

of the political aspects of human development have failed

to come to grips with an essential questiont what sorts of
social and political practices will be adequate to the

task of providing the conditions which promote responsible
citizenship - citizenship based upon a reflective understanding of the nexus of personal life and social history?

My argument will be that a failure to adequately
conceptualize the process of human development and
characterize its outcomes is at the root of this situation.
The development of hypotheses geared to this question may

be fruitfully pursued,

I

contend, by treating conceptual

development as an essential aspect of human development.
Conceptual development is viewed as a process of developing
of
a progressively more complex and integrated framework

concepts for interpreting and acting in the world.

I

want

capacities
to focus on the development of those conceptual

most
necessary to grasp and act responsibly toward the

17

complex and most fundamental features of political
life.
Thus, my work is about concepts

t

about the under-

standing of human development as conceptual development;

and about the theoretical concepts used to comprehend this
process of human development.

I

take the latter problem

first, and present a discussion and critique of "political
socialization'* as a concept for organizing such inquiry,

and a clarification of "socialization" and "education" as

guides to our concerns with human development. Then, in
Part II,

I

focus on one approach to human development,

the cognitive -developmental theory, which does view the

process in such a way as to highlight the emergence and
importance of concepts as tools of understanding.

CHAPTER

II

"POLITICAL SOCIALIZATION" IN CONTEMPORARY
POLITICAL SCIENCE
Terminological and Conceptual Discontinuities
In the decade or so since the term was first

introduced, the study of "political socialization** has

become a major subfield within the discipline of political
science. 14 No other field of political inquiry has expanded
8o rapidly, at least in terms of the number of political

slcentists identifying it as a major interest. 15 But this
growth, in interest and in the number of studies published
as contributions to our understanding of "political

socialization", has not been an even growth. It has been

accompanied by its own methodological difficulties,
first of all. But even as major works are appearing which

tackle these methodological difficulties, the importance
of disputes centering around the concept of "political

socialization" Itself are increasingly being recognized.
As David Easton and Jack Dennis note, "there are many

ways of describing the processes to which the word
socialization

is presumed to refer, and each description

helps to predetermine the kinds of data examined, the

modes of analysis applied to them, and even their final
interpretation.

"1*7

If we were to attempt to characterize the actual

19

intellectual currents in the field or subdiscipline of
political science called "political socialization", it
could not be done in neat phrases like "contrasting
approaches** or "contending camps" or even "coherent

debates". While significant empirical work has been done
and continues to appear in scholarly journals, the

actual intellectual state of the field is terminological

chaos and conceptual confusion,
remedy. But

I

I

intend to offer a

would like to first sketch briefly some

of the dimensions of the problem of terminological

discontinuity.

Almost invariably, an introduction to the study of
political socialization covers two points. First, we are

reminded that the study of the political aspects of

human learning and development has a respectable history,
ranging from the works of Plato and Aristotle, through
Rousseau and DeToqueville, to the researches of Charles

Merriam and his associates,

These studies are generally

said to deal with "civic education", or "citizenship
education** or •*political education". And second, the

roots of the modern behavioralist approach are exposed by

mention of the first studies developing the terminology
of ••political socialization",
••Civic education" studies have fallen on hard times.

The ••behavioral movement" in political science has brought

an increasing absorption in quantitative empirical

20

methodology, approaching at times
a new ••methodise". 19
As Richard Dawson grants in his
survey of political
socialization literature, "The contemporary
rigor,

systemization, and method through which
questions about
political socialization are posed and researched

involve new techniques and constitute a new
conceptualization. "20 These new conceptualizations of the
political
learning process are built upon the attempt to expunge
all value implications from the theoretical notions
used

to guide political research. "Civic education" was

apparently viewed as too much laden with the values and
normative concerns of earlier theorists.
Another factor in the disrepute of "political

education" studies is related to a connotation of
intentional instruction or indoctrination which the term
has acquired for some. Michael Oakeshott's attempt to

rescue the term is prefaced by the following comment!
The expression "political education" has fallen on
evil days; in the willful and disingenuous corruption
of language which is characteristic of our time it
has acquired a sinister meaning. In places other than
this it is associated with softening of the mind, by
force, by alarm, or by the hypnotism of the endless
repetition of what was scarcely worth saying once, by
means of which whole populations have been reduced to
submission, 21

Behavioral political scientists have retained a range of

referents for the term "political socialization" broader
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than the notion of Intentional, organized
instruction.
Fred Greenstein makes this contrast
between narrow and
broad meanings of political socialization*

Narrowly conceived, political socialization is thf>
deliberate inculcation of political information,
values, and practices by instructional agents who
have been formally charged with this responsibility.
A broader conception would encompass all political
learning, formal and informal, deliberate and
unplanned, at every stage of the life cycle, including
not only explicitly political learning but also
nominally nonpolitical learning that affects political
behavior . . , .22
All of this would seem to indicate a fairly consistent and

open terminological and conceptual shift within the
discipline of political science, from the traditionalnormative study of "political education", to the

behavioralist study of "political socialization". The

term "political socialization", and by implication the
corresponding shift in conceptual concerns, is connected,
then, with the emergence in the 1960 's of a field of

specialization "coequal with such venerable subdivisions
as Constitutional Law and International Politics. "23
But even as the boundaries of the field are being

secured, the need is felt to locate and elevate its

intellectual progenitors. This is the second typical part
of an introduction to the study of "political socialization",

Herbert Hyman's book. Political Socialization

,

is nearly
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always acclaimed. The introductory
passage in an article
by Greensteln is not atypical.
"Political Socialization" is a growth stock. The
phrase seems never to have appeared in print
before
1954, at which time it was introduced more or less
in passing in the chapter on voting in the first
edition of The Handbook of Social Psvcholnqy This
terminology was still exotic in 1959, when a book by
Herbert Hyman entitled Political Socializatinn was
published: as the book made clear, by that date not
a single piece of research had been self-consciously
carried out under the 'political socialization*
rubric, even though many research findings relevant to
the topic could be extracted from the often quite
fugitive literature on the development of children's
social orientations. 24
.

While Hyman 's book came out in 1959, it is rarely
noted that in 1957 David Easton conceptualized the
process of political learning as "politicization**.
As each person grows up in a society, through a
network of rewards and punishments the other members
of society communicate to and instill in him the
various institutionalized goals and norms of that
society. This is well known in social research as the
process of socialization. Through its operation a
person learns to play his various social roles. Part
of these goals and norms relate to what the society
considers desirable in political life. The ways in
which these political patterns are learned by the
members of society constitute what I call the process
of politicization Through it a person learns to play
his political roles, which include the absorption of
the proper political attitudes. 25
.

This is merely a terminological difference, to be sure.
For in his cooperative research with Robert Hess, Easton

adopts the term "political socialization" to cover the
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same View of the political
aspects of learning and development. 26 The conceptual content
being unaltered, the shift
In terminology might have been
influenced by the growing
currency of "political socialization",
or by the divergence
this conceptualization from previous
attempts to attach
a meaning to the term "politicization".
The following

m

definition of "politicization" is offered,
for example,
by Harold Lasswell and Abraham Kaplan in their
widely
known work. Power and Society

.

Conduct is politicized in the dearee that it is
determined by consideration of power indulaence or
deprivation of the self by the other, 27

Here politicization would be the transforming of social

relations into power relations, rather than, as Easton

viewed it, the inculcation of the dominant political norms
and values. Lasswell and Kaplan draw on the notion of

power motivated activity. Easton* s most recent book, on
the other hand, reinstates the term "politicization"

within the conceptual framework of "political socialization"
and gives it the sense of becoming politically aware .

Children in the political System

,

by Easton and Jack

Dennis, identifies four major processes involved in early

political socialization, one of which is termed 'politicization*. Here, a child who is thoroughly politicized "has

become aware of the presence of an authority outside of
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and more powerful than the family. "28

Easton's shift from the term
•politicization' to
•political socialization* as a generic
category should
cause no discomfort to those who wish
to move quickly to
Identifying empirical gaps in the literature,
or to
bringing data to bear on divergent hypotheses
generated

by theoretical reflection on

a process whose main

dimensions have been agreed upon. Any number of
studies

could be cited which note a fairly wide range of
definitions
of political socialization, and then select one
"for present
purposes" in order to get on with the business at hand.
But Easton's terminological shift to the mainstream

in the early 1960 's culminated in 1969 with a general

critique of all previous conceptualization of political
socialization. This explicit departure is made because

earlier definitions "typically refer to phenomena that we

consider too variable to include with confidence in the

basic description of political socialization. "29
Consider now the further discomfort which might be
felt, by one attempting to gain acquaintance with the

dominant debates and camps in the field, when it is

discovered that Easton's former collaborator, Robert Hess,
now rejects not only the term but also the concept of

political socialization itself.

25

The concept of political
socialization is no Inn^^radequate as a tool for understanding
the pS?itlcal
studying
processes
^S^^^^^S^
S5
^ the^rocesses
through which
it is acquired. 30
It is also noteworthy that the
term "political

education" and "civic education" have not
in fact been
dropped from the vocabularies of "political
socialization"
researchers, despite any possible "sinister
meaning", value
connotations or empirical imprecision which might
be

adduced. Fred Greensteln uses the term freely, and

apparently often Interchangeably with •political
socialization* .31 a survey of literature by Richard

Dawson and Kenneth Prewitt, on the other hand, identifies
•political education* as a sub-type of political socialization. It is, for them distinguished first of all as a

transmission of specifically political orientations, and
secondly as an intentional or deliberate process, ^2
Others, such as Robert Pranger and Christian Bay,

have made contributions to distincruishlnCT the spheres of
political education and political socialization processes.

They have not considered them as alternative terms to
cover a single process of political learning and development. They are seen rather as the names of alternative

and competing processes or modes of communication within
a political culture,

It appears that the terminological and conceptual
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variations may reflect an incipient
intellectual chaos.
Closer to the truth may be the
observation that social
conflict has produced deeper questions
and deeper
divisions among those reflecting on human
nature and
society. Robert Hess suggests such
a process in relating
that when he adopted the term political
socialization for
research in the late 1950 's.
One feature of the political life of
pre-adults was
a general lack of fervor and conflict over
political
Issues and problems
in that tranquil atmosphere,
the concept of political socialization seemed
ly apt. Since then, the political life of the singularyouth of
this country has changed in dramatic ways. 34

....

Most of the authors

I

have cited recognize that

their choice of terms is not arbitrary. We cannot divorce

ourselves entirely from considerations of the historical
acretions of meaning which become attached to our terms.
Nor can we ignore the current vocabularies of the social
slcences. Intellectual progress, even sanity, weigh

against each choosing a technical and idiosyncratic

meaning for his terms. But few have recognized and

confronted the deep-rooted assumptions about man and
society which influence the choice of conceptual content
in the process of explication.

From this brief survey we can at least conclude
that some order must be brought to this area of study if

communication between competing views is to be possible.
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Two Views of An Emerging
Debate
Some of the difficulties
in explicating the
concept
of •'political socialization"
can be attributed to
factors
such as the very rapidity
of growth of interest in
the
topic, or the time lag between
the borrowing of a concept
and an understanding of the
various disciplinary
and

theoretical contexts from which it
was torn in the process
of importation. These could be
seen as temporary problems
to be worked out with increasing
interdisciplinary
sophistication and expanded research.
This view is
summarised by Fred Greenstein:
Conditions of rapid growth are bound
to generate a
confusion
The confusion
aSuf
about political socialization begins with
the verv
meaning of the phrase? there seem to be
at least
four prevailing usages, and some of the
contestation
on the general merits of political
socialization
inquiry appears to be of the blind-men-and-thedebating parties disagreeing
^^^^
""ff^!!^'referents
on the implicit
of their terms rather than
on empirical grounds. 38

....

On Greenstein 's usage, which is common among "political
socialization" theorists, "political education" is taken
as an alternative term to cover the same phenomena. The

debate is thus terminological and the real issues largely
"empirical".
The "elephant" story aside, Greenstein might be

saying that our concepts are "open" in the sense that
there is a range of possible empirical research necessary
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prior to a full characterization
of the phenomenon in
question. It is here, he admonishes,
that disagreements
should focus. But while it is true
that our concepts are
open in this sense, they are also
"open textured" in the
sense that they are imbedded in a
larger system of tacit
rules and meanings. 39 jt is this larger
system of meanings
that we refer to as a theoretical perspective
or framework.
If a theoretical or conceptual framework
is taken
as a

given, as unquestioned, then, the fruitfulness
of a

concept is indeed wholly an empirical matter. A
different
perspective emerges, however, when we focus on the

theoretical framework itself,
Greenstein's "blind -men-and-the-elephant" analogy
is a singularly Inappropriate one for his purposes. He

wants to argue that the current disputes over the fruitfulness of different explications of "political socialization" amount to nothing more than a definitional quibble.

Explanatory fruitfulness can only be determined by hard
empirical research, he admonishes us. What he fails to
note is that the blind men are engaged in a quibble about

how to describe an "elephant", not how to explain it.
The story does illustrate an

important point

i

that

phenomena can in principle be classified in an indefinite

number of ways. But imagine now that the fourth blind

man took Greenstein's advice and moved immediately to
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empirical research, in order to explain
how this tree-ltk.
creature moves. (The fourth blind man
is touching the
elephant's leg.) Certainly we can see
that his initial
characterization has involved empirical
assumptions which
render his task ludicrous. He will not,
for example,
investigate "slithering" mechanisms, nor will
he have any
Inclination to give an account in terms of
"walking"; for

"tree-like" is equivalent to "one-legged".

What we can draw from this fable is the lesson
that

phenomena can be classified in an indefinite number
of
ways. Concepts, embedded as they are in theoretical
frameworks, involve one in a particular characterization
of the phenomenon in question, thus closing off an

indefinite number of descriptive possibilities. And this
partial closure of our concepts involves the importation
of empirical assumptions into explanatory research.

While in Greenstein's view, "political socialization"
and "political education" are alternative terms to cover
the same phenomenon. Christian Bay applies the terms to

what he sees as crucially different phenomena. Elaborating
on a distinction made by Robert Pranger,'*^ Bay views
"political socialization" studies as capturing "the ways
in which established political norms are implanted on

nonsuspecting youngsters, who by and large become molded
toward accepting what exists, rather than educated
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toward questioning and judging the
present and seeking
better ways for the future. "41 "Political
education", on
the other hand, is directed toward
"equipping us to seek
and promote the best political order. "42
According
to

Pranger's formulation, the aim of "political
education" is
to produce "the free man armed with enough
political

sophistication to participate in politics as a person

with the capacity for independent Judgment, despite the
pressures from political socialization, "43
As

I

have said, we want to find a way of under-

standing these terminological and conceptual divergences

which will bring some clarity to this area of inquiry.
A good part of this task of clarification is philosophical.
But the possible contributions of philosophy to the debate

are almost totally unexplored, and the few contributions

which have been made are largely ignored in the political
science literature. When Richard Peters was preparing an

analysis of the concept of education in 1963, he was
"unable to unearth any previous attempt to demarcate

the concept of 'education* . "44 And there is, to my
knowledge, no explicitly philosophical clarification of
the concept of socialization, and only a small number

which pay any serious notice to the complexities of the
concept, 45 The terrain is thus largely unexplored, and
I

offer my conrments with some hesitancy. They can be
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Judged fruitful,

tasks

I

beueve, if they aid in the
two .ain

have set for this wor)c:
first, a critique of the
currently accepted concept of
political socialization; and
secondly, an attempt to assess
one possible approach
to
the study of political
education.
I

The kernel of my thesis about
"socialization" and
''education" can be introduced in
two parts. First, the

use given to a wide range of concepts,
including "socialization" and "education", is governed
to a large extent by
complex webs of normative committments
which I will refer
to as a •^conformity perspective" and
a "developmental
perspective". 46 Alternative readings of
these two terms,
•socialization" and "education", are shaped by
the

committments involved in these two perspectives. In
the
next section of this chapter we will lay out
briefly the
crucial tenets of the "conformity" and "developmental"
perspectives. In the following chapters

I

will show how

certain uses of "socialization" and "education" are
related to these perspectives.

I

will argue that since

the conformity perspective closes off important empirical

questions, it may have undesirable results for political

inquiry and for political life.
The second part of my thesis about "socialization"
and "education" is an attempt to clarify a more prominent

feature of the debate, the question of "aims".

I

will be
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arguing first that the normative component
of each concept
13 bound up in the different level of human
development
It picks out. In order to clarify this
dimension of these
concepts we turn in Part II to an assessment
of

"cognitive-

developmental

psychology. The criteria which different

processes and activities must meet, if they are
to

contribute to "socialization" or "education" are tied
to
the achievement of different levels of rationality

in the

course of mental development.
We will turn now first to the perspectives which

I

have labelled "conformity" and "developmental", and then
in the next three chapters to a clarification of the

concepts of "socialization" and "education".
The Conformity Perspective and the

Developmental Perspective
We have looked at some terminological and conceptual

discontinuities which have plagued the political science
literature on learning and development. There has been.
In general, a failure to probe into the sources of these

surface differences. Just as the clash and clang of issue

conflict in the governmental arena may divert attention
from submerged issues, so also in the Intellectual arena
some of the most significant incipient challenges to

prevalent conceptions of political socialization may be
lost in the heat of contest over minor points. The debates
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Within the political socialization
literature generally
range only through matters
of research strategy and
methodology, and fail to touch
on fundamental assumptions
and perspectives. Fred Greenstein,
as we have seen, takes
up the criticism that political
socialization studies
operate with a pervasive conservative
bias and dismisses
it quickly as either a simple
misunderstanding or a
definitional quibble. 47 But if definitional
differences
have important ramifications, we cannot
dismiss them
as trivial.

Every discussion of politics carries with
it a
conception of human nature - a psychology and a
philosophy
of man. This is true regardless of the priority one
gives
to the understanding of whole political systems as an
aim

or focus of study. As Robert Lane has noted.
Classical political theorists relied, implicitly or
overtly, on assumptions regarding the plasticity,
socialibility, fearfulness, ambition, conscience of
mankind. Sophisticated modern political theorists,
more conscious of the many dimensions of human nature,
may turn to the theories of contemporary psychology
and psychiatry to inform their doctrines and make
their conceptions more plausible, 48
This, surely, must be a recognized premise of any empirical

study of political socialization or political education.
But in choosing a particular psychological theory, we may

close off certain questions and possibilities relating to
human capacities and abilities. Political scientists who
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remain aware of this, without denying the
need for
empirical research, would do well to
consider the warning

announced by Slgmund Koch,
That modern psychology has projected an Imaae
which Is as demeaning as It Is slmpllsltc, few of man
Intelligent and sensitive non-psychologists would deny.
To such men - whether they be scientist,
humanist or
citizen - psychology has Increasingly become an
object of derision ..... But for the rest, the mass
dehumanlzation process which characterizes our time the attenuation of the capacity for experience continues apace. Of all fields in the community of
scholarship, it should be psychology which combats
this trend. Instead, we have played no small role in
augmenting and supporting it, 49

Psychologists and philosophers have engaged in reflection

on their perspectives on human nature, but political
scientists have not often drawn on this type of thought
in assessing the psychological dimensions of their
research, without endorsing his precise assessment, we can

cite Carl Rogers* attempt to come to grips with this di-

mension of research.
Each current psychology has its own implicit philosophy
of man. Though not often stated explicitly, these
philosophies exert their influence in many significant
and subtle ways. For the behaviorist, man is a machine,
a complicated but nonetheless understandable machine,
which we can learn to manipulate with greater and
greater skill until he thinks the thoughts, moves in
the directions, and behaves in the ways selected for
him. For the Freudian, man is an irrational being.
Irrevocably in the grip of his past and of the product
of that past, his unconscious.
It is not necessary to deny that there is truth
in each of these formulations in order to recognize
that there is another perspective. From the existential

T
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internal frame of reference, man
the characteristics of a machine, does not simolv h;,v*»
being in the grip of unconscious he is not s^iniv
person in the process of creating motives^he is a
himself, a pirson
who creates meaning in life, a
person who embodies a
dimension of subjective freedom
live dimensions of his life which ... He ITlhll
are iot fully or
description of his condition^
«j.^ion
itT^l
l^':'^''''^^''^^
ing or of
his unconscious. 50
.

L

The last sentence in this passage is
important. The claim
is made that certain explanatory theories
in psychology

close off descriptive possibilities, and that these

descriptive possibilities may be linked to the
perspective

on man which underlies and merges into empirical research.
Failure to recognize this possibility of closing off

descriptive avenues and thus possibilities for empirical

research has contributed to the confusion about the concepts
of socialization and education as frameworks for research.
The perspective on human learning and development

which prevails in the "political socialization" literature
will be called the "conformity perspective". And the
perspective built up by competing views which advocate the

study of "political education" will be called the
"developmental perspective". These perspectives can be

characterized in terms of a broad set of ideas which
influence the selection of research problems, the
selection of theoretical frameworks from the psychological
and sociological sciences, the analogies and metaphors
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selected in making interpretations
of research plausible
to the research community, and the view
taken of the

consequences of research for social and
political life.
The Conformity and Developmental
perspectives

are in one

sense Ideal tyeps. No single author
explicitly and
consistently adheres to all the positions on
major

questions relating to learning and development.
But the
issues and positions do constitute a fairly
coherent

set

of clues as to an author's image of man.
Each of these perspectives involves, first of
all,
a broad view of how man does and can relate to his
world

and how fullfilment, realization or personal meaning
is

achieved in the course of his life. A general view of
the alternatives is laid out by Silvan Tompkins,
Is man the measure, an end in himself, an active,
creative, thinking, desiring, loging force in nature?
Or must man realize himself, attain his full stature,
conformity to, a norm, a measure, an ideal essence
basically independent of man?51

Tompkins traces the ideas which "resonate" with these two
positions in mathematics, the philosophy of science,
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics, art, educational theory,
psychology, etc. In the psychological and sociological

literature on learning and development, this issue is
frecjuently interpreted as dealing with assumptions about

the source of "initiative** in these processes.

But it is

important to note that there are clearly different views
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about the nature and criteria
of human fulfillment.
Assumptions are made about what is
and is not worthwhile
the products of learning and
development. But in actual
research, these assumptions are not
always made explicit.
The conformity perspective, as we
shall see, suffers from
an "Ostrich complex", denying, when
challenged, that any
normative committment preceeds or is
supported by its

m

empirical presumptions. Both the conformity
and the
developmental perspectives grant that we must
postulate
certain human capacities which are required if there
is

to be any social life at all. Where they differ is
in

how we are to characterize these capacities.
^- The Conformity Per spective . Finding the measura
and fulfillment of men given outside of, and beyond them,

the conformity perspective sees man as a passive recipient
of those beliefs, values, etc. in terms of which we specify

his behavior. The capacities given in the character of

human existence are displayed in the molding of man by
social stimuli and his adaptability in the face of

social demands connected with the stability, continuity
and survival of the group. Man, in other words, is the

passive recipient of societal norms and values connected

with these goals? and these norms and values are
impressed by its agents on his mind or geared into his

behavior patterns. Human capacities are specified in terms
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of a metaphor of malleability
or plasticity. And this
often amounts to the view that
man's uniqueness

lies in

Ms

capacity to be trained or conditioned
to fit into
existing societal patterns.
In taking conditioning or training
as paradigm cases

of learning, conformity theorists
typically adopt

explanatory notions which can be assimilated
metaphorically
to the ideas of collision and manipulation.
At
the explana-

tory level, these theorists often involve
themselves in
a language of material force and
mechanistically

conceived

causal laws. Agency or assertiveness is attributed
to the
-other", not to a "self", in the explanation of
human
behavior, agency moves to the fringes of attention. The

whole landscape becomes a collection of passive, plastic
objects, or at least it is the "other" who becomes the

source of assertion and decision. As the environment

impacts upon the organism, its malleability is indicated

by the emergence of responses which correlate with (are
a function of, reducible to, conform to, caused by, etc.)

the initial stimuli. If there are purposes gleaned in his

pattern of conduct, they are not in any irreducible sense

Ms

purposes, the purposes of an agent and definitive of

his capacities; for mind is seen as a more or less direct

reflection of environmental agency.
The man who emerges from these learning processes
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is seen as a direct reflection
of social forces, past and
present. His actions appear to be
calculable as an

equilibrium point among vectors of
differing direction
and intensity. Social groups and
organizations

provide us

with the social cues, expectations and
pressures that
l«bue a pattern of life with coherence.
And social

practi CGS

involve actions which we are led to view
«as

if

they were

our own.
^*

The Developmental Perspective . The conformity

perspective as we have seen, takes the capacities
of man
to be unchangingly specified in the minimal requisites
for social functioning. While the content of what
is

learned may change, the manner of coming to grips with

the social world (i.e., conformity) is set in an image
of unchanging human nature. The developmental perspective,
however, views man's nature in terms of the progressive

development of his capacities, or qualitative changes in
his mode of acting in the world. And it is in the frame-

work of these changing capacities that man seeks his
fulfillment. In loving and hating, creating and transforming, risking and protecting, appreciating and resenting,
in all these activities man defines and, as he develops

his capacities, redefines the dimensions of his human

fulfillment.
The developmental perspective thus offers a

characterization of man in terms of capacities which can
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be developed. These hu-nan
capacities may be understood
outside the context of any
contribution to social functioning. The development of
human capacities may contribute
to social stability, or social
transformation, or they
may not contribute at all to the
structural properties or
functional capacities of the social
system. Instead
of

seeing man as the passive target of
environmental impress,
this perspective sees man as actively
structuring the

perception and knowledge of his world. And
his activity
is essential in the development of
qualitatively
new

modes of acting, new capacities. This is not
by any means
a postulate which involves denying the
influence of
the

social environment on human learning and development.
It is rather a claim that exchanges between human
beings

and the social world are interactive exchanges.
Human capacities, human ways of performing, are

captured by notions which relate together the specific
beliefs etc. of an agent

.

one who chooses, decides,

intends - one who in other words is the source of an

assertive point of view. One of these ways of characterizing human capacities from a developmental point of view is
in terms of rationality, and it is this capacity which

will be of particular concern in this paper. Viewing man
in terms of the development of essential capacities does

not involve the claim that men can ever become totally
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self-conscious or able to reflect
critically on all
aspects of their situation at
one time. But the development
of one's capacity for reflective
reason can enhance the
ability to step back from a situation
with apparently
"given- alternatives and reconsider
the alternatives in
light of values which transcend the
practices structuring
the situation. Habits of mind and
established practices
become less entrenched. And the emergence
of new

perspectives and possibilities need not bring one
to the
brink of confusion and panic, but can provide
challenges

to the most human and humane activities.

CHAPTER

III

THE CONCEPT OF SOCIALIZATION IN

CONTEMPORARY SOCIAL SCIENCE
Origins of the Concept of Socialization

Only a small amount of attention has been given
in
the last decade or so to the definition of the term

"socialization". A full understanding of the intelletucal

history of the term is beyond the scope of this section.
It would involve a treatment of the practical and

theoretical concerns of many thinkers through the centuries

who have written of the process under a different label;
a consideration of the social, political and intellectual

climate in which the term first acquired conceptual

significance

I

and an exceptional cross-disciplinary

competence, sufficient to grasp the core concerns of
sociology, psychology, and anthropology in the process,
We will look here first at the origin of the term,

and then at the meaning it had for the scholars who first

attributed to it a broad theoretical importance. What

questions did they ask? What issues led them to focus on
and fill out a conception of socialization? Theory is

developed in response to questions we ask about reality.
And,

as Dennis Wrong reminds us,

"Forgetfulness of the

questions that are the starting point of inquiry leads us

44

to Ignore the substantive assumptions
'buried* in our
concepts and cotnmits us to a one-sided
view of reality. "54
The term "socialization", like
most others developed
as concepts for the social sciences,
was used in ordinary
discourse long before being appropriated as
theoretically

significant by sociologists and psychologists.
There seem
to have been three important early usages. 55

pij-st of all,

the term was used as a political-economic concept in the
sense of subjecting to collective (or governmental)

ownership or control, as when socializing the economy
refers to establishing collective ownership of the means
of production. According to the Oxford English Dictionary
"to socialize** can mean

''to

,

establish or develop according

to the theories or principles of socialism.** In a second

usage, socialization captured the idea of a universalizing

of culture, overcoming differences, or creating moral and

political unity among all men, A third use of •*socialize**,
noted by the OED as early as 1828, gave it the sense of
•*to

render social, to make fit for living in society**.
The first two types of uses noted above were both

present in the literature of the social sciences through
the first decades of this century. In the edition of the

Encyclopedia of the Social Sciences oublished in 1938,
the article on •*Socialization** dealt with the first type
of use, as a concept of political economy. In 1921,
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Robert E. Park and Ernest W,
Burgess wrote that -Soclali.
zation, when that word is used as
a term of appreciation
rather than description, sets up as
the goal of social
effort a world in which conflict,
competition and the
externality of Individuals, if they do not
disappear
altogether, will be diminished that all men
may live

together as members of one family, "56

2^935

^^^^

seemed to be drawing on both the political-economic
and

socio-cultural uses when he wrote of

the

progressive

socialization of the world, that is, the incorporation
of
all the peoples of the earth in a world-wide economy,

which had laid the foundations for the rising world-wide
political and moral order. "57 Both of these uses of the

term involve developmental notions, i.e. they point to
standards or conditions which may or may not be achieved,

A task is indicated, and this is related internally to
an achievement which serves as the fundamental criteria of
the associated processes.

Socialization and Conformity! An Exposition
In turning to the thrid, early lexical, definition

of socialization, "to render social, to make fit for

living in society," we must note first a crucial ambiguity

which appears in refining this definition. Unless one
carefully attends to the distinctions we find in the
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ordinary uses related to this
definition, it is not clear
Whether the important reference
is to the beliefs etc.

which are necessary if there is
to be any society or
social life at all, or to the beliefs
etc. which are
required of a child by "the special
milieu for which he
is specifically destined. -58 it is my
thesis that the
most fruitful explication will root itself
firmly
in

reflection on the core idea of what is necessary
for there
to be any social life, or what is presumed by
the notion
of man as a social animal. Indeed, John Clausen
notes

that the first sociological usage of the term "appears
to
have derived from the concern of early sociologists with
the problem of how society is possible. "59 socialization
is an apt term for organizing reflection on this question,

for in its central uses it captures a ground-level vision
of human rationality. That is, the most important achieve-

ment picked out is the achievement of a basic ability to
reason, through language, in achieving a coherent organi-

zation of purposes.
But with the growth of a "scientific sociology"

modeled on the natural sciences, the central implication
of socialization has become "that the individual is

induced in some measure to conform willingly to the ways
of his society or of the particular group to which he
belongs. "60 in other words, where the definition "to
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render social" can be interpreted along
the lines of what
is required for there to be anz social
life, or as what
is required in a specific social order, the
social

sciences

pursued primarily the latter sense of the term. This

course of inquiry is not inappropriate as long as we
recognize the crucial link between these two aspects of
socialization. However, when these investigations are

pursued from the conformity perspective, the link with
the more fundamental sense of socialization is cut. My

critique begins with the failure to attend to the develop-

ment of those human capacities required in any society.

I

want to argue that any such inquiry into the requirements
of a specific social order mugt not lose touch with the

more fundamental question of the requirements of any
social order. We must not lose sight of the basic human

capacities whose development is presupposed by the idea of
a human society.

The same issue of the American Journal of Sociology

in which Park referred to "the progressive socialization

of the world" contained an article by John Dollard, in

which socialization was defined as "the process of training
a human animal from birth on for social participation in

his group. "^^ From this time, the conformity perspective
has prevailed in most thinking about the empirical fruit-

fulness of the notion of socialization. Three features of
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Dallard's definition are noteworthy.
First, socialization
is itself taken to be a process,
rather than indicating
criteria which processes such as
training, instructing
etc. must meet if they are to
be referred to as socialization. Second, the process is
equated with training,
and

It is one feature of this notion
that the criteria of
success is not given in the activity
itself. Socialization
Is thus made to imply a method of
achieving extrinsic

ends. And third, these extrinsic ends
are specified by
the beliefs etc. of a particular group.

Dollard also noted at that time a dichotomy that
has dominated thinking about the assumptions and
hypotheses

of a theory of socialization.
The 'child development* movement is closely
allied to the study of socialization. The trouble
with this conception is that it implies that development
is more or less automatic, granted certain conditions,
while the socialization concept pictures development
as occurring only under pressure and sometimes heavy
pressure. 62
The language of both "heavy pressures" and "automatic

development", calls to mind a vocabulary of mechanisms,

when in fact he is speaking, we must presume, of human
beings.
The "official certification" of the conformity

perspective on socialization came with Irvin Child's
1954 review article in the Handbook of Social Psycholocrv .
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Child defined socialization
as "the whole process by
which
an individual born with
behavioral potentialities of
an
enormously wide range, is led to
develop actual
behavi<Lor

which is confined within a much
narrower range
range of what is customary and
acceptable

- the

for him

according to the standards of his group.
cannot deal here with the factors
which led to a
narrowing of the types of usage given to
the term socialization. One could almost say it became
a cross-disciplinary
paradigm for socio-psychological research. And
it should
be noted that this development was accompanied
by a vast
expansion of the amount of research done under the
rubric
of "socialization", as well sis a multiplication
I

of the

disciplinary and theoretical perspectives which competed
to establish which were the most important problems to
solve in expanding our understanding of "socialization".

Irvin Child's 1954 review of the relevant literature
for the Handbook of Social Psvcholoav . titled "Socialization", also gave the term something like an official

status as designating a field of inquiry in a broad sense. ^5

Many social scientists have taken this "field of inquiry"
status of the term as warrant for omitting a definition
of the term. But repeatedly one finds further statements

about what socialization "is" or what it "means" scattered

throughout the pages of these researches.

Thus, one

ambiguity of the term lies in its use, on the one hand.
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m

a general or broad
sense to designate a field
of
inquiry, and, on the other
hand,

to narrow down the

specific conception of
socialization to make it as
compatible as possible with the
authors committment,.3 on
basic theoretical issues.
•

Other terms have been employed
in the past, and are
used today, to refer to what
is now called socialization the broad sense of the designating
a focus

m

of interest.

Child rearing, enculturation,
education, occupational
preparation, role learning, etc. are
examples of terms
which could be used to pick out a relevant
aspect of
social reality. But the assumptions and
implications of
each terminology varies, as a certain
conceptual boundary
is established in use. In the case of
socialization, the
original theoretical question to which its
scientific

conceptualization from the conformity perspective
constituted a response was not -how is society (or
group
life) possible? "67
rather, »*how is it that an infant
acquires the behaviors (beliefs etc.) of the specific

group or society in which he was born?"
•^Education" is treated as virtually synonymous with

••socialization" by these authors in many cases (e.g.

Greenstein, as we noted above). When it is distinguished

explicitly it Is generally in terms of two rather
ambiguous criteria* Education is taken to imply a more
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formal and a more explicitly
intentional or directed
learning process. In this case,
education can be viewed as
a particular type of socialization,
and socialization
as

a particular type of training.

Both terms thus are taken

as picking out processes and
activities directed towards
ends external to the processes themselves.
At the individual level, human
learning and

development are treated as adjustment to the
demands of
group life, the receiving of group or societal

norms and

values. At the social system level, the focus
is on the
shaping and molding of man by his society, and
the effect

of these processes, in turn, on social cohesion
and
stability. And insofar as it is admitted that human
beings
are capable of satisfaction or frustration, fulfillment

or misery - that men can find one form of life in some
sense better than others - this fulfillment or satisfaction

comes through conformity to socially defined behavior
patterns.
At the individual level, a view of man as essentially

passive, plastic and malleable is most typical of attempts

to apply the principles of behaviorist learning theory to
social learning. And at the system level, this view of

man is most typical of structural-functional theorists.
This latter is the perspective of Alex Inkeles when he
specifies the elements of a sociological view of man.

«
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can be given all manner
of content?

culturf:hUe™;a'out''orr?

°'

'"""^"^

°—

dependency. leadrto'internalizf??on'of

cooperation, he resoonds to -xternal n,.f
?f
again push hi. to act .ain?y
tn accorl with'the
'^''^ characteristic ol
society
^^-xcuy in
nis time and
^TtilT
^^^"f
place. 68
Here we have an explicit
formulation of several of
the theses of the conformity
perspective, and definition

of socialization in terms of conformity.
Man is viewed,
first of all, as malleable and plastic,
"a flexible form
which can be given all manner of content."
Man is also
seen as the passive recipient of cultural,
societal,
and

group norms and values. The fundamental
motivation to
conform to the demands of society, to engage the

cultural,

social and group norms of his environment (captured
by the

process term "internalization"), is found in a characteri-

zation of man as an acceptance-seeker, "eager to earn the
good will and approbation" of others in his network of
social relationships. And the language of mechanism and

manipulation is clearly applied when he speaks of

.
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"external pressures which

.

.

.

push him to act

.

.

.

.

Elsewhere Inkeles states that
"the objective of socialization is to produce competent
people, as competence is
defined in any given society";
and the "aspects of
competence" he deals with in this
article "are precisely
those which one requires either
to continue as part of. or
attain to a position in, middle-class
America. "69
And Inkeles* use of the term
is not at all atypical,
for there is no question, in the
following quotations,
about the intention to pick out the
molding of children
to a very specific form, getting them
to conform to what
is acceptable in a particular society.

Socialization consists of those patterns
of
action or aspects of action which inculcate
in
^^^^^^ (including knowledge), motives
ii;^ attitudes
and
necessary for the performance of present
^
or anticipated roles. 70
The socialization process

...

is the process

by which people are developed into social system
members., who carry in their heads as cathexes,

cognitions, and evaluations the culture of the system. 71

From the sociological point of view, socialization refers to the process whereby individuals acquire
the personal system properties - the knowledge, skills,
attitudes, values, needs and motivations, cognitive,
affective and conative patterns - which shape their
adaptation to the physical and sociocultural setting
in which they live. 72
We may define socialization as the process by
which someone learns the ways of a given society or
social group so that he can function within it, 73

Socialization is the learning of patterns of
behavior which are conventional in the society, "74
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But the conformity
perspective has not captured
the
entire range of literature
dealing with the empirical
study of human learning
and development. For
example, the

'•symholicinteractionisf' school of
sociology and socialpsychology, built up around the
works of C. h. Cooley, w.
I. Thomas and G. H.
Mead, has kept alive a
mode of
discourse which challenges the
assumptions of the conformity
perspective. This literature
characteristically draws
on a language of choice, decision
and purposive
activity,

usage of the term "socialization"
retains the important
sense of becoming a human, i.e.,
social, being - getting
children to the point where they are
able to grasp
and

communicate about the basic rules of
social life. One
textbook in this tradition, for example
states that "the
child becomes socialized when he has
acquired the ability
to communicate with others and to influence
and be
influenced by them through the use of speech. "^S
Some sociologists in the conformity school,
on the

other hand, have explicitly recognized a moral quality
of
man which sets him off from society in a way that can

hardly be captured by mechanistic notions of engendering
conformity of passive organisms to an intransigently
external social order. Ralf Dahrendorf, for example notes
that "this moral quality of man detaches him in principle

from all claims of society. "76 This aspect of human

•
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development is not, however, open
to social research for
Dahrendorf for ''what sociological
,
theory does not tell
us about man is his moral
quality." But perhaps social
science is limited in this way,
on Dahrendorfs view,

because of the restrictive notion
of ^•science" he and
others adopt. Dahrendorf continues:
Scientifically it may be plausible and
useful
to interpret the educational process
as the socialization of the individual, but morally it
is crucial
capable of holding his^Sn
^«^?n^^%i"^'r'f"^'
against the claims of society,
We will quote now another passage from
Dahrendorf which
makes clear how he interprets the implications
of the

moral quality of man for sociological theory.
Now the assumption that man behaves as homo
socioloqlcus makes possible a general explanatory
proposition; that a person in a situation of role
conflict will always choose the role with which
the stronger sanctions are associated
This
is an example of "good" sociological theory
All this is true even though the role conformity
assumed by the theory is "unrealistic", in the sense
that there are many poeple who do not behave in the
manner postulated here. If we should now try to make
our assumption "realistic", the entire theory would
fall to pieces. The following statement would clearly
be more "realistic": "'In the face of the role conflict,
many people (perhaps 60 per cent are inclined to
prefer the role with which the stronger sanctions are
associated? others (say 25 per cent) behave in accordance with moral principles without regard to social
sanctions; and some (say 15 per cent) react to role
conflicts with complete resignation or passivity.
Such a statement is all very well, but it can no
longer be used to explain anything, 78

....
....

)
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In making his proposition
.ore "realistic", what
Dahrendorf
has done is to specify the
types of re.nons for an
action

Which constitute the context
for decision of various
individuals. While this more
'^realistic" proposition might
not explain what Dahrendorf is
intent on

explaining, because

it is not in general form, it is
not devoid of explanatory
significance. Within a developmental
perspective, one

might formulate a proposition such as

.

a

person who has

reached a stage of moral development in
which right and
wrong are defined in terms of external
sanctions, will
always choose the role with which the
stronger sanctions
are associated. And more importantly, propositions
such
as tho following can be formulated! social
conditions X

will facilitate the development of persons who behave
in
accordance with moral principles

,

rather than merely

responding to external sanctions.
We need a more adequate explication of the

concepts of socialization and education for organizing
and guiding investigations such as these. As we turn to

this task, we present a critique of the interpretation of
"socialization** in terms of conformity, and a clarification

of the primary sense of the term - development of those

capacities required of human beings if there is to be

any social life at all.

CHAPTER

IV

THE CONCEPT OP SOCIALIZATION.
A CRITIQUE

AND A CLARIFICATION
The danger In the pattern
of the analysis of socialisation in terms of n^olding
a chlld^s essentially
malleable
mind lies in a tacit promotion
of conformity for conformity
sake. The analysis is guided
by the restrictive conception
of what the scientific study of
man ought to be like

which emerged under the influence
of positivism, and the
failure here reflects on this program.
In order to see

where the fault in this analysis lies we
must look at the
entpirlcal questions which cannot but
fail to emerge,
and

the tacit normative committments which
cannot be avoided
by social scientists who view socialization
as conformitytraining.
First of all, as we noted earlier, "socialization"
is viewed as the name of a proces s or activity.
Frequently

it is taken to Imply that socialization is a method
,

distinguished from formal teaching or instruction."^*^ The
result of treating socialization as a process is to sever
the conceptual connection with any human achievement.
This supposedly preserves the "scientific" value neutrality

of social science, for the connection with what is learned

through this method is an external, wholly empirical one.
Any particular beliefs, values, etc. could be learned
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through this .ethod, and
the study of this
process ventures
no norniative criteria
as to what is to be
included. But
When we spealc of a .an^s
beliefs, attitudes, values,
etc..
we are not citing his
essential capacities. Instead,
thesl
tertns specify the categories
by which we distinguish his
specific p prfnrm.nrr^n. If. on the
other hand, by 'socialization" we pick out an achievement the achievement
of

those mental capacities which
warrant the claim to be a
social human being - then the
application of the term

involves certain normative judgments.
The achievement is,
I want to suggest, the
capacity to reason, to organize
one's purposes through communication in
a public order.
Now there is a certain kernal of truth
in the

conformity interpretation. That is, basic social
rules
must also be the rules of some particular society.
However, while it is true that societies will specify

these rules differently, there must be some such rules.
It has been argued by several contemporary philosophers,

for example, that any society must have rules about not

injuring others, caring for the young, and the distribution
of goods; and these rules presume the centrality of
notions of truth-telling, con£3ideration of interests and
justice. 80 It is the capacity to grasp and apply these

rules in the conduct of life that is captured by the

notion of rationality. There are in addition, as Alasdair
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Maclntyr. notes, "some
com.onsense beliefs (about day
and
night, the weather and the
material environment generally)
which are inescapable for any
"81
rational
agent,

And it

is this achievement of
rationality, necessary to the
persistence of any social order, which
is central to the
criteria of socialization.

John Clausen comes close to noting
this essential
connection with rationality in the following
passage.
^^^^^^^ce of deviant
^oer^enr^r
experiences - that is, of socialization tosocialization
deviant
norms, or of the individual's emotional
or rational
rejection of norms. Nothing is explained bv savlnrr
^"^^""^"^^^^^
'i^n^ ncialized* unless th^ ^t^.r- ^
I'^^^.^"
of
the deficiencies in his socialisation can be
specified. Conversely, conformitv in itself is
not
evidence of successful socialization. Neither the
rigidly conforming neurotic nor the person who
conforms without being committed to group goals can
be regarded as an ideal product of socialization. 82
In considering the possible meanings of "unsocialized",

Clausen notes four alternatives. The first alternative,
**socialization to deviant norms", is on the face it contra-

dictory. This type of confused statement is not infrequent
in the literature, and the source of confusion is the

attempt to treat socialization as the name of a process

which is externally related to its outcome. But this attempt
clearly comes to grief when we look at the implications of
picking out "unsocialized" behavior. For it is perverse
to maintain that unsocialized behavior could be the
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successful outcome of a
socialization process. But
let us
overlook this for the moment
and aslc what the socialization theorist might be
trying to convey by implying
a connection between
socialization and deviant behavior.
The answer, of course, is
that in distinguishing between
dominant and deviant socialization,
the hope
is to avoid

the charge that "socialization^,
has an inherent conservative
or status quo bias. Socialization
may be to dominant or
deviant norms, and is not centrally
connected
.

to the

stability of a particular social order
(although it is
still interpreted as the learning of
particular
social

beliefs or norms). The attempt must
ultimately fail however. Given the notion that socialization
is externally
related to a particular set of norms (and
also the presumption that learning the particular beliefs and
norms
of some group is implied), socialization may be

characterized as dominant relative to one group, deviant
at a second level, dominant in a third order of
social

participation, etc. The characterization as dominant or

deviant is wholly arbitrary! unless

etc, of

,

that is, the beliefs

a particular social order are reinstated covertly

as an implici t normative criterion . In the latter case,

of course, characterizing a learning process as "socialization" does indeed imply a crucial connection with the

stability of that social order.
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The fourth alternative suggested
by Clausen as an

Interpretation of "unsocialized" - rational
rejection of
norms - is also implausible. We would
hardly say of a
young man who. with a clear mind, sound
reasons and a

coherent argument, commits himself to a
non-violent
refusal of induction into the military, that
he is "unsocialized". It could be implied, of course, that
his

position has been influenced by "deviant socialization" -

participation in a social group which rejects loyalty
to

war-making organizations or rejects war under any aegis.
However, aside from the difficulties with the notion
of
••deviant socialization" noted above, this interpretation

is counter to the thrust of "rational rejection of norms"
as implying a self-conscious and autonomous decision.
In the other two cases,

"incomplete or inadequate

communication of norms," and "emotional.

,

.

rejection of

norms", we are getting closer to the heart of the central

criteria of socialization.

I

cannot take up here a full

analysis of the many faces of these interpretations. But
I

can point out that in the latter case ("emotional

...

rejection of norms") it would be important to distinguish
between being "overcome by emotion" and acting out of,
for example, jealousy. When we say someone is overcome

with emotion, we imply his vision is clouded, that his
grasp of the situation is unclear;

and in this case
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The Xln.
^^^^^^^^
^^^-^^
the fieia o. action
is .Xurrea. WHen a
hus.ana pleaas In
court, however, that he
Mllea his wife in a fit of
jealousy, he is claiming
that he coula not help
aoin.
What he knows clearly he
aia. He actea without
regard to
reason and calling this
"unsocializea.. behavior wouia
not
be inappropriate.

Although Clausen^s suggestions
about the possible
meanings of •^unsocialized"
n.iss

the .ark, I helieve,

m

the passage we are discussing
he does suggest two
cases
which bring us closer to its
central meaning, "Neither
the rigidly conforming neurotic
nor the the person who
conforms without being committed
to group goals can be
regarded as an ideal product of
socialization."
The

behavior of the "rigidly conforming
neurotic" does not
exhibit understanding of how his
behavior fits into the
social context - the pattern of behavior
is fixed in
regard to some point in his past. This
suggests that the
capacity to understand the basic features
of the social
context is an important part of what we
convey by the
idea of "socialized" behavior.
But what of "the person who conforms without being

committed to group goals"? This case suggests a second
important criterion of socialization, A person must not
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-rely

.e ..ought to the point
of

u.na^^,t^

.asic
requirements of an ongoing
social life, he .ust also
be
Sommltted
some sense to the Implications
of his
behavior. Its consequences
for group life. He must
stand
committed to his behavior In the
sense of taking responsibility for Its consequences vis
a vis the group,

m

from

the point of view
Thus,

r^f

the aronn <^oo1^

m

the case of both the rigidly
conforming neurotic and the person who conforms
without committment, it
is Implied that the Intelligent
organization of behavior
necessary for social life in this context,
and its articu-

lation through reason and communication,
is absent. "Socialization", then, picks out, in its primary
sense, the
tasks

(activities and processes) involved in getting
human
beings to the point where their behavior
exhibits an understanding of and committment to the basic
requirements of
Q4
social life.
But this interpretation will still be somewhat
un-

clear until we face squarely the complexity Introduced

by application of the term to cover social learning
through the whole life-cycle.

I

do not want to argue that

such a usage is necessarily inappropriate, but it does seem

to me that we must be especially cautious here. The clearest cases of socialization in this primary sense are drawn

from experiences with young children. For example, the

64

young child who constantly attacks
his companions may be
deemed "unsocialized" while
socialization will lead him
to understand and act on the premise
that
,

social life

Just cannot proceed on the basis of constant
aggression.
It is clear here that by "social
life" we do not mean

only the child's particular group of
companions; it
refers to the requirements of anY group life.
Applications of the term to cases of social learning
later in the life cycle are built upon this
primary

sense of "socialization". We might say, for example,
that
a Junior executive had been socialized to his
role in the

organization. Now it is clear that we are not speaking
of anx organization, but of this organization in
particular.

How do the criteria of understanding of and committment

to the requirements of any group life carry over into
this derivative use of socialization?
The complex of beliefs associated with the organi-

zational life of executives can be divided roughly into
two categories. There are, first, those basic norms

which are essential to the existence and character of the
organization; for example, making a profit in the case of
a business organization.

Second, there are many relatively

specific (and possibly conflicting) rules which are inter-

pretations of these norms in terms of the problems
confronted in ongoing organizational life. Socialization
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of a Junior executive occurs
when he is brought to understand the specific rules of the
organization in terms of
its basic norms or purposes,
his intelligent application
of the rules exhibits an understanding
of and committment
to the more basic purposes of the
organization. So we
interpret socialization in specific
organizations,

^

institutions, professions, etc., in terms
of learning the
intelligent application of rules of social
interaction
from the point of view of the goals or
purposes of the
organization etc. The criteria of understanding
and

committment are retained. With young children, the
development of social understanding and committment hinges

crucially on the development of the capacity to reason,
in the basic sense of influencing others and being

influenced by them, through language, in the organization

of his purposes and the selection of actions. With this

derivative sense of socialization in later life, the

capacity to reason in this instrumental sense (the
means-end sort of selection of actions in light of the
goals of the group) is presumed.
There is an additional conceptual point to be made
about the primary sense of socialization. It is,

I

believe,

a logical feature of this notion that we would not say

that one chooses to be socialized, A child who begins to

cooperate with his companions rather than conflict with
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the. constantly has not

to recognize the
futility

Of conflict. It is hardly
so self -conscious an
accomplishment. He has Simply
recognized it in the course
of his
interactions, helped along
perhaps by the admonishments
of his parents. And while we
might call behavior connected
With many forms of mental illness
"unsocialized"
,

it

would be odd to say that a mental
patient chooses to be
socialized. This points to the
basic level of rationality
Implied. A socialized person is
capable of
selecting

means to his ends with at least the
minimum required
attention to the basic necessities of

the social context.

But to say that a person is being
socialized does not
seem to convey the idea that he is being
brought to

self-consciously conceptualize and choose to
account for
these basic requirements of social life. The
explanation
for this is that it is precisely this capacity
to choose

self-consciously in social interaction which is the
achievement of socialization. One could hardly utilize
a capacity he had not yet developed.

We would not normally say of a young man who takes
a new job or pursues professional studies that he chooses

to be socialized according to the norms and beliefs of
the organization or profession. ^5 jt is not a specific

activity or process, like training or instruction which
he may Indeed choose. It is rather a standard which
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activities

move one toward. Socialization,
then.
Picks out certain criteria
which social processes
U,ce
training and instruction must
meet.
n.ay

While a medical student would
choose to be instructed
anatomy rather than choosing
to be socialized to the
norms of the profession, at some
point he may be told
that he has been socialized that his actions reflect an
understanding and concern for the
profession which was
not earlier present. Or others might
point out that the
lack of change in his behavior indicates
failure of

m

socialization. If he has a developed capacity
for rational
reflection on the success or failure of his
"socialization"
- for putting this in perspective of his
larger social
world - he might be gratified or disappointed.
On

reflection he might approve of these basic norms and
their
interpretation, or critically appraise these norms which
he does now understand as themselves irrational.
But this

capacity for critical reflection and appraisal is

a

further achievement in the development of reason which,
we will argue presently, is part of what is picked out

by the notion of being an educated person.
While it would be quite odd to say that a baby or
a neurotic chooses to be socialized, there is a subsidiary

sense in which one can submit himself or engage willingly
in processes which, he recognizes, may result in
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socialization. If a blue collar worker
is given a responsible management position (e.g.
the television character
Arnie Nuvo), his union's shop
steward may say that he will
be "socialized". Here socializing
picks out the idea that
the worker will be faced with the
problem of rational
behavior in the context of a different
group with
distinct interests. Its correct application
in this context
is based on the truth of a conterf
actural condition such
as,

if he were to maintain the same view
of what is in

the interest of the workers, his actions would
exhibit
a certain incoherence,

rooted in inconsistent beliefs

about the appropriate action to take in situations
related to union-management disputes. In accepting

a

management position, the worker would be committing
himself to engage in activities which he may recognize

would involve socialization in some sense, though he
might disagree about the implication of socialization
in this particular context. Part of what he might

communicate by arguing that socialization would not have
this particular result is his incredulity that he could

commit himself to opposing the interests of the workers.
He might envision himself rigorously supporting the

norms of comportment, committing himself to the goal of

efficiency and profit, and yet slyly supporting the
interests of his former compatriots when a conflict of
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interests arose in maneuvering
to avoid the need to take
a position in situations of
conflict.
Part of what is implied by
socialization in the
basic sense of becoming a human
(i.e., social) being is
that being on the inside of normal
social life involves

caring about others, respecting them as
persons who have
a distinct point of view and a place
of rational participation in some social order. 8^ r^e criterion
of caring for
the point of view of others in a social
order carries
over into subsidiary uses, where we imply that
one cares

that the group should exist and is not impervious
to the

central focus or goals of the group. Thus, to assert
that
after a period of time our worker-manager has not come
to

commit himself to the ascendancy of management over

worker interests in situations of conflict, is to go
some way toward defeating the claim that he has been

socialized. We might want to say that he is not fully

socialized.

These criteria of understanding and committment

have been discussed from the point of view of the achieve-

ment aspect of "socialization". But they carry over also
to the task aspect. Thus while instructing and training

might contribute to socialization, neither conditioning
nor mindless drill would be included;

for part of what

we communicate by the notions of conditioning and drill is

"
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precisely the lack of intelligent
participation of the
subject with concern for meeting
standards of rationality
implicit in a sucessful outcome.
If we are correct in connecting
the proper appli-

cation of the term "socialization" to
the achievement of
the basic rational capacities required
for participation
in any social order - through the
criteria of understanding
and caring for the standards implicit in
the basic rules
of social intercourse - then I think we have
gone
some

distance toward supporting Alasdair Maclntyre's
argument
that "a logical dichotomy between facts and values
must

break down.
For to characterize actions and institutionalized
practices as rational or irrational is to evaluate
them. Nor is it the case that his evaluation is an
element superadded to an original merely descriptive
element. To call an argument fallacious is always at
once to describe and to evaluate it ... , The
social scientist is, if I am right, committed to the
values of rationality in virtue of his explanatory
projects in a stronger sense than the natural
scientist is. For it is not only the case that his
own procedures must be rational; but he cannot escape
the concept of rationality in his inquiries. 98

This committment to rationality is the tacit normative

committment which, at the beginning of this section,

I

suggested was obscured by those social scientists who view

socialization as the name of a conformity-training process.
In uncovering this committment we also bring to view the

empirical questions which

I

asserted cannot but fail to
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emerge on the conformity
interpretation. Socialization
cannot be just -learning'* of any
sort, linked as it is to
the notion of achieving a basic
rationality, if socialization were to be viewed as -learning"
of any sort, it
would have to be taken as failing to
distinguish between
coming to hold rational and irrational
beliefs. Preserving
these distinctions allows us to keep
open for empirical
research questions about whether getting on
the inside of
a particular social order leads to securing
a grip on

rational behavior in a new social order - to
socialization,
in other words - or to the dissipation of the
coherence
of one's beliefs insofar as they are related to
action in
this social context.
It might be objected that in a -scientific"

context, closing off some of the distinctions implicit in

the variety of ordinary uses is unavoidable and/or often
disirable. But this objection fails if

I

have successfully

captured the most important criteria of the concept of
socialization. For

I

have argued that the very point of

having distinct concepts such as "learning", "socialization", and "education", is to separate out different

standards which must be met for applying the terms to the

results of different activities and processes. In other
words, there is an achievement implied by the notions
of socialization and education, and the most important
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function of these terms is
to capture these achievements
as they are exemplified
through processes and activities
associated with learning and mental
development.
The sort of achievement indicated
by the notion of
socialization, connected as it is with
the notion of
rationality, rules out processes which
involve presenting
a subject with incomprehensible
or incoherent ideas, or
engaging him in mindless conformity for
conformity's sake.
This is, at least, in some sense and
to some unknown

degree, necessary for the persistence of
any social order.
No rational parent, so far as I know,
would seriously set

out to make such demands on his child from the
time he
Is an infant. And it is on this around - that we >nnch

value the achieve ment of the rationality exhibited
in
social life if t here is to be any social life at all

-

that the case for mv explication of the concept of

socialization must rest

.

There is no canon of "science", aside from the

committment to rationality alluded to by Maclntyre, which
forbids the organization of inquiry around a conception
of socialization as conformity-training. Still, this

focus involves, as we have seen, a neglect of the task
of explaining how some activities and processes connected

with the learning lead to the securing of a basic level
of rationality, while some do not. They may fail to

:

CHAPTER

V

EDUCATION AND SOCIALIZATION
The Concept of Education

We have already gone a long way in the
last chapter

toward a clarification of the concept of education.

For

education is a concept of the same type as
socialization,
and is connected with the development of reason
through the
same criteria of understanding and commitment. 8^
For the

most part we need only capsulize Richard Peters' analysis,
which, so far as

I

am aware, holds the field of philoso-

phical clarification of the concept of education to
itself.

But before

I

concept of education,

introduce Peters* analysis of the
I

want to introduce two passages,

by different authors, which will help set the framework
for the remaining portion of this inquiry.

First, Professor

John Anderson points to two currents of thought on

education
The classical and the utilitarian views of education
are distinguished as employing intrinsic and extrinsic
criteria, the one considering education in its own
character, as the development of thinking or criticism,
the other considering it in its contribution to something else, subordinating it in this way to the noneducational and running the greatest risk of distorting
For clearly there can be no subject or
its character.
field of study which is utilitarian in itself, whose
character resides in what it produces or helps to
produce, and this applies as much to science as to
any other study • ... '^^
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Here Anderson points to a
crucial connection between
••education" and ''the development
of thinking or criticism".
We will be introducing Peters*
more refined criterion of
-cognitive perspective" as a way of
illuminating the
connection in a moment. But Maclntyre
eleborates on the
importance of critical thinking as an
educational

achievement.

I

quote at length from his intriguing and

forceful argument.
Our aim ought to be to helo oeoDle to discover
activities whose ends are not outside' themselves
and
it happens to be of the nature of all intellectual
inquiry that in and for itself it provides just
such
activity. The critical ability which ought to be
the
fruit of education serves nothing directly except for
itself, no one except those who exercise it.
About critical ability I want to stress three
things. First it is the antithesis of that acceptance
of wants, tastes and prejudices as given facts which
so disfigures our society. For critical activity
involves the testing of any claim to knowledge or
understanding at the bar of some impersonal, rational
criterion
Secondly, critical ability is something each has to acquire for himself
Thirdly,
to have seen this is to see that the element of
universality in all criticism is perfectly compatible
with specialization. The unity of criticism lies in
the fact that all understanding and all knowledae is
a matter of concepts and to that degree philosophical;
and that all understanding and all knowledge is
acquired as dependent upon its own past intellectual
background and is to that degree historical
But there is something more important still about
critical activity. It is not the activity of isolated
individuals. It is always exercised inside an academic
tradition which is the tradition of some particular
society. Unless critical standards claim social
recognition, criticism is untrue to its own claims to
universal allegiance. But a condition of this is
precisely the refusal to make criticism the prerogative
We are all equal before the
of an elite
;

....

....

....

....
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standards and democratic
community need ea:ro?Lr.91
In this long passage a
number of themes emerge

which will be important for drawing
together the overall
direction of this inquiry. They are
1
the possibility
of suspending a direct instrumental
relation to
.

)

one's

wants, of gaining a certain detachment
from them; 2) the
idea of education as a personal
achievement, or an achievement, as we Will argue in Part II,
connected with an
individual's development as a person,
3) the important link
between education and conceptual development,
4) the social
and historical rootedness of a tradition
of critical

thought; and 5) the kernal of an argument
showing the

Intertwining of value committments associated with
the
notions of "education" and "democracy". The first
four
of these themes will figure importantly in our
assessment,
in Part II, of the potential contributions of a
cognitive-

developmental psychology to the study of political
education. We turn now to the concept of "eudcation".
Peters' analysis of the concept of education can be

Introduced through his own capsule statement of his
thesis.

My thesis is not that 'education* refers to any
special sort of process which might be equated with
Instruction, training or drill, rather that it

:

;
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alone couia ^rtllZ be^^rae'
a°?'For°U^^^"^"^
training and instruction might
be in futiL tMn„,
like opium-taking
P^rthermorefinslr^cUon
might consist
presenting inert ide^s whl^ are
incomprehensible to children, whilst
training ™ignt
might
approximate to mindless drill
_92
.
.

m ....

.

^

The criteria implicit in the
central cases of education
are
i

that 'education* implies the transmission
of
what is worth-while to those who become
committed
to it
that
(2)
'education* must involve knowledge and understanding and some kind of cognitive
perspective
which are not inert;
(3) that 'education' at least rules out some
of transmission, on the grounds that they procedures
lack
wittingness and voluntariness on the part of the
learner, 93
(1)

The first two of these criteria refer to the achievement

aspect of the concept of education. This achievement

aspect is more elaborately captured in the following

summary
An educated man is one whose form of life - as
exhibited in his conduct, the activities to
which he is committed, his judgments and feelings
- is thought to be desirable,
(2) Whatever he is trained to do he must have knowledge
not just knack, and an understanding of principles
His form of life must also exhibit some mastery
of forms of thought and awareness which are not
harnessed purely to utilitarian or vocational
purposes or completely confined to one mode,
(3) His knowledge and understanding must not be
inert either in the sense that they make no
difference to his general view of the world, his
actions in it and reaction to it or in the sense
(1)

.

78

that they involve no concern
for the stand,^flo
awareness?^:
well as the ability
w^T^aftie
^hfTf.°' to attain the™.
94
'

This last summary sets forth
the achievement aspects
of education most clearly
implicit when we speak of an
"educated person". This, Peters
indicates, is "shorthand
for summarlzinc our notion of
a form of life which is
worthwhile enough to deserve being
handed on from
generation to generation. "95 But this
usage is of relatively
recent origin.

A little research in the O. E. D
reveals tha^
the notion of "educated" as characterizing
the alla person n^orally, intellectucallv
and''lf^T^
fT^"""
and
spiritually
ennerged only in the nineteenth
before the nineteenth centurv
there 5^
had been the ideal of the cultivated
person who
product of elaborate training and instruction,
^tl
I
the term
"an educated man" was not the usual onp
for
drawing attention to this ideal. Thev had the
concept
cut they did not use the word 'educated* quite
with
these overtones, 96
,

The main idea embodied in this use is that certain
social

activities should lead to the development of desirable

qualities in someone.
Other uses of the term education and its derivatives

differ in certain respects from what is conveyed by the
idea of an "educated person". For example, to indicate the

variety, we may speak of making educated guesses or hiring

professional educators; of the educative effect of certain
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activities, or the influence of
education on econornic
developn^ent, of A^ish education,
or American education
or socialist education, and of
primary, secondary and
higher education. I cannot go into
special features of
these many uses, some of which are
clearly peripheral to
our concerns here. But we can note
certain of these
features in order to get a better view
of the concept of
political education to be proposed.
Some of these uses of the term "education''
tend to

view education as

a

manner of achieving ends which are

extrinsic to the activity itself, it would not be
at all
logically odd to speak of the affects of education on
industrial development, or to refer to Amish education

where some external link to the passing on of Amish
traditions is suggested. What we want to point to, in
these utilitarian and social-economic uses of "education**,
is that by separating too sharply the achievement aspects

of the notion there is a danger of promoting or tacitly

supporting the grip of conformist ways of thinking. As in

the case of socialization, viewing education as a process
draws attention away from the essential goals of education.
As Peters notes.

In the context of the planning of resources it
may be unobjectionable to think of education as
something in which a community can invest? in the
context of a theory of social cohesion education may
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be harmlessly described
as a socializing
process. 97
But he warns that ''these
descriptions are both too
general
and too embedded in a
dangerous dimension, for they
encourage a conformist or
instrumental way of looking at
education. '.98 ^hese descriptions
are rendered from the
point of View of a spectator who
attempts to suspend his
grasp of the goals of educational
activities. But getting
at what is essential to and
distinctive in the notion of

education involves grasping a relatively
specific type
of human achievement. When we speak
of the "influence of
education on economic development- it
may be
all too

easy to confuse the effects of
institutionalized training
with the goals of education. .\nd the
problem with
uses

such as "Amish education" is the implication
that an
educated Amish person is distinctive in being
Amish and
not being educated. In this case the achievement
aspect

of education is tied to the passing on of particular

social practives rather than to the full development
of

human capacities. Where possible, it would be better to
substitute phrases like "the socialization to Amish

traditions," which may occur partly in Amish schools.
The fact that specialized institutions are often

seen as carrying the burden of promoting education has

affected the character of these uses of the term. The
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fact that we call these
institutions ••educational" should
not obscure the fact that some,
if not most, of what goes
on within them may not have an
educative effect on
the

young people populating them. And,
likewise, we cannot
limit the notion of educational or
educative processes to
formal institutional activities, separated
by physical and
social barriers from the rest of the world.
Those educational theorists who speak of -^education in the
streets"
or

••schools without walls" are not,

at least in this respect,

confused about the concept of education. And, most

importantly in the context of this inquiry, public
policies
of many kinds, and even political activity itself,
can

clearly promote the development of citizens as educated
men. The extent to which this is possible in different

political contexts

- for

example in the context of

American state -monopoly capitalism as opposed to

a

socialist system - is an important question. But the
thrust of our inquiry would be lost if we do not keep

clearly in mind that it

ls_

an open question. The purpose

of Part I of this paper is, in a sense, to contribute to
this cause by bringing out the point of keeping it an

open question. Exactly how institutionalized or non-

institutionalized activities can be educative can be seen
more clearly when we turn to the "cognitive perspective"
aspect of education.

"
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While education is not tied to
the effects of special
institutions, it is usually thought
of as an intentional
activity, or an activity whose
connection with the aims of
education is fairly clear. As Peters
notes.

People often say thincrs like 'It was
a real education
to travel with my neighbor.'
This usage is an exceotion
criterion that education is
that l°^"'°"f
we consciously contrive for ourselves sometM^f
or for
others, "9
To summarize, the concept of education
specifies

certain criteria which activities or processes
must meet.
The activities picked out are not necessarily
the domain

of specialized institutions, but can be a part of
any set
of institutionalized or non-institutionalized practices.
The possibility of conscious control of or engagement
in

these activities is however, implied.

The criteria of

these activities are connected with the development of

human capacities in the passing on of

a

form of life.

The aim or achievement implied is bound up in the idea of

the development of reason.
The distinctiveness of the notion of an "educated
person** flows from the higher levels of the development

of reason implied, indicated by Peters in the achievement
of **cognitive perspective".

Part of what is meant by this

is that "being educated implies the possession of

knowledge, but rules out mere knowledge, in that it also
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requires understanding of
principles . . .
..iqo ^nd part
of the meaning of cognitive
perspective seems to be
attached to the idea of overcoming
the disciplinary
.

specialization implicit in calling
someone

a

trained

ntathematician or scientist or cook,
and yet recognizing that
-we can . . , ask the further
question whether such people
are educated men.-lOl The core of
Peters* notion of
•^cognitive perspective" is, I believe,
that a man who is

highly trained, but not educated "has a
limited conception
of what he is doing."
He does not see its connection with
anythina else,
its place in a coherent pattern of life.
It'is,
him, an activity which is cognitively adrift. 102 for

These aspects of "cognitive perspective" can be summed
up, perhaps, in terms of the high levels of
conceptual

development implied by this distinction between training
and education. It is a degree of development in one's

conceptual grasp of the world that allows him to apply

Intelligently those principles imminent in his activities

which point beyond their narrow functional aspects toward
their role in the shaping of a coherent pattern of life.
But such a formulation covers over some ambiguities; and

the reader might note a difference in nuance in turning

back to Maclntyre's interpretation of pinnacle of
educational achievement in critical thought. We mentioned
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there in a footnote that
Peters Is far ^ore cautious
and concerned to avoid the
implication of mere criticism
in talk about critical thought.
Maclntyre presents a
sharp contrast between critical
thought and "that acceptance
of wants, tastes and prejudices
as given facts which
so

disfigures our society." (,^ve,
pp. 75-76) Peters, however,
is satisfied to note a certain
"fluidity
"103
of wants.

And there are other concepts which
have been taken as
capturing this higher level in the development
of reason

which is promoted by educational processes,
such as, for
example, "autonomy". In Part II of this
paper,

I

want to

propose that the idea of the "reflectiveness"
of high
levels of rational thought be pursued as part
of what can
be seen as a middle ground between Maclntyre 's emphasis
on

the shaping of a form of life and Peters* emphasis on

putting it in perspective. And we will be looking at the

way in which

a •'cognitive-developmental* psychology can

be fruitful in filling out this notion of reflection.
But before we turn to this second part of our

inquiry, let us bring together the main comments made on

the concepts of socialization and education, and sketch
in a preliminary way what we would be looking for in a

study of political socialization and political education.
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Socialization. Education, and
Political Science
The political beliefs
and orientations of
citizens
are important both to
the polity and to the
individual
Citizen. The social
processes involved in the
development
of these orientations are
connected also with the
development of capacities for
social and political reasoning. It is this latter
development which gives
political
beliefs and orientations an
openness, flexibility and
integration which is important
for individual satisfaction
and social cohesion in a changing
society. It is
the

importance of this development of
reason which leads us
to call for careful attention to the
distinctions between,
as well as the common processes
associated with, political
socialization and political education.
The notions of "socialization" and
'^education" are
linked through their mutual connection
with the idea of
reason and its development. The point or
sense of these
concepts is derived from the particular
interpretations

or specifications of the criteria of understanding
and

committment. This mutual link with the development
of

reason in social life makes the connections betwen the

concepts quite complicated.

Some uses of each term

overlap into the conceptual territory of the other,
creating difficult to handle borderline areas.

I

want to

pursue the argument here that certain distinctive uses of
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each term ought to be Incorporated
into any study of
political socialization or political
education.

One of the overlapping uses
of the two terms has
already been noted when we mentioned
the idea of Amish
education. Part of what we might mean
by this could be

conveyed Just as well by speaking of
the socialization
to Amish traditions in Amish schools. The
same point
holds for Catholic education or American
education.

This

comes out clearly when we think of the
point someone

might make that he received an American education
at
school and Polish education at home.

Another area of overlap is highlighted when we

speak of "social education" or "social aims

of education."

Part of what we might convey by this is a general deepening

of a child's understanding of the social world around
him, and a refinement of the skills of social interaction.

The term socialization could also be applied to these

activities without stretching its point. ^0"*
But this overlapping should not lead to the idea that

the two notions can be assimilated to one another. It is
the distinctive uses of the terms, and the point conveyed

by these uses, which are most Important. The primary sense
of socialization is becoming a social human being, capable

of organizing and executing one's purposes through

interaction with others in a social order. And the
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primary sense of education,
built on the understanding
and con^ltt^ent presumed
social participation,
points
to the achievement of a
capacity to

m

put one's activities

m

perspective, and. Importantly in
this context, to
reflectively appraise different
facets of one's social
participation, and to view social
forms In critical
perspective,

•

A different sort of argument
could be made against
this position, drawing on the
broadest possible sense
of socialization. Socialization is
becoming human in a
social world. So socialization in its
broadest sense is
all encompassing! the introduction of
the child to a

heritage of all types of knowledge. Since
the development
of children's minds can occur only through
some
sort of

interaction with this social world of knowledge, it
could
be said that education is a form of socialization. ^05
While this interpretation builds on the indisputable

truth that all learning occurs through participation in
a social world,

it is inadequate for two reasons.

First,

this interpretation of "socialization" is far too broad to

provide a useful framework for empirical research. Peters'

comment on this proposal makes a similar point:
All education can be regarded as a form of
socialization in so far as it involves initiation into
public traditions which are articulated in language and
forms of thought. But this description is too general
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And second, the very breadth
of this notion of

socialization obscures the basic sense
of becoming a
rational human being. The acquisition
of irrational beliefs
from one's social environment leading
to mental instability,
could still be viewed as socialization
on this interpretation. It would also, then, be quite
impossible to
give any specific sense to the term
"unsocialized".
It would be more appropriate to the
basic sense

of each concept to view socialization as a pre
condition
to the engagement in educative activities . This
proposal

meets the requirements of common usage, first
of all.
Unless socialization has proceeded far enough in the

child's early years, it would be said that he is unready
for school education. Or unreasonable defiance of a

classroom teacher would be viewed as unsocialized
behavior, and would interfere with educational activities
in the classroom. But besides being in accord with common
sense, this proposal also makes good theoretical sense.

For example, this interpretation helps us to organize our

thinking and research in a way that brings out the changing capacity of the child to formulate and choose among

alternative courses of action. The logical feature of
"socialization" that makes it inappropirate to say that
a child "chooses" to be socialized can help focus our
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attention on the fact that the categories
for choice are
given In a social world that Is as yet
outside his grasp.
Once on the "Inside" of a social
order,
however, the

opportunity arises for him to consciously
pursue the
complexities of his cultural heritage through

education.

Ana at some point, he will be capable of
choosing self-

consciously to pursue an education or to contrive
educative experiences or activities for himself
or for
others. In other words, we can choose to become

educated,

but not to be socialized; and this feature of these

concepts focuses our research efforts around the
conditions

for the development of capacities for rational thought
and
choice.
So my argument is that socialization should be viewed

as a precondition to education. But we must add a

qualification about socialization in its derivative sense
of initiation into the social practices of particular

institutions, organizations, etc. The most appropriate

locution here is "socialization to" some sphere of social
life.^O*^ Socialization to some particular social sphere
niav

be educative in the sense of contributing to develop-

ment of perspective on one's social activities. For example,
socialization to the norms of

a

government regulative

agency may help a businessman gain perspective on the
somewhat different norms which he had earlier accepted in
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corporate life. But the
connection here Is a loose
one;
ana this is part of the
reason for retaining the
separate
concept of education to pick
out activities with a closer
empirical connection with the
development of reflective
reason.
With this in mind, we can
interpret more clearly
C. Wright Mills, observation
that many people in modern
society are -with' rationality
but without "substantive
reason". We can say that many have
been socialized
to the

norms of large bureaucratic
organizations. But their activities do not lead to a perspective
on their personal
lives and the social world that will
tie their personal
troubles to issues of social change. The
very organizations
whose actions produce the disruptions of
social change may
in fact be preventing the development
of substantive reason

by its emplyees. The activities of work life may be
restrictive of mental exercise rather than educative.

.\nd

the intervention of these organizations in political
life

may be preventing public policies which would promote
educative activities of all types. The most important of
educative activities then would be "political education".
But whether or not this theory is correct, we can

new at least give a fairly definite sense to the concepts
of "political socialization" and "political education".
First of all,

"political socialization" can be
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understood as piocing out the
activities and processes
Which bring people to the
point of being able to
participate intelligently in a society's
political practices,

it
is an initiation into the
rules of political activity
which

brings out the rationale or
dominant purposes served
through the established political
framework. Consider
youngster who distributes campaign
literature

a

for the

candidate for elective office, on the
belief that the
candidate is to be appointed and is trying
to drum up
business through advertising. Clearly he
has not been
led to grasp the rationale of his activity
in

terms of

competitive elections for public office.
This interpretation of political socialization
is
not a step back toward the conformity perspective.
It is
not a process of training in established political

behaviors, but involves activities which lead to a grasp

on the principles of political life in a particular society.
In the first place, the rules of political practice

require intelligent application to particular circumstances.
For example, as the political socialization of our young

person who distributed campaign literature proceeds, he

might be called to work in a congressman's Washington
office. His charge is to welcome and aid any people from

the home constituency that show up in the office.

V/hen

he applies this rule rigidly, to the letter, even to the
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extent of aiding the campaign
manager of the Congressman's
opponent in the coming election,
we would certainly
want
to say that his socialization
to electoral politics
is
incomplete, for lack of understanding.
Or if he understood
the implications of aiding a
lobbyist in defeating
his

Congressman's bill, and yet did
go, we could say his
socialization to the norms of congressional
politics was
Incomplete, for lack of committment,
addition

m

to

intelligent application of rules to
particular circumstances,
political socialization leads to the capacity
to interpret
conflicting rules or guidelines in terms
of the overriding
organizational rationale of one's activities. And
the

criteria of understanding and committment, not
conformity,
elucidate this Judgmental capacity as well.
One final point to note about "political
socialization"
is that socialization here is taken in its derivative

sense. Political understanding and committment are not

essential to becoming, at a basic level, a social being

capable of acting on reason in social life,
"Political education," finally, picks out those

activities and processes which bring people to the point

where they are capable of reflecting on and critically
appraising established political practices. It does not

apply to merely getting people to criticize. Nor does
it imply that we can be reflective all the time or in
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all matters, a critique
may or may not emerge from
reflection on features of our
political life, but if it
does, it should be a reasoned
critique, pointing to
alternative principles and new
practices for political
life. The rules, priorities and
even the goals of established political life can, at this
level of development, be
viewed in terms of new possibilities.
No longer limited
In his rational capacities to the
intelligent application
and Interpretation of given rules, a
politically educated
person can explore the possibilities for
expanding the

dimensions of politics. 108 And exploring these
possibilities
can be viewed as an important part of responsible
citizenship, an important dimension of committment
to

creating a form of life in which human needs are
satisfied,
human rights are expanded, and political education

through participation is made available to all.
The first part of this inquiry is now complete. We

have attacked the problem of how to conceptualize human

development in a politically relevant way. The first

task was to sort out uses of the term socialization
along broad criteria suggested as a conformity perspective
and a developmental perspective. The conformity inter-

pretation of socialization was criticized as cutting out
a vital sense of socialization as the development of

basically rational human beings, and thus tacitly
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yielding to a promotion of molding
people for blind
conformity. A developmental
interpretation of the concepts
of socialization and education
was proposed, and their

bearing on issues of citizenship was
suggested. The
next part of this study moves to an
analysis of cognitivedevelopmental psychology, which can help
to fill out our

preliminary idea of the achievements of
political
socialization and political education.

PART II. DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY
AND POLITICAL EDUCATION

CHAPTER

VI

DEVELOPMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY. AN EXPOSITION
Introduction
1.

We have seen in Part

I

that the aims of political

socialization and political education are
distinct. The
study of political socialization brings
out the achievements involved in acting rationally within
and in terms
of the norms of a given political framework.
And
the

achievements of political education point to the
development of the capacity to step back from this framework

through the reflections of reason, and appraise it in
perspective. Political socialization and political educa-

tion are distinct, then, but are also mutually linked
to the capacity for rational thought and action, A major

advantage of this analysis - as opposed to the treatment
of socialization and education as the names of processes
- is that it leaves open questions about the extent to

which particular social structures and public policies
promote the development of reason through socialization
and education.

What

I

want to do in Part II is to suggest a

possible course of study toward
education. It is

a

a

theory of political

suggestion that the approach to

developmental psychology of Jean Piaget and Lawrence
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Kbhlberg will aid us in filling
out the empirical di.ensi
ons
of the processes involved in
the achievements of socialization and education. We need a
more complete sense for
the kinds of changes that occur
as mental development
proceeds, and the Piaget-Kohlberg
approach may help. The
assessment of this approach attempts,
first, to clarify
further the achievements of mature
thought picked
out

by the concept of education. The second
part of the
assessment tries to show that a developmental

approach

to political education requires

a

more specific explana-

tory theory than that offered by Piaget
or Kohlbert; a
theory which is tied into a theory of social
structure.
In the concluding chapter, an example of
research

in developmental political psychology is discussed,
and
is evaluated in terms of its relevance to the
conceptual

framework of political education. Finally, we offer a

view of why and how political education ought to be
promoted,
2.

Any discussion of the cognitive-developmental

approach must make choices about the best way to present
and talk about it. The effort here is informed by a

desire to draw on both "philosophical-normative" and
"psychological-empirical" inquiries.
Philosophical understanding has attended primarily

to the elaboration of conceptual distinctions. But their

.
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usefulness for the scientific
interpretation of human
behavior is hindered by the failure
to fill in empirical
facts, especially those about
conceptual development.
Psychological investigations, on the other
hand, often
fail to make adequate conceptual
distinctions. The

attitude taken here is that the
cognitive-developmental

approach is informed in its descriptive enterprise
by
some important and too often neglected
distinctions.

The

clarification of the significance of these distinctions,
however, is aided by analysis in which philosophers

specialize.
In discussing the cognitive-developmental approach
I

will be taking Piaget and Kohlberg as representatives

Piaget has dealt primarily with children's responses
to theoretical questions, where "theoretical" is con-

trasted with "practical"; and Kohlberg has dealt primarily

with children's responses to practical questions.

This

distinction is clarified by Peters.
(With theoretical questions) no issue of doing
anything or changing anything is settled by answering
The issue is about what is the case or why it
them.
is so or when something happened.
Practical questions,
on the other hand, are concerned with what ought to
be the case, with reasons for action
This
realm of discourse has its own distinctive concepts
such as 'ought', 'right', 'desirable', 'worthwhile',
and 'good' as well as its own distinctive features
for answering questions which are raised, 110

....
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Political discourse involves
an intermingling of both
types of questions (as is
also the case with educational
issues). Coming to a Judgment
on political questions
requires treatment of both
theoretical and practical
issues, .^d reflective and
rational political discourse
is an individual and social
achievement which can only
be had if we become clear about
the whole multi-faceted
phenomena of mental development.
Failures of understanding and problems
of assimilation have accompanied the over-sharp
drawing of disciplinary boundaries between psychology and the
social sciences.
While philosophers and psychologists are
now beginning
to see the need to attend in a self-conscious
manner to

the description and justification of the
full development

of human capacities, they often seem to be wearing
intellectual blinders when the problem arises of connecting
these ideals of development to their realization in the
actual socio-political world. For the developmental

psychologist, this may be connected with a failure to

clarify the character of mature social thought and the
conditions for its development. For the philosopher it

may be the result of
"liberal society". As

a rather uncritical faith in our
C.

Wright Mills assesses the state

of that tradition, "the ideals of liberalism have been

divorced from any realities of modern social structure

loo

The order of exposition
will be as follows.
Fi^t
we Will give a general
characterization of the
cognitivldevelopmental approach - the
basic hypothesis
pursued
by Piaget and Kohlherg
- and a su^.ary
statement of the
stages of .ental development
they have postulated
(Chapter
6). The next two chapters will
involve a sympathetic
but
critical assessment of their
theories, dealing with the
characterization of mature thought
(Chapter 7), the
explanation of development, and
the relation between
modes of thought and social
action (Chapter 8).

General Characterization of the
Cognitive-

Developmental Approach
The core achievements of the
cognitive-developmental

approach can be referred to as descriptive.
Piaget has
forcefully reminded us that characterization
of
the

products of mental development is closely
bound up with the
type of explanation of development offered.

But the explana-

tory side of his theory is somewhat undeveloped. 112
The
crucial element of this descriptive contribution
is the

doctrine of stages of mental development. The organizing
"hypothesis" or main thrust of the work of Piaget and
Kbhlberg is the view that mental development can best be

comprehended as a qualitative transformation of cognitive
structures in an invariant and culturally universal
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sequence. Discussing separately
the ter^s of this hypothesis
Will give us an outline of the
main tenets of the stage
theory.
1.

2oanitive_Stru^^

A stage of mental develop-

ment is posited on the basis of
a coherence or organization
among actions and patterns of
action. It is the underlying
•*thought-organization"ll4 which is the basis
for attributing stages. The distinction between
structure and content
is a useful device for understanding
this point. There can
be wide variation in the content,
or specific thoughts
and actions of children at a certain
age, but by comparing
their thought to that of older and younger
children, a

certain type of mode of thought emerges as
characteristic
of that age,
2.

Structural Trans formation

.

Mental structures

(types or modes of thought) change with age,1^5

j^Yxts

change can best be seen not as a gradual, incremental

accretion of actions or types of action (schemata), but
rather as a total alteration (transformation) of the

basic character or underlying organization of thought.
3.

Qualitative Transformation . The idea of structural

change as transformational is required by two further

characteristics of stages. They are first of all
"structural wholes", more or less complete and balanced
(equilibrated) organizations of thought. Secondly, these
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structural wholes are
qualitatively aifferent fro™
one
another,
Bterarchlcal Intearatloj,. A
mental structure
does not disappear when a
higher form of thought is
achieved, father it is
reintegrated into the succeeding
structure even while its character
is transformed. The
earlier structure is in one
sense part of the "matter"
upon which the new structure
operates. One stage thus
takes the character of
pre-requisite to the succeeding
Stage.
4-

Invariant Seg n^nrp. The positing of
an invariant
sequence of stages in mental development
is one of the
most difficult and intriguing claims
of the developmental5.

ists.

It involves a number of assertions
and qualifications.

The stage must appear in an unchanging
and constant order,
so that stage A appears in every child before
stage B.
This invariant sequence also forms a logical
order, in

that the logical character of the concepts available
at
stage B presumes the attainment of stage A concepts. It
is not necessary that all individuals, or even all

"normal- adults, achieve the final stages. Some may be

fixated at a lower level, while others may achieve a

higher mode of thought in one content area but no in
another
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SultumiiUJnlversal. The distinction
between
structure ana content

Is the basis of the
assertion that

While content .ay vary
with culture, there are
universal
structural elements In .ental
life. Where
the later

staces have not been achieved
In a culture, It Is said
that they would follow the
same Invariant sequence
If

the

conditions facilitating further
developn,ent were to
appear.
Form this core stage theory we
will be focusing
primarily on the invariance of the
sequence of stages
which is posited for all cultures.
But with our outline
of these stages we will discuss
the Piaget-Kohlberg position
in two related areas: the conception
of mature thought
at the final stage of development;
and the notions

introduced to explain development,
7.

MatureJ[2!o^^

It is recognized among the

developmentalists that investigators will differ
somewhat
in their descriptions of mature thought. This
is a

crucially important interpretative enterprise, if the
full implications of this approach are to be brought
out.
For the characterization of this mature thought sets the

stage and casts the characters for the related tasks of

explaining this development, and justifying its promotion.
Each successive stage is said to be more differentiated
(to embody conceptual distinctions built upon those of the

y
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P-vious stage) and complex,
and .ore integrated.
The

-in

feature of this final
fonn of thought is thus
a
general and .ore stable
equibriu. between the
thinner
and his World.
^-

^^^i^naMor^of^eve^^

The type of expUnati
on
offered by the cognitive
developmental approach has be
en
Characterized as interactionist.
This ter. designates a
.manner of relating together
the explanatory factors
and
notions used. As we said, it
is important to understand
the manner of describing
and interpreting mental
development in order to grasp the
significance of this type of
explanation. An eclectic statement
that full explanation
of mental growth requires an
account of both biological
and environmental factors,
distinguished in terms of
their quantitative significance,
would not be an interactionist position. For the primary task
the developmental1st sets for himself is understanding
the genesis of
mental structures which are qualitativ^T
distinct.
The question about the genesis of structures
is approached
by the developmentalist by positing an Interaction

between the active structuring of the world by the
child
and the given structure of the environment. An
account

which attributes mental structures to one of these types
of factors alone is said to be inadequate. 116
It Is especially important to understand the role
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of experience with the
environment, if the implications
of this approach for
social and political theory
are to
be drawn out. I quote here
from Kohlberg.
^" interactional conception
scageo
staaes'^Siffprr^;
differs from a maturatlonal one in ^v,=t.of <v
assumes that experience is necessary
?or the stages
generallv Lre'"' richer stimulation asLSng'that'
will lead to
J
^^^^^^
involved.
It
nronoLf rrr^
proposes
that an understanding of the
role of
analysis of universal
?^aturef
features of experienced objects
(physical or social)
sequences of differentiation'
ind ?n?e^r.M°'
and
integration in concepts of such objects,
and
(3) analysis of structural relations
between
experie
neeinputs and the relevant behavior
organization. 11?

^

^

Before we move to an exposition of the
stages of

mental development outlined by Piaget and
Kohlberg, it
is necessary to intoduce two further
distinctions.

Both

Piaget and Kohlberg accept the thesis that every
judgmental
act has both cognitive and affective aspects. These
are

two facets of what is essentially the same phenomena
of

human intelligence in operation. Another distinction which
is tacitly made in their studies between judgments made

about the physical world and those made about the

interpersonal or social world,
Piaget 's studies have focused primarily on the

development of the child's conception of the physical
world, although in one seminal work he dealt with moral
Judgments.

And he has been primarily occupied with the

•

,
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laentification of cognitive stages
and sub-stages, rather
than the affective aspect,
which Is Interpreted as
structural tension and transition.
Kohlberg, on the
other hand, has studied primarily
.oral development, also
terms of Its cognitive rather
than affective-emotional

m

components

,

Both Piaget and Kohlberg have
identified broad
periods or levels of development, with
a varying number
of stages and sub-stages.
Their interpretations are

usually drawn from clinical type interviews
with children
of varying ages.
(Some of Piaget 's later
studies have

Involved both verbal and nonverbal
responses; and Kohlberg
has been engaged in longitudinal as well
as cross-sectional
studies.) The attempt is made to discover
whether qualitative differences in the mode of thought (or
type of judg-

mental criteria) can be found.

What follows is a sketch of

the main characteristics of the stages proposed,
first by

Piaget for general cognitive development, and then by

Kohlberg for moral development ^20
.

r^^^

purpose of this

summary is to show the sense and pattern of these developmental theories, and to fill out the meaning and

application of the basic developmental framework outlined
above
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Piaget, Levels of Cognitive
Development
Ontogenetic development is
divided into three
broad peiods or xeveis
levels hv
4 4.^
by Piaget, with
a number of subperiods or stages. The Levels
are:
,

^

3.

concrete Operatronr (2!?l'y:ars ^^^^^^^^^ of
The Level of Formal Thought
(ll-is years).
)

In the first of these periods
the child acts directly on

the world around him. But in the
second and third levels,
he operates also on a different
plane of reality, the
representational or symbolic. At the beginning
of each
level, as the child achieves in crude
form a new set of

cognitive skills, his actions are "egocentric".
This

egocentrism is relative to the full elaboration of
these

cognitive skills, but it also marks off from the
previous
level a qualitatively new way of structuring
intelligent
action. This egocentrism indicates a disequilibrium

between two functions of intelligence; those of assimilating

reality to existing schemas, 121 and accommodating these
schemas to reality when assimilation is impossible. As
the egocentrism of each level is overcome, a relatively

stable equilibrium is achieved. But only in the third
level is a fully stable equilibrium achieved, an

equilibrium in which objectivity and full reversibility
of thought are elaborated.
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^'

^^^^-^^^

sens ory-Motor In^.^^.^ .^^^

.

this level, the hasic
.anner of relating to
the
world is by way of direct
perceptual and .otor activity
The infant.s first
actions are reflexive. The
egocentris.
here is complete, for the
self and the world are
totally
undifferentiated,
the course of this period,
objects
are gradually seen as
interrelating in the direct way
as
entities. As a correlate of the
independence attributed
to objects in their interaction,
the world of objects
takes on an independence from the
self. The growing

m

gap between the self and the world
is part of a
decentering process. Eventually different

features of

different objects are distinguished,
and the self likewise
becomes multifaceted or autonomous on
this plane of direct
action. This process of detachment of
self and world
prefigures a sense of spatial, temporal and
causal
dimensions, and the child becomes capable
of imitation and
play. The coherence of action, or equilibrium,
achieved
at the sensory-motor level around age

2

is one of direct

action on the world. But it is enriched by a growing

ability to symbolize.
2«

Hie Level of Prep aration for and Organization

of Concrete Operat ions (2-11 y e.^^raK At this level, there
is cognitive operation on concrete reality by means
of

symbolization and symbol manipulation. Language develops
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and beco.es a prl.e
tool for dealing with
concrete
problems. This level is
divided into two stages:

" -r:?r?:^-:L--^---^-a^
"

a^rScf ^e^---At first,

-e^-age

...everslble
o. reversible

m

the "Preoperation" period
of preparation,
the language and thought
of the child are egocentric.
He
is tied to his own viewpoint.
And while he has vague

intuitions about the intentions
and perspectives of others,
he is unable to take the role
of the other or understand
it

m

coherent way. His attention is
centered, and his
reasoning is frequently distorted by
thinking only
a

about

the surface features of phenotiena.
Thinking here can be
seen as prelogical, and one of its
main characteristics
is its •irreversibility". This is
demonstrated by the
inability, for example, to understand that
the quantity
of water in a tall, thin glass is conserved
when
its

surface qualitative appearance is transformed by
pouring
the water into a shorter and wider glass. Here
is
the

way John Flavell introduces the notion of reversibility
of thought (which is achieved only in the second stage
of this concrete representational level): "a cognitive

organization is reversible, if it is able to travel
along a cognitive route (pursue

a set reasonings,

follow
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a series of
transfonnatlons In . aispla..
etc., ana then
reverse a.rectlon in
thought, to ,ina

a.ain an unc.an^ea
point Of departure (the
.e^innln, precise, the
original
state of display, etc.)"122

In the "Concrete
operational" stage, the
child
achieves a coherent and
integrated cognitive syste.
on
the concrete representation
plane. He overcomes the
egocentrist of the initial
pre-operational stage. Through
the decentering of his
reasoning process, he is
now able
to balance or compensate
in understanding a
process by
reversing a line of reasoning.
He is now able to see,
for example, that added width
in a water glass compensates
for a loss in height. Also,
in overcoming the
egocentrism
of the first stage, the child
develops a richer capacity

for taking roles in concrete
situations. And finally,
he begins to extend his thought
from the actuality of
the concrete situation toward
an understanding of its

potentialities.
But there are limitations still
in this level of

thought, relative to the problem-solving
achievements of
formal thought. The cognitive activity
of the child is
still oriented towards immediate and concrete
reality! he

still begins his reasoning process with the
actual
situation, seeing its potentialities as a function
of the

various given descriptions. Descriptions of objects and

Ill

system Of descriptions
under which he comprehends
these
events are never assessed
as a whole in terms
of theories
Formal or theoretical thinking
becomes possible at the
next level, where the child
achieves a greater degree
of
detachment from the descriptions
which were previously
accepted as direct representations
of reality.
^'

I^vel of Formal Thonght
,

m

the final level

of cognitive development, reality
is still dealt with in
terms of internal manipulation
of symbols.
But the child,
or adolescent, is no longer limited
to operating with
symbols which represent a concrete
reality content.
In

addition to these first-order operations
he can now perform
second-order operations.
The first-order descriptions
or
symbolizations are now treated not as direct
representations
of reality, but as conditionals.
And the operations he

performed with these symbols are now seen as part
of a
total set of all logically possible operations.
Thought
here is completely reversible.
Succinctly stated, concrete

reality can now be seen as a special case of the possible.
This is a qualitatively new type of detachment or

conditional dissociation from concrete reality.

The

initial forays into hypothetical or theoretical thought
are marked again by a certain egocentrism.

But it is

s
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E-sslble. graaually, to
achieve objectivity.
This can
occur When the cognitive
structures of formal
operational
thought are In egulUbrlu,.
Plavell gives the following
paradlg. case of how the
adolescent thln.s. or can
thin.,
at his cognitive "best"!

for consideration the totalitv
of distinct combinatinn.
P^^Po-itions. These combinations are
r'gardeS
ll ^^^^f
""^'^^ "^^^
confirmed
^^d
som^i^firmedV'°'"\^'
'
^"^^^tigation.
is
it
true
that a elicits
^nar
^Ucits X?
L't^'^'^T
if so, does 3 also? Is it
true
thA^
A produces X only when B is
absent? Such are the
questions which make up the domain
of
thf^^^'S?^
adolescent
views
Ms
as ti^^'^^^^^^'^T"'
determining the actual shaoe of
rifn o V successively
putting them to empirical
test!l23^

^

Sk

Kohlberg: Levels of Moral Development

Most of Piagefs studies that have contributed
to
this theory of mental development have dealt
with such

categories as space, time, number and causality. Little
of his energy has been spent studying the development
of
categories of practical reason, although one of his early
^oJ^s, The Moral Judgment of the Child

,

broke some new

ground in this area. One of the most thorough and persistent

elaborators of the developmental approach to moral judgment
is the United States is Lawrence Kohlberg. Kohlberg*
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theory postulates osmewhat
more tightly defined stages
than Piagefs original wor>.
in the area of ^oral
Judgment.
And while Piaget placed
considerable emphasis
on peer

group interaction in explaining
upward stage movement,
Kohlberg broadens this to focus
on general role-taking
opportunities.

^ "Ulster of the dimensions of moral ludqment
^""'^^ ^^^^^^^^
conteS rather
th^n CO
n^.f'^^r
than
cognitive
form. An example is the dimension
of
responsiveness to peer, as opposed to adult?
expectahypothesizes this dimen^ion^^s
n'^r'^'^J^^
part
of his autonomous stage, his rationale
for
deriving this from a consideration of
cognitive
form
is vague and unconvincing. There is
nothing more
cognitively mature to preferring a peer than
adult
.... While Piaget attempted to define two an
stages of
moral Judgment (the heteronomous and the
autonomous)
empirical study and logical analysis indicate
^rr^^''''
rnat his moral stages have not met the
criteria of
stages he proposes ... as his cognitive
stages do.l24
^4

Kohlberg*

s

methods of study are similar to those

employed by Piaget. In an interview, he presents a child

with a moral dilemma; i.e., he describes a situation
in

which someone is called on to make a morally relevant
decision. After finding out what the person in the story
did, the child is asked,

"Should he have done it?" and

••Why?" One of Kohlberg 's favorites is the following

conflict involving the values of property and human life.
In Europe, a woman was near death from cancer. One
drug might save her, a form of radium that a druggist
in the same town had recently discovered. The druggist

s
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was charging $2,000,
ten times what th« h
to make.
^"'"'^
The sick woman's husb^nr
^i-^
r f
everyone he knew to
"'^"^ to
borrow
^i^^'
only get together about h^l th^^"
'^o^ld
f
H^^'
the druggis? that
^^^^
M^wife
sell it cheaper or let hTm was dWna '"Z^^^'
^^'^^'^ ^i'" to
said, ..No... ^he^husband^got'^L
'^^^^^^
per:;e f'nl
the man's store to steal
^^"^ ^^o^® into
5
the husband have done
"i^^'
^^^ould
?iat7 ^fllf
*

%

^

Kohlberg presents his results
generally in the form
Of a summary of the stages
discerned.
He does not tie his
stages to age-norms, which
in any case are merely
guides
for developmental analysis.
But he holds that his
stages
define.
(A) culturally universal
components of morality;
(B) coherent modes or
structures of moral judgn^ent;
and

(C) a

logically invariant sequence (i.e.,
the order of
progression could not be different).
The evidence he
presents to support this claim is
methodologically
somewhat more sophisticated than Piagefs,
and includes
a study of moral Judgment development
among Taiwanese
peasants. 126 The summaries often vary in
minor detail
from one article to the next, but the following
summary

attempts to present the general outlines of
Kohlberg 's
stage framework. ^27

^^ee also Appendix A,

Definition of Moral Stages'.^

"Kohlberg*

Its purpose is to familiarize

the reader with some of Kohlberg*

s

basic distinctions and

terminology.
Kohlberg*

s

studies have led him to distinguish
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three basic levels of
moral development, first,
a
preconvfi ntlonal

level*
-Level,

s^>r-/^r^^
second,
a conventional level,
and

^^^r6, a postconvenMonal,
principled or autonomous
level
Within each of these
general levels of moral
thinKing, two
structural stages are
distinguished,
the preconventional
level, moral value is
interpreted in terms of the
physical
or hedonistic consequences
of action. The major
difference
between stage 1 and stage 2
children is that stage 2
subjects have achieved a basic
notion of fairness as
reciprocity. The stage 1 child
is attentive primarily
to differentials of power,
status or possessions, rather
than to exchange in terms of the
different needs people
have. In response to the dilemma
of whether to steal the
drug to save a life, the stage 1
subject might typically
rest his judgment on factors such
as the cost of the drug
or the damage done in the process of
stealing it, or the
likelihood of going to jail. In contrast,
a stage 2 child

m

.

might point out that Heinz wants his wife
to live, or
that he may need her to help him someday,
or that the
druggist needs to make a profit. Unilateral deference
to
superior power gives way here to a naively egoistic and

egalitarian judgment of the external consequences of
actions.
The conventional lelvel of moral thought overcomes

the egoism of stage

2

in resting moral judgment on the
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ae,«e

to

„Mch

an action con.o..s
to t.e expectations
o.
others ana supports the
basic dimensions of
one-s social
oraer. Sta.e
3 involves an orientation
towara pleasin, ana
helping others, aoing what
is approved by the™,
ana is
often referred to as a
"^ooa hoy-nice girl"
orientation.
The "others- who aefine
right ana wrong perfo.ance
of roles
are usually those whose
expectations are ™ost prominant
the chiia.s social
environ-nent. Stage 4 is
referrea to
as "the law and oraer
orientation" or an "authority

m

ana

social-order maintaining orientation",
this stage the
social order is seen as a value
vdxue in
In it==i<=
„
Itself, somewhat
distinct
from the persons whose
expectations make it immediate
to
Mm. one does his '.duty- and upholds
a general respect
for authority, vn^ereas a stage
3 subject might
Judge the
drug stealing case in terms of
saving face or gaining the
approval of his family, the stage
4 child will

m

invoke

notions of honor, duty and the
importance of maintaining
the social order, including its
laws.

There are two critical limitations
to these four
types of moral thought, and these
limitations emerge most
clearly with stage 4 judgments. Stage 4
thought does not
clearly recognize obligations to persons
outside the

particular social order of the subject; and it
provides
no clear guides to the creation of new norms
or laws, no

perspective adequate to guide participation in

a

changing
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social order. The
postconventional level of
thought is
constituted by stages which
represent structures of
thought adequate to overcoming
these limitations.
Moral
values and principles are
accepted apart fro. an
individual's
identification with his social
order, and they are viewed
as valid regardless of
whether they are held by
significant
persons or groups in his
society. The first such
structure
of thought, stage 5, is a
Contractual legalistic
orientation",
this stage, obligations are
framed in
terms of freely made agreements
and contracts. Emphasis is
placed upon procedural rules for
reaching agreement and
results in a "legal point of view",
the case of stealing
a drug to save a life, considerations
such as the

m

m

appropriateness of pertinent laws and procedures
would
take deliberation beyond the level of
simple maintenance
of the social order. The final stage
in the sequence is
termed "the universal ethical principle
orientation".

Whereas stage

5

thinking is bound to consideration

primarily of concrete rules and norms of a society, stage
6 Involves the structuring of thought around universal

ethical principles - at the most general level, the

principle of justice. The formal properties of law
(universality and impartiality) are extended to the whole

domain of a person's moral relations. Decisions of
conscience are made on the basis of self -chosen principles
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Which are a.st.act ana
ethical in nature,
.^^.ents a.out
the stealing of a dru,
to save
a life would .e
fra.e.

m

ter.s Of the principle
of respect for hu.an
life and
personal standards of conscience
such as honesty.
Now before launching into
an assessment of the
fruitfulness of the
cognitive-develope.ntal approach
for
the study of political
education, one last bit of
ground
woric must be laid. The
cpaestion is, how is the
relation
between the stages of moral
judgment and stages of
cognitive-development conceived? Kohlberg's
answer is that
there is a parallelism or isomorphism
between general
cognitive development and moral
development, cognitive
maturity is a necessary, but not
sufficient condition for
moral judgment maturity.

1

^-elation of moral Judgment to
intellective

suggested by the fact that our staae
df??i?FT^
^^'^^ Piagetian concrete operations
f r! no
^^r""^
are
necessary
for conventional (Stage 3 and 4)
morality and that formal operations are
for principled (Stage 5 and 6 morality necessary
.... While
formal operations may be necessary for principled
morality, one may be a theoretical physicist 'and
make moral judgments at the principled level. 128 yet not
)

We turn now to the task of assessing the merits
and

limitations of developmental psychology, and its potential

contribution to the study of political education.

CHAPTER
DEVEDDPMENTAL PSYCHOI^GY,

VII
A„ ASSESSMENT (I)

Introduction
The assessment offered
here, and in the next
chapter'
can advance only a small
portion of the way toward
a
definitive Judgment on the
fruitfulness of the cognitive-

.

developmental approach for the
study of political
education.
I have approached
the tas)c of assessment
in a critical, hut
sympathetic and, hopefully,
constructive manner.
The distinctions which are
brought out so clearly

by developmental psychology
provide

a

useful framework for

research.

Political judgment overlaps with
moral judgment
in many ways.
And we should expect to find
distinctions
Similar to that between a conventional
morality and a
principled moral code when we look at
the types of reasons
or mode of thinking which supports
or underlies the political Judgments of the population.
This is, in fact, similar
to the core distinction we have drawn between
the achievements of political socialization and the
achievements of

political education.
The fruits of this approach will effectively

challenge,

I

believe, those who view man and the science

of man from the conformity perspective, investigating

what is essentially a conformity-training process under

^
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the ruhrlc o.
"socialisation... The
develop^entalist s
unaerstandin, of the
explanatory task, and its
relation
to normative inquiry
differs considerably.
The concepts
Which ^tde research are
philosophical or normative
rather
than behavioral, .^d
empirical research results
•

,

are said
"to help Clarify and
define an ultimately
adequate,
universal and mature conception
of morality. "1 31 gut
there is no thought of
abandoning analytic and
empirical
rigor. The approach, in
fact, should prove more
satisfying

in the understanding and
explanation of
social and political life. But
in order
fruit, the developmentalisfs
notion of
of a full-blown explanation needs
to be

narrower confines of

a

many facets of
to bear this

the character
pulled out of the

psychologist's treatment. For

a view of the common and universal
dimensions of mental

development is not complete without
explicit ties to the
character of an individual's involvement
in social and

political life.
There is an important connection between the
points
made in the two preceeding paragraphs, which
can be

advanced in a preliminary way here. That is, while
manv
of the distinct ions made bv developmentalists can aid
in

formulating

a

jus tifiable ideal of human development ^ ^
.

we are le^t wit h an inadequate conception of how this
ideal might be r ealized in particular societies with their
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example, Kohl.er.
clai.s that t.e aevelop^ent
o. a.ea.
concepts follows the
sa.e invariant sequence
in an
Atayal viUa.e on Por.osa
as in ^.erica, .ut
that during
the Atayalan adolescence
there is a "rearession.'
to
concepts held by younger
children. This is accounted
for
as '^cultural learning'.,
for "the culture can
^reverse*
the sequence by specific
training. "1 33 Now the
question
•night arise as to how
to prevent this reversal
and ..ove
Atayal youngsters bac^ toward
a conception of drea.s
as
internal and i.^aterial n^ental
phenomena, and away fro.
the "regressive'' equation of
the soul, the dream,
and

ghosts. Would it be a task for
formal educational
institutions, or some other institutional
device attenuating the hold adults have over
adolescents - their
leverage for training? But as soon
as we consider the

question in this light it must be recognized
that any
such measure would involve tampering
with the myths which
provide the social fabric with structure and
continuity.

We would be looking, in other words, for
a point cf
leverage which would Involve more or less
fundamental

transformation of the Atayal culture and social structure.
These broader social implications of the approach seem
some-

what opaque to most developmental psychologists. It would
be the task of a theory of political education to tie the
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Ideals of hu^an development
picked out by the concept
of education to a theory
of social structure. Only
from
that point can we develop
an adequate idea of how
to
promote political education.
The comments which follow
are pursued under three
headings, 1) the character of
mature thought (this
chapter), 2) the explanation of
mental development; and
3) from thought to action (chapter
8). It will be

apparent not only that many of the
points made could be
pursued profitably in greater detail,
but also that many
of the points made separately have a
close bearing on one
another.
The Character of Mature Thought

This section is divided into three parts.
First,

we present a critical assessment of Kohlberg's
theory of
moral development. Since practical questions (in the
sense of "practical" introduced above,
pp. 98-99) are so

intimately involved in the reasonings behind political
Judgment, it is important to understand more precisely

how Kohlberg's theory taps into this dimension of thought.
Next, with a broader view of the dimensions of socio-

political judgment in hand, we consider Piaget*s (and
Kohlberg's) treatment of the unity in mental development.
In what sense must we make reference to a unifying feature

of mature thought? And what can we say about mature socio-

,

'
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political thought in ter^s
of its ••reversibiUty"
or
••objectivity, nn^uy. „e
concluae this section
with a
brief treatment of what
„e ta.e to be a central
feature
of mature thought - its
reflectiveness.
W« have looked at the
broad theoretical framework
of the cognitive developmental
approach, and
at the

specific stage sequence
postulated by Kohlberg for
moral development. The
postulates of the theory
Kohlberg
proposes to account_for the
stages of moral development
can be summarized as follows:
'^^^^^

stages of moral develoompnf
V represent
which
(3) c^^Kiu:ve-^ t-rn..f-,,^:r.°gT!"^
in conception of selFI^TT-i^^nffflKS^^
j''^
represent successive modes of " tLing
l^^. l^J
J^hps" in social situations, s o that (D) the sffial
environmental determinants of development
are ?he
opportunities for rni . ..w.^ Moreover!
(S) the
.^;rn..nr.^ his perceived
environment
so that
tharr.r.^
(r) moral stages and their
development
represent the interaction of the child's
structuring
features of the environment^''?''^/"^^'^^f successive forms
of equilibrium
Tn
i?"" ^^i?^
In interaction.
This equilibrium is conceived as (H)
^ith (I) change being caused bv
3^
i^^^^^'
disequilibrium,
where (J) some optional level of
'^t^''\^^J^^^^^P^^cy is necessary for change between
the child and the environment, 134
'

'

We now want to consider what is involved
in treating

stages of moral development as "level

[s]

of justice", and

mature moral thought as a "justice structure". "^^^ There
are two types of criticism to be offered of the way

Kohlberg has formulated or interpreted this theory. The
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outline o. stages .e
postulates see.s acceptable
e„ou,. i„
^emo, .oote.
e.pi.ical eviaence, ..t
the clal.s about
.o.aXlt. put .orwa.. .
„ot cXearly .oote. in
eviaenee ana
Ultimately phllo3opM=al-nor.atlve
claims about morality
- »ust be -^estlonea. The first
type of criticise,
which
I will only
outline briefly, deals with
the adequacy of
the characterisation
of (^nature) morality ger^,
as
bouna univocally to the
concept of Justice. The
question
is whether .orlality is
not conceivea of .00
restrictively.
The secona type of
criticism - which is in a sense

m

the

converse of the first - asks
whether Kohlberg's interpretation of morality is adequate
to the logical features
of many virtues which we would
want to incluae in a fullblown conception of the development
of practical

reason.
(This line of thought is pursued
in the next section,
••Cognition, Affect, ana the Unity
of Mental Development. ••)
The two approaches to criticism
are united in the idea that

human development Is best treated

not

development (with a single concent,

lust as ^r,n^^,.^.,.1

justice, at the

pinnacle), but as t he development of reason
(ratlonalitv
or modes of reasoni ng with and through concepts
.

The first set of criticisms to be dealt with
come

from the point of view of the moral philosopher. The

aeliberatlons behind the critique flow from posing the
question, "Is Kohlberg prescribing a moralityP-'l^e ^

l
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persistent criticism of Kohlberg
is that he has not
spelled out clearly enough the
postulated logical
relations between the concepts
at different stages.
For
example why is it that a
"punishment orientation" is
logically prior to a "reward" or
"instrumental" orientation.
Kohlberg has gone some way in
a recent article toward

spelling out these logical relationships
more clearly. 137
But especially at the higher
levels, it becomes clear
that Kohlberg 's theory not only makes
claims about logical
priority, but also "has built into it
claims
about the

relative worth of the stages as ways of
moral thinking. "138
How, then, does Kohlberg interpret
these claims of worth-

whileness?
Justice, including the notions of equality
and

reciprocity, is given priority by Kohlberg
as the central
feature of mature moral thought. And the "justice

structure" which emerges at stage

6,

it is argued, can be

Judged more adequate or better according to the
criteria

-advanced by the formalists in moral philosophy

-

of

Increased prescriptivity and universality (or universalizability). And these standards are internal, so the

argument goes, to the notion of what morality is.
The general criterion we have used in saying
that a higher stage's mode of Judgment is more
adequate than a lower stage is that of morality
Itself, not of conceptions of rationality or
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sophistication imported fro.
other domalns.l39
These formalist claims
have never been
without
serious challenge.l40 But
the task of taking
up this
Challenge directly is beyond
the scope of this
paper or
the competence of the
writer. Instead, x will
note some
of the difficulties others
have pointed to.
one question which arises
is whether justice
can
stand alone as a principle
in dealing with moral
problems.
It can be argued, for
example, that the criteria
of
equality and reciprocity (equality
in exchange) are too
formal. For they do not
discriminate between the various
respects in which people could be
treated equally. One
could attempt to wreak equal harm
on others without
1.

violating the formal notion of equality.
William Frankena.
for example, finds it necessary to
appeal to two principles
of morality: justice and benevolence.
"The
area of Justice

is part of morality, but not the
whole of it.

Beneficence,

then, may belong to the other part of
morality, and this
is just what seems to be the case to me."^^^
2.

Another line of argument questions whether

Kohlberg's theory deals adequately with the moral virtues

picked out by concepts of character traits. Richard
Peters notes the "inadequacy in Kohlberg's treatment of
the content of morality as manifest in virtues such as
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courage, compassion,
sincerity and the

1 Ike. "

He disnilsses character-trsi »•<.
v«
done on honesty showed
that lt^as s?t,';^"f^ '^''^ """^"^
and an unreliable
predictor of what ^M?^ °" =P^"^1" =
over a range of circumstancer
"""^"^
Whether this might be specifi^ lut h= i
""^"^^^^
to a trairf
honesty. Ke never examines
the
marked
dif-^^
between them and what he
calls mnlip^est??!""^

Peters suggests that the
learning of habits, even when
they
are not fully understood,
may be an important part
of
what is required in developing
a rational, principled
moral code. This argument is
parallel to the position
taken in Part I of this work,
that political socialization,
though not issuing in a reflective
understandina or
perspective on political life, may be
seen as a prerequisite
to political education.

A further, related, question can be
raised about
the notion of objectivity in morals,
Kohlberg connects
the logical criteria of reversibility
to the reciprocity
of Justice and to the uni versalizability
of moral
3.

Judgments.

Alasdair Maclntyre (as one among those who

have questioned the possibility of generating
a list of
[formal]

defining characteristics of morality) notes that

universality of application is involved in conceiving of

anx type of rule, Ke argues then that "there is nothing
specific to moral valuation in uni versalizability and in
so far as moral valuations are not expressions of rules

12S

they are not unlversalizable.

••

envisaged where
moral va^u!J^on^are°Lt"^'
extreme would
^he one
those fn^^T^^'^^i^^'^^*-

in certain situations of
moral oerplexitv
H-^-cj-^-ity

is the case with

supererogation^

matelv say

wv^at-

^^^^^

4.-U

•.

Tn T.Z

.

LL'n

^o and

'

.

,

,

,

This

'""^l^^ °f

°f^"^
=

?lln'; Sn::."?:^,L?^r
'^7"
j-ogicaiiy
«nn°;*
cannot, be universalized. 143
'

want to refrain fro^ entering
into this arena of
debate about the .leaning of morality
and the type of
criteria proper to distinguishing
moral from other types
of discourse. I will grant that
a fully developed moral
person may act on principle, and that
his type of Judgment
differs in an important qualitiative
sense from conventional Judgments which hinge on "doing
the done thing.- There
Is in other words, a developmental
dimension to the
I

distinction between traditional and principled
moral codes
which comes out in considering how it is that
people can

come to act on self -accepted (autonomous)
principles. ^44
What

I

want to follow up on is the more general

consideration of what types of concepts enter into
practical discourse - on what there are reasons for doing
or for bringing into being.

I

want to ask whether there are
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not at least

see

practical concepts important in the
political discourse and the
political Judgments which
provide the flesh and hones
of political life which do
not Share the central
characteristic that Kohlher.
ascribes
to mature .oral thought
(and Piaget to formal
thought)
- I.e. reversibility (or universalizability)
.
dealing
With this question, we will
also be indirectly calling
into question Kohlberg^s
Judgment that the criterion of
mature social-moral thought is
tied to a single concept
like Justice and not to a more
general dimension of
rationality.

m

We might consider such concepts
as courage and
integrity, or autonomy and creativity,
or being critical
and displaying foresight. For example,
a man might find
good reason to act courageously in a
situation in which
he could not demand it of others, or
see it as their

duty also - an act of supererogation as
Maclntyre noted
above. Richard Peters has suggested viewing
these higher-

order traits of character as examples of human
excellence

which we find admirable, but which do not necessarily
call forth approval in a moral sense. 145 por they refer

to the manner in which something is done rather than

precisely what it is that is done (i.e. they indicate
development of human capacities

) .

We may disapprove of

the specific activities in question, such as robbing

a
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trams or having

a Jo)ce at someone
else's expense.

And
yet we may retain some
'^sneaking admiration"
for the
excellence displayed in the
enterprise - «„o>.
ciiuerprise
such as courage
and foresicrht
the fir-atfirst case or creativity
g i: in th*»
and critical
acumen in the second.

m

.

Similar notions come to mind
when we consider the
range of interpersonal relationships
which we enter into
and develop during the normal
course of life, in these
relationships certain "reactiveattitudes and feelings,
to which we attach great
importance, emerge - such as
gratitude, resentment, forgiveness
and love. It is these
notions 1 will consider in the next
section.
But first

I

want to note that these two types
of

notions - character traits and reactive
attitudes - share
one feature in common. It is that they
are connected

intimately with what it means to be a "person".
As Peters
develops this idea:
Being a person is connected conceptually with
having what I call an assertive point of view, with
evaluation, decision and choice, and with being, to
a certain extent, an individual who determines
'his
own destiny by his choices. It is connected, in
other words, with reason in its various aspects.
are all persons in that normally we have a potentiality
for developing such capacities to a considerable
degree. 146
'/>?e

The criterion of development which we want to

propose as appropriate to the sphere of social and
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political judgment is that
of reflective
rationality. To
aeliberate reflectively on
political <^estions
involves
consiaering or treating others
as .ore or less
developed
persons who are capable of
.ore fully developing
the

capacities which mark the. as
persons - that is the
.ore
••intellectual" excellences
U.e critical thinking

and
foresight, the richness of
"affective" life brought out
in forgiveness and love, as
well as those virtues which
lie on the border, such as
integrity and courage. Political
aiecourse and Judgment involves
(to anticipate the argument
in the next section) concepts
such as these (i.e. autonomy,
resentment, courage, etc.) which
are not necessarily
••reversible" in the Plaget or Kbhlberg
sense. These

notions are connected, on the one hand,
to the development
of reason, and on the other hand,
to the idea of being a
person.

Cognition, Affect, and the Unity
of Mental Development

want to consider now the distinctions which
were
Introduced earlier between cognitive and affective
aspects
of mental life, and between social and physical
spheres
I

of

Judgment. My comments are based upon a reading of the

final section of an article Piaget first published in
1940,

"The Mental Development of the Child.

"^'•^

In this

132

article we find one of
his rare attempts to
aeal with
both cognitive and affective
aspects of the thought
of
adolescents,

Plagefs essential thesis

Is that cognition
and

affect are two aspects of
the same phenomenon.
Concepts
for dealing with the physical
world or the Interpersonalsocial world are similar in
having this "double
aspect".

David Elkind summarizes the
position as follows.
By and large Piaget would
seem to hn

a

The cognitive systems termed
''personality and '.s^lf"
If they differ f'om
^"^'^ respect.
o?herV^f^f
systems - such as those dealina
7''^^^^^
w^th
th^ physical
^^>.
the
world - then it is in terms of
their
^^"^
content, not their mode of operation. 149

What is interesting (or troubling)
about this
article (and other treatments by Piaget
and Kohlberg) is
that Piaget speaks of a parallelism and
interaction
between cognitive and af fective/sori
development.

Exactly parallel to the elaboration of the formal
operations and the completion of the construction
of
thought, adolescent affectivity asserts itself
through the development of the personality and its
injection into adult society ....
Now this personal
system cannot be constructed prior to adolescence,
because it presupposes the formal thought and
reflexive constructions we have Just discussed. 150

To summarize the difficulty which might be thought

to arise here, we can aski

is Piaget postulating an over-
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sphere o. Jua^.nts
a.out t.. p.,.,.,,
,,,,,, ^ ^^^^^ ^^^^
point Of interpretation
only to deny it. as
Piaget
definitely
xy woulti
•v-.
wouio. But the manner
of exDoq^^^r^r,
i ^
,
c-«.position could
lead
to misinterpretation
of Piaaefs
^laget s theory of
*
mental life,
along the lines of what
Richard reT:ers
Peters fin^.
finds common in
child development textbooks.

use of intellect w^re
free froA nf

f

morality and the

awareness, each of which has
its affec?i5e aspect. 151
But Piacret has no such
intentions, for he holds fast
to
the position that "personal
schemas, like all others,
are both intellectual and
affective." He continues.

We do not love without seeking
to understand, and we
y.^''^'' ^^'^'^ "'^^^^^^^ ^ ^"^^1*^
of judgment.
tL. when we speak of 'affective
Thus
schemas', itmus;
be understood that what is meant
is merely the
affective aspect of schemas which are
also intellectual.

The theory can best be conveyed by
pointing to the

dialectical interaction, in mental development,
between

application in the social and physical spheres. The
thrust
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Pia^et.s treatment o.
t.e senso.v-.otor
sta,. 3,..s to
revolve arouna th,
aeveXop^ent of certain
cental sKiUs
(with cognitive and
affective aspects) l„
,,,Ung „lth
th. Physical woria.
he Is sufficiently
aialectlcal to
allow that certain social
experiences ana concepts
are
crucial to the development
ana elaboration of
certain
level of thought
the physical sphere.
Por exa.pl-

m

in speaking of the
adolescent's "new capacity
to orient

himself toward what is
IS a^-str^^r-i=r>^ not .
abstract and
immediately
present .
which ... is indispensable
.
instrument
in his adaptation to the
adult social framework ......
he says "there is no
doubt that this is the most
direct
and, moreover, the simplest
manifestation of
.

formal

thinking. "153
The point of interpretation
is,

I

hope, settled.

But two more points must be
made. First, there is an
important and intimate connection
between the affective
aspects of mental life and the
development of inter-

personal-social concepts. This connection
comes through
clearly when we look at those "reactiveattitudes and
feelings which emerge in participative
interpersonal
relationships. Second, we are still faced
with the problem
of finding ways of describing the overall
character
of

the levels in the development of mental
life. In the

article mentioned earlier ("The Mental Development of the
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Chiia..),

P,.,et ..e,uentl, .e.ers
to the ..reversiMUty.
ana ..reflectiveness.,
of for.aX t.ou.nt,
..t these ter.s
ao not appear at all
the discussion of
social/affective
development, x want now to
loo. at how Pia.et
conceives
of the unity in mental
development, and defend
this
conception in modified form.
The necessity of
modification
Will come out when we loo.
at certain important
features
of reactive interpersonal
attitudes.

m

in the article we are
considering, Piaget offers

the following insight into
the threads of continuity
and
discontinuity in the mental lifej
conclusion, let us

point out the basic
unit.. of the process
unity
which, from the construction
universe by infantile sensor^^oto?
inLnf^'^^'
reconstruction of the
wnr?d i'^^:?^^'.^^^^^
^ypothtico-deductive thinking o^ the
^Z]t
^"^wledge of the concre^i ^orld
der^ve^f^
^^^^^^
operations of middle
cM^dhoo^
childhood. w
Je have seen how these

^

successive

^''^^^^^ ^ decenterina of the

?n?t??i"'^''"^
f ^r^^
initial egocentric
point of

vie^n order to place it
^ver-broader coordination of relations and
ion^
concepts, so that each new terminal
grouping further
integrates the subject's activity by
adapting it to
^^^^^^^^
^^^^ intenectual
e?aS::r^;r^'"''^.^""''^^elaboration,
we have seen affectivity graduallv
disengaging itself from the self in order
thanks to the reciprocity and coordination to submit,
of values,
to the laws of cooperation. Of course,
affectivitv
is always the incentive for the actions
that ensue at
each new stage of this proaressive ascent,
since
affectivity assigns value to activities and distributes
eneray to them. But affectivitv is nothing without
intelligence. Intelligence furnishes affectivity with
its means and clarifies its ends .... in reality,
the most profound tendency of all human activity is
progression towards equilibrium. Reason, which
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Reason, rational action,
or rationality
cental
life - these, then, are
the phenomena which
have this
double aspect of cognltlvlty
and affectlvlty. intellectuality and emotionality.
Placet has been engaged
the description and
clarification of the characteristics
of different levels or types
of rationality. This is
the
thread of continuity In
mental development.

m

m

But because Plaget finds
a fundamental coherence
or structuring of the reasoning
processes of a child at
a certain level of thought,
he must also account
his
descriptions for discontinuities
in the development of
reason.155 This development Involves,
in other words,

m

qualitative transformations in the
mode of reasoning,
Plaget offers a rich variety of
concepts for getting at
the essential characteristics of
rationality at the level
of mature or formal thought. In
different places he has
said that mature thought Is detached,
objective,
equilibrated, reversible and reflective.
Plaget himself has
noted that these are different perspectives
or conceptual
tools for getting at the essential characteristics
of
the reasoning processes.

What

I

want to propose here Is first of all, that

the "reflectiveness" of mature socio-political thought be
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,

taken as central to its
understanding, and as the
central
cognitive criterion of
political education,
I will
present, in the remainder
of this section, the
rudiments
of a philosophical argument
that mature socio-political
thought cannot be "reversible"
and "objective" in quite
the same sense indicated by
Piaget. To do this we must
return to a consideration of
the "reactive" interpersonal
attitudes we have mentioned, and
the sense in which they
may enter into mature "reflectively
rational"
thought.

These attitudes and feelings (e.g.,
resentment and
gratitude, forgiveness and love, hate
and hurt feelings)
are "reactive" in the sense that they
depend on the
attitudes and feelings of other human
beings toward us. 156

These feelings have at their core a view
of the good-will
or malevolence which others have toward
us. And they

point to "the very great importance that we
attach to the
attitudes and intentions of other human beings,
and
the

great extent to which our personal feelings and
reactions

depend upon, or involve, our beliefs about these
attitudes
and intentions.

"^^'^

Now, to return to our central problem, the

characterization of mature (or formal) thought, we find
that Piaget attaches importance to two achievements which
find expression in reflectiveness of thought. Formal

thought is, first of all, thinking about thought. It

i
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implies a sort of detachment
attained when the direct
operations on concrete reality
are themselves represented
and operated on in propositional
form.

Secondly, in

formal thought there is a reversal
of relations between
the real and the possible. Piaget
and Inhelder sum up
these two features as follows
Formal thinking is both thinking about
thouaht
^
operational
iS^^r''^^^:;^'
system
which operates on propositions whose
truth, in
relational, and numerical
2"
^"rV?^^''^?^^
operations) and a reversal of relations
between what
IS real and what is possible (the
empirically qiven
comes to be inserted as a particular sector
of the
total set of possible combinations ). 153
It is the second sense of reflectiveness
that I

want to consider - the quality which assigns the
real to
a "mirror-reflective" relation to an empirically
discover-

able subset of the logically possible.

I

want to

a rgne

that the featu re of formal thought which Piaget ties to
this

s ense

of reflectiveness - its reversibility and

,

to some extent, its objectivity - cannot be characteristic

of tho se social attitudes and feelings we have called

"reactive ". And it is at least doubtful whether any

mature thought about social phenomena can be reversible
and objective in quite the sense that Piaget attaches to

these terms. The argument follows from three points.
1,

The reactive aspect of these interpersonal

attitudes is not simply a mirror reflection. Rather, there

.
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is an indefinite series
of reflections.

Por in for.in,
beliefs a.out others, there
is .ore than Just an
account
n^ade of their beliefs
about .e. We consider
also their
beliefs about my beliefs about
them, and so on.
2.

In thinking reflectively
about and forming

beliefs about this series, we
are not Just detached
observers (although there is a
sense, captured by the
notion of role-taking, in which
a certain detachment is
necessary to grasping the perspective
of the other and
attempting a coordination). Rather,
we are parttclo.n^.
and thus in an important sense
these attitudes are nondetached. It is conceivable that this
participative
attitude can be suspended, but as Strawson
notes,

"a

sustained objectivity of interpersonal
attitude, and the
human isolation which that would entail
does not seem
to be something of which human beings would
be capable,

even if some general truth were a theoretical
ground for
it. "159
3.

We are not just participants tout court in
social

life, but participants in relationships whose
fabric is

dependent on specific beliefs about others and their
attitudes. Because of this, new information or

a

change

of beliefs may alter (sever or deepen) a relationship in

such a way that it can never be the same again. But at this

point our thinking about this relationship is in a
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sense Irreversible. The
ramifications of a change
in
belief can alter the whole
interpretative framework.
Cne
cannot reverse his thought and
think about what it was
like "When she loved me," when
new information alters
his
belief about what was before the
core of his interpretati ve
framework - i.e. when he learns that
she was deceiving
him all along. We are not framing
"hypotheses" in forming
beliefs about others in these relationships,
but something
more like hedging our bets in the
risk of investment in
human social life. But however our bets
are hedged, they
cannot be totally withdrawn in the way
a disconfirmed

hypothesis can be discarded.
I

conclude, then, that an important range of
concepts

about interpersonal relations, tied to the
notion of being
a person,

point to a certain irreversibility of mature

thought about social life.^^O

j

^^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^ ^^^^

character trait concepts, tied to both the social conditions
presumed by the process of public discourse and to the
Idea of developing one's capacities as a person, are

similarly applied reflectively without the implication
of reversibility.

Charles Taylor comes to similar conclusions after a

somewhat different argument.

Reversibility implies a grasp of things as
systems which can undergo a coherent set of transfromations as ideally manipulable entities; and
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them. Bu? an oblectl?e

unal^J

S?""^"^

'^'^iP^

«lth

Taylor emphasizes the affective
or striving aspect of
interpersonal relations, spea).ing
of the working through
of a tension-filled relationship
imagination, or playacting, in order to better
grasp its significance.

m

^i^^^en sources of tension
in a relationship,
relatfon^h?
for instance, we can out it in
perspective; and with this we alter
the reLt^onship
in some degree, so that its
past form can become
entirety; and by this I me
not
"Jusr^h'r^'"
Just that we cannot return to it
in fact but th^^
^'^^^ ^^^^P inteUectuany'of a
return path; in '^l.^
r^tu^Hatr?
other words, cur thought here is
lignif^^aice
a swZdl?'";';."'"^'
Significance. To attempt to treat it as is
an
object, which can be examined in
abstraction from our
^^^^^ ^--^ from th?s
8Wlnr^'%'i;
sharing and hence alter the relationship
We
cannot become disintricated enough from
these
Situations of involvement to dominate them
as
Tnanipulable objects, and hence objectivity
here has
to mean something else; it can only mean
that we
come to put them into perspecitve. 162

L

....

Here we arrive at our conclusion about Piaget's
and Kohlberg's conceptions of mature social thought*
it

cannot be reversible and objective in exactly the sense

which they seem to intimate by those terms. It is for this
reason that

I

have chosen the reflectiveness of mature

social thought as an essential characteristic. In our

assessment, then, there remains only the further clarifi-
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cation Of What we .ean by
the reflectiveness
of .ature
social thought.
we are interested
primarily in the reflectiveness
of
practical reasoning, which
involves questions of
what
there are reasons for doing
and what there are
reasons
for bringing into being. I.t
.e begin by putting
fo.ard
the core clai. I want to
clarify as a defensible view
of
What is involved in reflective
practical reasoning. The
claim is that when a reflectiveness
.,,_„^,„

is attained,

the crucial achiev<.^o nt 1^

t.h.

.v.i..,.

formulate new altern.Mv.. f or .nti
on outsid.

£^MIgwork.of^grm5 and goals

^S^gna-Conflicting_a^^
and autono'pous manner

.

^

.nd

t-^

.

reconcile or

of action

m

oW.o

a princip led

It is not a choice of means to
a

given end, as in conventional (or
instrumentally rational)
thought, where, according to Kohlberg, the
ends are given
in the social mores and sustained by
Justification in

terms

of upholding the social order. Rather, in
reflective thought

one is able to deliberate on the ends of action,
to hold

them up and view them from many angles or perspectives.

.\nd,

most importantly, there is an awareness that since we are

crucially implicated participants in social life, actions
can have qualitatively different results. We become aware
that choice among ends which have qualitiati vely different

results is, in effect, choice of a future self. We become
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capable of understanding and
choosing a.ong alternative
personal ideals and for^s of
life.

Benemve_£^tionallty

I nvolves, then, holding „d di f fer.nv ^
^ds or ,,m, „^
action and asking what the reason. ...
aoln.
.
terms of What vmd of self .nd
^v-^^

for brl ncrlng Into being
The distinction

I

.

„

.

have drawn between instrumental

and reflective rationality resembles
that made by Dewey
(noted in Chapter I) between "wide and
narrow use of
reason" when we deliberate, that is,
rehe.^rse
in

Imagination various competing possible lines
of action.
latter holds a fixed end in view and
only upon means of reaching it. The
former regards the end in view in deliberation
tentative and permits, may encourage the coming as
into
view of consequences which will transform it
and
create a new purpose and plan
Deliberation
is not an attempt to do away with this
opoosition of
quality by reducing it to one of amount as with
utilitarian rational calculation. It is an attempt
to uncover the conflict of aims in its full scope
and bearing
in short, the thing actually at
stake in any serious deliberation is not a difference
in quantity, but what kind of a person one is to
beco'Tie, what sort of self is in the making,
what
kind of a world is making. 163
'^^^

^
nv.
deliberates

....

....

We can see now how developmental psychology is tied

to the developmental perspective. For with the achievement

of mature reflective thought

-

with the ability to gauge

in imagination possible self-transformations, and to

accept the irreversible altering of relationships which
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way arise from
a^-K^
rom fh<
this« achievement
of perspective „e are
capable of vlewln, others
as agents, as
persons

wlthl

assertive point of view
„ho are also potential!,
capable
of acting to control
their destiny, to enrich
their
emotional lives and to
develop their higher
order
capacities. Another connection
is that in thinking
reflectively about oneself and
others as persons capable
of developing their capacities
to a high degree,
the

question of the possibility
of wide scale human development arises. That is. in what
sort of society Is the
development of human excellences -

fuUy

reflective persons

- possible,

developed,

and how might this society

come into being. The question
is, basically, how to
create
a rational society. To speak
of a rational society is not
to specify what partlclar aims
might be pursued by
members of the society or the
specific social practices
shaping the form of life considered
desirable.
It is

only to say that it would be capable
of providing
conditions for the full development of

reflectively

rational citizens. This type of thinking
might be called
Utopian In the modern sense that what ought
to be

the

good society - is intimately connected with a
view of
how it might be brought into being. IS"* We can
sum up by
saying that reflectively rational social and political

thought involves at least four components: 1) a view of
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hun,an excellence,

tied to the notion of
persons ana their
full development, 2) a view
of the rational society,
3) a
theory of society and social
change, 4) a moral point
of
view (Which attempts to refine
the principles used
to deal
with conflicts arising In the
achievement of human

excellence - the full development
of reason, and the
rational society).
Let me conclude by pointing
out that this proposed
criterion of mature socio-political
thought (-reflective

rationality) is normative in two senses.

It is normative,

first of all, because the stages
of mental development
(the development of reason) are
picked out from a particular
angle or perspective. The distinction
between instrumental
and reflective rationality is but one
of many criteria

which could be proposed for better coming
to grips with
the qualitative structural development
of practical

reason.

Just as

I

have given reasons for rejecting "reversibility"

as a major developmental criterion in this
sphere, so

also may further empirical and conceptual inquiries
force
a

revision of this notion of "reflectiveness". This

criterion is normative in

a second,

related, sense also.

For if it is to pick out a significant feature of mental
life, it stands in need of justification. That is, if it

proves an empirically fruitful and conceptually clear
notion, the question arises as to how much reflectiveness
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ou,ht to

p.o.ot.a .or „.at
proportion a.a se,™ent
of
the population, and how
this ought to be done.
This Is
the «oral component of
the developmental
perspective, ^s
Taylor puts it, a developmental
criterion is normative
because "concepts of successful
maturity are the basis
of
arguments concerning how we
should live. "165 ^ tentative
attempt to Justify this
criterion is presented
the
concluding chapter of this study.

m

CHAPTER
^^^ixaJ.

VIII

i^oYCHOLGGY: AN ASSESSMENT

(H)

Introduction
in the preceedlng chapter,
two central points
e.eraed
about the enterprise of
constructing a developmental

political psychology geared
to the study of political
education. The first
f i r•Q^ is
<
a, general point about
the fundamental character of Piagefs
developmental psychology. It
was pointed out that Piaget
has been engaged in the
tas.
of reconstructing the
ontogenetic development of reason
or rationality. I argued
further that the highest
level

of rationality in socio-political
thought is best
characterized in terms of its
reflectiveness; that the
development of practical reason is
intimately co nnected
with the notion of a person, and
that a certain human
excellence is apparent in the emotional
life and character
of individuals who attain a
perspective on life through
reflection. The second point is that an
understanding of
reflective social and political thought
requires recognition
of the participative character of social
relations. Actions

are tied not Just to the beliefs of the
agent, but to his

beliefs about others* beliefs, and how he figures
into
their beliefs, etc. It is the shared significance of

behavior which warrants describing it as action. And it
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is this participative character
of social life which

requires qualifying the sense in
which social thought can
be reflective - i.e. it cannot
always be reversible in the

way reasoning about physical objects
can be.
In this chapter

I

want to proceed by showing how

this second point is related to the
explanations offered
by Piaget and Kohlberg for advance in
levels of rationality
with ontogenentic development, and to the
claims made by
Kohlberg concerning the explanation of action.
I will be
trying to lay the basis for the argument that
the categories
of a theory of social structure enter at
crucial points
in an explanatory theory of political
education.

The Explanation of Development

Developmental psychologists have, on a number of
occasions, been criticized for "ignoring the social

dimension" in their inquiries. This attack might be seen
as rooted in a misunderstanding of the tasks developmental

psychologists have set themselves, or in

a

disagreement

about the characterization of the phenomena to be
investigated,

or in a more basic disagreement about

the character of a "science" of psychology and its

epistemological underpinnings. But this criticism has
also been advanced by some philosphers sympathetic to the

developmental perspective who are concerned with the interpretation of Piaget* 3 work. For example, Stephen Toulmin

:
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comments on •^conservation"
studies, in which it is
found
that the "preoperational"
child cannot understand
that an
identical quantity of water is
contained in a tall, thin
glass and a short, fat one
The experimenters seeminaly
ignored the
.
„
socially
determined - not to say conventional character of the tasks they invited
the cMld ^o
perform, notably, the ambiguities
in their lino^i stir
expressions, (a young child can hardly
be
to
guess intuitively by what exact
standards, and ^n
P^-ticular criteria, his interrogators
^nt^nd^h/^'f
° ^^T} ^'J'' "^^^ ambiguious question,
"?s
Is twi".
there 'more*
in the one container than in the
amount in both?"; and we have no
°; Sf'^""^.,^^®
right to be surprised if his resulting
behavior is
by our standards, inconsistent 167

expS

.

In this section

I

want to follow up on this last

criticism, and show how the "ambiguity" of the
concepts

which guide social practice, or the "inconsistency"
of
their criteria of application, may be related to
the

explanation of mental development.

I

will consider the

development of reflective socio-political thought and how
far the explanatory schemes of Piaget and Kohlberg take

us toward an understanding of its development.
Before we proceed, I want to state a central theme

of my argument. In speaking of human development as the

development of persons (or potential persons), and in
segmenting that development into a scheme of levels of
rationality,

I

assume that the explanation offered must
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taxe into account the
specific features of
the level of
reasoning to he explained.
Because of this, no
general
explanation can he offered
to account for all
the transformations in .ode Of
reasoning which can he
observed
auring the course of
ontogenetic development.
More
specifically, it is important
to distinguish between
the
factors which can be
oe cited to
ho explain
^v^i 4
the achievement of
instrumental rationality
(operational thought,
conventional
-norality) and those cited
in accounting for the
development
of reflective rationality
(formal thought, principled
morality). Instrumental
rationality can be viewed as the
use of reason
the minimal sense of what
is required if
there is to be any
social-institutional life at all. It
is
the achievement picked out by
socialisation to the basic
principles of social life, through
Induction into
conventional forms of thought and
social practices. Here
we are speaking of the ability
to grasp ends or purposes,
fit an action to that end as a means
of its attainment, and
to regulate this conduct by reasons
available in public
discourse. 168 Because socialization is an
achievement, and
,

m

failure is possible, an explanation of
successful socialization must make reference to the specific social
practices
which led to this achievement, A general description
of

the tyee of factor involved In explaining socialization -

such as role-taking opportunities - is possible. 169 gut
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because the opportunity to ta.e
certain roles In certain
Circumstances could hinder or
fail to promote socialization.
It is necessary to specify
the character of successful
practices in explaining the
achievement of
socialization.

When we are attempting to
account for the development
of the ability to reason reflectively,
•—
xu is
n=^..
IS aiso necessary
±
ix» it
to cite the role of specific
social institutions
or

traditions. Why is this so? First of
all, the capacities
or abilities which are expressed in
an^: type of reasoning

cannot be exercised apart from some
practices such as
those in which we find them exemplified.
We must reason
about something, and practical reason
cannot be exercised
outside the context of some question about
actual praccices^^O
In the case of instrumental reasoning,
the practices
involved relate to the capacities required for
some

minimum level of functionina in any society. The
explanatory
role of social experience cannot then involve picking
out

features of social practice which distinguish one society
from another.
In turning to the explanation of the development of

reflective rationality, however, we do not find this type
of reasoning in all societies. Where it is found, it may

be recognized in practices which may vary from one society
to another, according to the specific beliefs and ideals

of the people. Critical thinking, autonomy, and creativity

may be recognized in very different practices, but they
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are not at all n ec.ssarllv
connected with the minimal
requirements of social life. So
it is these specific
practices - institutions, traditions,
structural features
Of society - which must be
cited as necessary preconditions
for the development of reflective
rationality, i believe
that some such distinction as
this is implicit in the
explanatory schemes offered by Piaget
and Kohlberg.
However, they have failed to develop
this point, and this
I believe is one of the major
weaknesses in their theories.
To correct this deficiency would move
them in the direction
of a more adequate social psychology.
^'

Pi^qet and the Explanation of Mental Development

.

In the comments introducing the last
chapter, we said that

the distinctions employed by developmental
psychologists
like Piaget and Kohlberg - the phenomena they
identify -

provide an important and useful framework for research.
But it was implied that in order to provide an
explanatory

theory with real fruitfulness for social scientists
several important tasks remain.

I

want to focus here on

two interrelated tasks which have remained peripheral to
the endeavors of developmental psychologists. The first

difficulty is that the explanatory theory is constructed
at a very high level of abstraction, with attention

focused on identifying the types of factors important in

development. Flavell*s comments bear on this point:
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The system is obviously
descriptive in h>,« sense
It has over the years
that
nrovirio^
information on the chana?na nh/ ""f^^^^ °^ detailed
nltion in the course
^^^onLoene^Jc'd'''^"^
obviously it also purport
to exnl^
r!^"^'^^"^describes.
^^^"^"^
Piaget^ecognizes w^^wL
""^^^
age is a vehicle for
^^^t
causes ra^w
self,
nonetheless the "real" cauLf'"'' ^ ^^""^
tically varied at the exoerimen^^? ? ^""f ""^^ systemastudies (although atLmSs
Piagefs
are made r^^.'"
theoretically) and hence few
preaictive
predict^velt'^''^
l^^^
statements
are made. 171
,

It is necessary, then,
to get at the specific
practices

Which promote mental development.
The second task is to
interpret these "real"
causes
in ways that can be made
relevant to the questions
which

have priority for social
scientists, especially those
bearing on social structure and
social change.

FlaveU

further Indicates how a psychologist
might conceive of
this task.
In effect, every time Piaget discovers
a new
form and describes its development the stage cognitive
is
immediately for further experimentation: to findset
out
of what social and individual variables the new
form
might be a function, i.e., socioeconomic backaround,
general intelligence, familial environment, personal
adjustment, and so on.l"2

Let us now turn to Piaget 's explanatory framework.

Earlier we said that cognitive-developmental psychologists

offer an "interactionist" explanation of development.

This

is a term through which the developmentalist hopes to con-

vey his attempt to avoid the a priorism of the maturationists and the crude empiricism of the environmentalists! the
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first type of explanation tends
to posit cental
structure
Without genesis and the second
tends to view development
as genesis without structure
(to use Piagefs
aphorisms).
Development, the genesis of mental
structures (modes of
thought), is to be accounted for
as due to the interaction

of an actively structuring organism
and his environment.
Piaget goes further than this,
to the extent of
identifying four general factors which
must be included in
any adequate account of ontogenetic
development. 173 Each
of these factors is conceived of as a
complex of conditions
which is necessary, but not by itself
sufficient, for

development.

The four factors are:

1)

"organic growth and

especially the maturation of the nervous system
and the
endocrine systems"? 2) "exercise and
.
acquired
.

.

experience in the actions performed upon objects (as
opposed to social experience)";

3)

"social interaction

and transmission"; and 4) "a process of equilibrium
in the sense

...

.

.

.

of self -regulation". 174

It is the third type of factor that is of importance
here. 175 I want to note in particular that the social

experience involved in ontogenetic development is of two
types, "social interaction" and "transmission".
type,

The first

"social interaction", corresponds on the one hand

to the experience of confronting other selves in a social
order.

This results in attaining the capacity to take the

155

role Of the other, or
cooperate.

So, on the other
hana,
"social interaction., corresponds
to the preconditions
for
c^evelopin, fro. sensory-.otor
intelligence to operational
thought (instrumental reason).

The second type of social
experience, referred to
as
"transmission', by Piaget. has
a .ore ambiguous
status.

One form of transmission,
"school-teaching., is cited
as
a factor in the explanation
of ontogenetic development. 176
But on the next page. Piaget
states that "^y explanation
of the child's development must
take into consideration
two dimensions: an ontogenetic
dimension and a social
dimension (in the sense of the
transmission of the successive
work of generations).. .177 it is this
sense of
"transmission..

which is of greatest importance to
social scientists, and
which is almost totally unexplored by
developmental
psychologists.
For the ".successive work of
generations.,

includes not only .'school-teaching", but also
the in-

stitutional and structural features of a society
which

emerge historically out of previous social forms.

An

explanation of the ontogenetic development of sociopolitical thought which excludes these factors cannot, in
Its turn in the circle of human sciences, provide a

satisfactory conception of the human constructions which
these successive social forms represent.

Only by exploring

this sense of "social experience" will we find the
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institutional and social-structural
preconditions for
development from conventional-operational
thought
to

principled-formal thought, from
instrumental to reflective
rationality. The social scientist
may be interested in the
relationship between the different
modes of thought and
the construction, maintenance
and transformation of
specific social forms. But this task
can proceed only as
a complement to an adequate
understanding of how these
social forms relate to (facilitate
or hinder) the development of forms of thought,
^*

^>^lberg*s Explan.ntorv FramewnrV. We
noted

earlier that Kohlberg proposes to account
for the role
of experience in moral development in
terms of certain
universal structural features of the environment,

and the

relation between specific experiences and the
child's
mental structure. In the interpretation of social
experience,
Kohlberg places great emphasis on role theory. The universal
structural features of the social environment he identifies,
"the fundamental inputs stimulating moral development,"

are referred to as "role-taking opportunities.

"^'^^

This

Is basically a specification of Piaget's "social interaction"

factor. The minimal capacities for social-moral life are

established in all societies because "all societies are
alike In the sheer fact of having systems of defined

complementary role expectations.

"^'^^

Thus role-taking
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opportunities are reouired if there
uiiere is
xs to "ho
.
be any
social
life, and social institutions
constitute the framework
for providing these opportunities
on a continuing basis.
Role-taking opportunities are a
minimal condition for
moving to the conventional moral Ivel.lSO
Kohlberg also
generalizes this notion of role-taking
opportunities, and
makes the further claim that "All
societies
have the same

basic institutions of family, economy,
social stratification,
law and government." These institutions
have, he
says,

"certain transcultural functional meanings"
in spite
of "diversity in the detailed definition
of these

institutions, "ISI
An important part of Kohlberg 's theory
is the claim

that "the 'normal* course of social experience
leads to

progression through the sequence" of stages, while
•specific forms of experience, like jail, may have a
•regressive' effect.

"^'52

Kohlberg himself cites statistics

which should lead to questioning this claim. In

a study

of middle class urban boys in three nation (U. S. A.,,

Taiwan and Mexico), Kohlberg concluded that "moral Stage
4 is the dominant stage of most adults. "^^^ Another study

by Kohlberg and his colleagues found that only 57% of their
subjects over 45 years old had attained formal operational
thought. ^^"^ Certainly, the

the "normal" course of social

experience cannot be said to be sufficient for the
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transition to reflective thought.
But we do not need to rely
solely on statistics
to
throw doubt on the adequacy of
Kohlberg^s conception of
the role of social experience
in development. There
are,
I think, good theoretical
reasons. We will look now
at

how Kohlberg views the "sequence
of groups or institutions"
in which a child participates
in the course of progress
through the stages of thought. In
order to get
a fuller

flavor of Kohlberg* s treatment,

I

quote at length.

The first group, the family, has
received the most
attention in socialization theories. From
of view, however, (1) family participation our point
is not
necessary for moral development,
^n^'^V?^''^>.'''"i^^''^\^^
and (2) the dimensions on which it
stimulates moral
development are primarily aeneral dimensions by
other primary groups stimulate moral develooment,which
i.e., the dimensions of creation of role-taking
oppportunities
The second group in which the
child participates is the peer group
;;hile
peer-group participation appears to be stimulating
of moral development, its influence seems better
conceptualized in terms of providing general roletaking opportunities rather than as having very
specific and unique forms of influence.
A third type of participation presumed important
for moral development is that of participation in the
secondary institutions of law, crovernment and, perhaps
of work. One index of differential opportunities for"
participation in the social structures of government
and of work or economy is that of socioeconomic
status. It is abundantly clear that the lower class
cannot and does not feel as much sense of power in,
and responsibility for, the institutions of government
and economy as does the middle class. This, in turn,
tends to generate less of a disposition to view these
institutions from a generalized, flexible and organized
perspective based on various roles as vantage points.
The law and the government are perceived quite
differently by the child if he feels a sense of

....

....
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potential particiDation in the
social ^^r?-.^
order than if
he does not. 135
"

My critique is as follows. In
each case of social
participation, Kohlberg abstracts from
the specific
influence of a social structural or
institutional facet of
social life in order to return to his
notion of
"general

role-taking opportunities". But since
"social" is defined
by Kohlberg as "the distinctively human
structuring of action
and thought by role-taking, "186 this amounts
to nothing
more than citing "social experience" as a type
of factor
in development. In terms of Piagefs division,
it
is

••social interaction" without transmission
of the succes<;ive

work of generations

.

One exception will be noted in the quote

above. Kohlberg speaks of "socioeconomic status" as
an

index not only of role-taking opportunities, but also
of a "sense of potential participation in the social

order." But how is this idea to be given full concrete

meaning in an explanation if all institutions (except,
e.g.. Jail, which has a regressive influence) are

stripped of their specific features which might be cited
as promoting or fixating development?-'-^'^

Part of the problem

I

believe, can be found in the

quantitative interpretation given to the notion of
"role-taking opportunities". Special features of institutions

which might make for moral progress are reduced to

,
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quantity of communication and sheer
amount of role-taking
opportunities
Participation is partially a matter
of she-r interaction and communication in the grouD,
communication presupposes role-taking. since
in addition
individual in the communication
thf decision-making
^^''"^r
and the
structure of the
enhances role-taking opportunities. The grouD
more the
individual is responsible for the decision
of the
group, the more must he take the roles of
others in
It ... .
VVhile leadership roles might be
expected
to require more role-taking than follower
roles, it is
also likely that "democratic leadership"
requires
more role-taking than "autocratic leadership"
on the
part of both leader and follower
.188
.
.
.

Institutions, groups and relationships are conceived as

distinguishable, then, in terms of the quantity of role-

taking going on, and presumably that is connected with
the opportunities for role-taking available.

The special

character, or qualitative difference between various

relationships, groups or institutions is reduced to

differences in quantity of role-taking opportunities.
But how could it conceivably be fruitful to distinguish

the essential character of institutions such as marriage,

slavery and bureaucracy in terms of the amount of role-

taking opportunities?"^

Kohlberg might reply that the

distinction is only for explanatory purposes, for

understanding the role of the institution in stimulatina
development, and not for classif icatory purposes.

reply may seem plausible, but

I

want to argue that

This

:
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certain e...nM.l and dlst1
Institutions can be

ncn.l .h^

i-np orfan^

m

^h-

^-tar^_^
gXElanatlon^

aeyeloE^ent - features which bear
on the opportunities
of
social participants not only to
take roles, but also
to
construct new roies,
^, -u
rolp<? 190 to probe
^
in
a manner conducive
to reflection on what one really
191
wants,

Ernest Gellner argues that the
concepts and
institutions in a society are interrelated. ^92
^""^ beliefs are themselves, in
a sense,
^n«^^^^?I'''^^^^
institutions
among others, for they provide a
kind
of fairly permanent frame, as do other
institutions
independent of any one individual, within
which
individual conduct takes place. In another
they are correlates of all the institutions sense
of a
society; and to understand the working
of the concepts
of a society is to understand its institutions 193
.

And he adds in a footnote
It is, however, very important not to misunderstand this point. For it is not true to say that to
understand the concepts of a societv (in the way its
members do) is to understand the society. Concepts are
as liable to mask reality as to reveal it, and
masking some of it may be a part of their function. 194

In offering an example to illustrate his argument, Gellner

asks us to imagine a society in which the word "boble"

applied to characterize people.

Research reveals that bobleness or bobllitv is
attributed to people under either of the following

is
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L

courage, and generos^",
"Prlahtness.
cluef
*
person holding a certalA Iffint
is also i£3oia^%^^^J^i?f^^0'^-,^-J-t-i" Position.

Bobility-(a) appears to be a
descriptive term (descripti^Lve
of a character trait), while
bobility-(b) is an ascription,
not dependent on the characteristics
of the person
in

question. But the people in this society
do not distinguish
two concepts, bobility-(a) and
bobility-(b) 3o it appears
we have a case of a concept with
multiple and incoherent
.

criteria for its application.
Gellner wants to point out that incoherent
concepts
- or concepts with Inconsistent criteria - can
be soci-.lly

functional, that there can be "social control through
the
employ.Tient of absurd,

ambiguous, inconsistent or unintel-

ligible" concepts and doctrines.

Bobility is a conceptual device by which the
priviledged class of the society in question acquires
some of the prestige of certain virtues respected in
that society, without the inconvenience of needing
to practice them, thanks to the fact that the same
word is applied either to practitioners of those
virtues or to occupiers of favored positions. It is,
at the same time, a manner of reinforcing the appeal
of those virtues, by associating them, through the use
of the same appellation, with prestige and power. But
all this needs to be said, and to say it is to bring
out the internal logical incoherence of the concept
- an Incoherence which, indeed, is socially functional, "^^^
And likewise "social change may occur through the replace-

ment of an inconsistent doctrine or ethic by a better
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one. ^198 social change thus
.ay conceivably .esult
when a
person notices the incoherences
of doctrines or concepts,
and attempts to reform the
institutions which Justify
thl;
or "it may be that it invariably
is a discontented
segment
of society, a new rising class for
instance, which

exploits those incoherences, "199
It is thus one side of the
social-psychological

dialectic to view the role of reflection
in discerning
these inconsistencies and moving to maintain
or transform
the institutions they justify. The other
side,

of importance

here, is involved in the search for social
conditions,

relationships, and institutions which provide the
conditions
for reflection - the openness to (expectation of,
demand
for, etc.) want probing and role-construction. For the

identification of these social conditions is necessary
for an explanation of the development, beyond minimal

socially required level of operational thought, of
reflective rationality.
I

think some insight can be gained into the

sociological deficiency of Kohlberg's theory if we note

that he has been attentive primarily to the debate with
those who view socialization from the conformity
perspective. On this view, as we saw earlier, the

direction of mental change was distinguished in terms of

conflicting categories of conformity and deviance.
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support and alienation, etc.
f^hlberg wants to show
a
universal dimension of moral
development, which goes
beyond an equation of morality
with .ores. Thus he writes.

IsTo "w^'g^oupT^-L^rshrofd:?"^

sociological notions

is ofte^
«rt"^?he':M^s":tr::L''ri?'^"^"^
basic raoral values
from his family 'some ?rom°th»
'"^^^ .'^"^
conflict
c^nllfc^^^Jth""
with one another. Insteadv;i::rtenrto''
of DarticlDsHon
conflicting d':vei:oL'^t:?
^renSf ?rm^rSitv='^^''"'
trenas
in morality, it appsars that
parti-in^ti on n
converges in stirnulatinf t^e^deveLp2^°?°"
llnl^""^^
"^'^^
tranL?t?e'd
by
oy one
onf particular
particuT^r'r"^'^'''
group as opposed to another
^^^^P^ ^^^^ con^licti^a'
^ipdi'^r^r"
^r^^^^
immediate demands
upon the child, they do not seem
to present the child with basically
conf?ic?ina or
different stimulation for general .or.l
development 200
•»

•

•

.

If my critique to this point has
been coherent, it should

be clear that

I

would claim against Kohlberg that the

particular demands made on a child or an
adult may be
conducive to developmental failures - fixation
or

regression - rather than provide stimulation
for moral
development. Basic moral values and moral development
might not be promoted by one particular group to the

exclusion of others. But it is the effect of engagement
in particular institutions, or even the impact of

widespread social practices, that is important in
impeding or promoting development.
But it should be clear by now that Kohlberg 's

account of the explanation of development, particularly
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of the transition to
reflective thought, is deficient
on
at least two counts. First,
there is a failure to
include
the historical dimension of
social life, the imbeddedness
of relationships, groups,
institutions and traditions in
the ''successive work of
generations. "201 3^^^^^^ ^^^^^
a failure to grant qualitatively
distinct structural
features of society a different
role in promoting

different levels of development.
ought to note here, in anticipation
of objections
from developmental psychologists, that
Kohlberg does not
limit his understanding of the role of
experience in
moral development to "universal features
of experienced
objects (physical or social)." In addition
to this and
I

to logical analysis of concepts, he proposes
"analysis
of structural relations betv/een experience-inputs
and the
relevant behavioral organization". He calls this
a theory
of "structural conflict and structural match." This
type

of theory is required for precisely the reasons that we
have advanced in criticism of his sociological explanatory
ideas. An analysis of the "role-taking opportunities"

universally available in societies, he says, is

a

specification of "the general belief that the more the
social stimulation, the faster the rate of moral development."
Piowever,

"these theories do not account for specific

transitions from stage to stage or to eventual fixation
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at a particular stage. "202

The problem of moral change
of presenting stimuli which would aooear i-o
.^""^
are boS su?f^°.
f^^fi^iently
incongruous as to stimulate confn^?
^"^''^'^
existing stage schemata ani
su?fic?entL
^^^^^^^i^^tly
congruous
as to be assimilable w^^^
.
with some
accommodative effort, 203
The reason why this addition
to the theory fails to
satisfy my critique is that it
separates the sociological
and psychological notions advanced
to account for

development! "role-taking opportunities"
on the one hand,
and "cognitive stimulation" on the
other. It involves a
reduction of the qualitatively distinct
institutional
features of society (which emerge in an
historical

perspective on social structure) to quantitatively
interpreted role-taking notions, and the
reinsertion of
these qualitative-structural features at
the individual

psychological level. It is not just that the "successive
work of generations" is ignored, but this separation
also
leads to untenable assertions about the social
conditions

of development: for example, that the progression from

stage to stage is not promoted by the teaching of adults,

but is aided rather by optional "cognitive stimulation".
Richard Peters effectively criticizes the adequacy of

these assertions:
It looks ... as if Kohlberg's thesis about the
impossibility of adults bringing about conceptual
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concept Of "teacM^a-'ls'^^^^/Lployeaf
f Sr^tls''^""'
^<xn

oe acceiierated by a variety
of processes dnov,

call
ca!rthtr..''^""-rt''
this "cognitive stimulation", so'onrShlb:rg\:y
would call it "teaching". It is a but most oeooL
conceptual
if a restricted concept of "teaching"
employed which rules out the processesis being
bv means of
which adults help to get the child
into a'^p^sition
i^xon wnere
where
he can grasp a principle. 204

^

With the separation of social and individual
-psychological
explanatory notions, such confusions seem to me
inevitable.
From Thought to Action
We must also ask now what positive fruit
comes from

this assessment?

VThat

paths of inquiry remain, on the

terrain mapped out by the developmental perspective? As

we indicated earlier, there are two approaches to developmental study, each with a somewhat different set of
questions. We can view social practices as conditions which

relate to the development of rational capacities; or we
can view the levels of thought and judgment attained and
sustained in different social practices as conditions for
the maintenance or transformation of social life. For

our purposes this means that we can study the development
of modes of socio-political thought and view social

practices as conditions of this development; or we can

study socio-political institutions and practices, considering the explanatory role of the levels of thought or
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types of belief (as opposed
to specific beliefs and
belief
systems) available to members
of the society. While
these
inquiries have come to be separated
in the modern study
of man, they are in fact crucially
interrelated. Each
approach involves assumptions about
the direction and
possible results of the other. Since
I have chosen to
pursue the first, "psychological" side
of developmental
studios, I shall note here some of the
grounds on which
I base my belief in the
fruitfulness of a developmental
approach to the "sociological" side.
In line with his emphasis on role-theory,
Kohlberg

interprets the relation between level of thought
and

moral action in terms of the "definition of the
situation"
by the subject. The way in which an individual defines
a

situation will have a bearing on what course of action
he chooses.

VThile moral

judgment maturity is only one of
many predictors of action in moral conflict
situations, it can be a quite powerful and meaningful
predictor of action where it gives rise to distinctive
ways of defining concrete situational rights and
duties in socially ambiguous situations. The causal role
of moral judgment appears to be due to its contribution
to a "cognitive" definition of the situation rather
than because strong attitudinal or affective
expressions of moral values activate behavior. 205

A number of empirical studies have been done and
the results point to the explanatory power of developmental
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postulates. Kohll.., notes
studies in
larger percentage of subjects

wMch

a

consi.e.aMy

at the principled
level

refrained from cheating when
left unsupervised,
a
college group, while 42% of the
"conventional- subjects
cheated, only 11% of the
"principled" subjects did so.
And With a Sixth grade sample,
while 83^0 and 67% of the
"premoral" and "conventional"
subjects

m

(respectively)

cheated, 80% of the "principled"
subjects did not. 206
In another study of students
who listened
to

speeches outside of Sproul Hall before
its occupation
during the free speech movement at
Berkeley, it was
found that about 80% of the Stage 6
subjects and 50% of the
Stage 5 subjects actually sat in, but
only 10% of the
Stage 3 and 4 did so. 207
This type of study can also point the way
toward

advance in the explanations offered for the
actions of

individuals whose position exposes them to conflicting
or inconsistent social pressures, "Status inconsistency"
and "cross-pressure" hypotheses have been advanced to

account for the behavior of individuals in these situations.^

According to Lenski, for example, people regularly exposed
to social situations made ambiguous by their inconsistent

status are likely to "react against the existing social

order and the political system which undergirds it." The

theory is based on the supposition that "an individual
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With consistent statuses or ranKs
has
think of hi.nself in terms of that

a natural tendency
to

status or ranK which is

highest, and to expect others to
do the same," while
others "have a vested interest in doing
just the opposite,

that is, in treating him in terms of
his lowest status or
rank." "Since each regards his own
point of view as

right and proper, and since nei ther is likely
to
e£2b.l£::n^n__n^ej-,a^^

vi

^^^^

ew_t^^
^^^^^

are likely to be frustrated, and probably
angered by
the experience. "209 Presumably, it is the
frustration and

anger which are seen as a cause of the tendency to
blindly
"react against" the socio-political order.

But if we take

seriously Kohlberg's finding that "af f ective-situational
forces are less determining of moral decisions at the

principled than at the conventional level, "210 political

discontent might be seen as neither

a

blind response to

frustration, nor a mere "reaction against" what exists. To
the extent that an individual is capable of rational

reflection on his social situation, he is more likely
to be able to reconcile conflicting social expectations

and demands, to apply self -accepted and consistent

principles in an ambiguous situation.

Politically, this

could mean, for example, that voting would reflect

consistent recognition of one's interests, rather than
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a discharge of emotion as
a result of stress.
And with a

recognition of the interests of others
implied in the
development of moral principles,
political action could
be seen as directed toward transforming
those structural
features of society which generate
insonsistent pressures
and impede the development of reflective
thought. For at

this level one is capable of envisioning
a more rational
society and recognizing that the "emotional"
responses
of others can be tied to the failure of a
changing society
to present this change as an object of rational
assessment
and control. The crucial assumption in Lenski
s theory •

that individuals with inconsistent status will not
be

capable of "detached, analytical" reflection on their
situation

-

must clearly be taken as a variable feature

of social life.
And finally, developmental postulates could quite
pla,usibly be applied to larger problems of socio-historical

development, although almost no such study which specifically
ties in with developmental psychology has been done to
date. For example, if Kohlberg is correct in asserting

that principled thought and judgment are basically "law-

making" perspectives, we can ask what portion (per cent?
segment?) of

a

population must be capable of reflectively

rational thought before constitutional government is
possible, as opposed to universal application of

172

for.alistically codified customs,
or the looser syste.
of arbitrators in tribal
disputes. 211
At this point,

I

hope it can be said that
we have

sustained the argument tentatively
presented at the
beginning of this excercise in
critical but sympathetic
assessment. We said that the distinctions
brought out,
the achievements implicit in
developmental

stage criteria,

provide a useful framework for research
on political
education. Political education picks out
activities
fostering an achievement of excellence in
political

thought and action which is deemed desirable.
And the
framework of empirical research provided by
developmental

psychology can aid in filling out the formulation
of

a

justifiable ideal of human development. Such an ideal,
we
have suggested, is the development of those capacities
for reflectively rational thought which are essential for

full development as an autonomous person.
But the approach to the explanation of ontogenetic

development^^^ ^hich has been offered to date has not
recognized the importance of historically rooted
structural characteristics of societies. We have thus

been left also with an inadequate conception of how
political education might be promoted, within or through
the transformation of particular societies.
In the next chapter,

I

want to review some work
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which has been done in applying developmental
psychology,
and also to show that the goal of
political education

can

be justified even if one does not accept
autonomy as a
personal ideal.

C H A P T E R

IX

TOWARDS A THEORY OF POLITICAL
EDUCATION
Political Education and the Development
of Political Thinking
It is my belief that political
education ought to

be promoted to a far greater extent
than is now the case.
Our schools and other media of instruction
now devote

more attention to political socialization
than most
nations. But political education is still either
misunderstood or neglected. We must begin to establish
more

directly the case for political education and push
forward the argument that it ought to be promoted. But

before we can make this argument here, we must separate
out a distinct but related question: "Should a capacity

for reflective socio-political thought be promoted?" What
is the relationship between these two questions?
1.

Richard Peters' analysis of the concept of

"education" shows it to indicate the development of

desirable qualities in someone, and the extension of the

depth and breadth of his knowledge in the passing on of

a

form of life. In summarizing the conditions for the
correct application of the term "education", this analysis

distinguishes a value criterion and

a

cognitive criterion.

That is, the activities promoted through education must be
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considered valuable, and they
must lead to a growth of
knowledge and understanding. Both
of these types of
criterion are internally or conceptually
connected with
the notion of education. 213 But
specification of the
cognitive criterion adn^its of normative
dispute. Just

what do we mean by the achievements
of knowledge or reason
implied in the notion of an educated
person? And why do
we pick out these achievements in
one way rather
than

another?
The specification of the cognitive
criterion which

we have proposed for "political education"
is the development of reflective political thought. As we
noted
at the

conclusion of Chapter

6,

this notion of reflectiveness is

normative in two senses. It is, first of all, normative
in the developmental sense of laying down the outcome
of
a sequence of stages in political thought.

But from a

different perspective, it is also normative in the sense
of bringing out and focusing on one aspect of an inter-

related set of achievements in political thought. Other

criteria would shape our vision of mature political
thought somewhat differently. Focusing on this second
normative aspect of the criterion of reflectiveness will
allow us to note that there are other interpretations of
the cognitive criterion of education. We can then see
the point of justifying our focus on the reflectiveness
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of political thought as the
criterion of political education.
And this Justification should
shed light on the question
"why should political education be
pro?noted?"2l4
Before we approach this question
directly,

I

want to

look briefly at Michael Oakeshotfs
understanding of
political education. Here we will see a
somewhat different
interpretation of the cognitive criterion of
education;
and this will help us to get a better
perspective on the
task of evaluating reflective political thought.

Vve

will

look first at Cakeshotfs interpretation of political
education, and then at the main contrast model to which
he opposes this interpretation, 215
2,

In order to engage in political activity,

Oakeshott points out, it is necessary to understand

a

society's traditional manner of atte ding to its common
affairs. The initiation into a traditional manner of

behavior is nearly all-important for Oakeshott; but it is
most definitely not seen by him as a straightf or'v>7ard and

explicit process of training, Above all, political

education is a matter of imparting the potentials for
good judgment within

a

tradition; and in this one cannot

be trained. It can come only from teaching, observation,
and practice in exploring the potentials of a given

tradition. Education, for Oakeshott, is
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the process of learning, in
circumstances of c='ir..^and restraint, how to recocrnize
and make sonetMna i?^
ourselves. Unavoidably, it is a
which we enjoy an initiation intotwo-fold process in
wha?
better word I will call "civilization-, f or San^ of a
and in doina
so ^iscover our own talents and
aptitude, in relation
^^^^^ to cultivate Tnd^'^^"
use'?he.?2re'^^^^^^^'
The sort of knowledge and sort of
education appropriate
to politics is "knowledge, as profound
as we can make it,
of our tradition of political behavior "217
.-The fruits of
.

a

political education will appear in the manner
in which

we think and speak about politics and perhaps
in the
manner in which we conduct our political activity. "218
Reaping of these fruits of political education will
involve, then, a more profound understanding of political

activity and a more thorough understanding of our own
political tradition. The cognitive achievement of political

education is specified only this far

- that it

involves a

more profound and thorough understanding of a tradition
of political activity. Profundity and thoroughness of

understanding does not carry us too far in getting

a

grasp

on the cognitive dimension of political education. But we
can perhaps get a better view of Cakeshott*s argument by
looking at the position he is most concerned to defeat.

Oakeshott argues most strongly against an "ideological
style of politics". Ideology, on his interpretation, is

merely an abridgment of tradition. The error in ideological
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politics is that ideology is "regarded
as the sole guide
relied upon"2l9
political activity. It is a
defective
understanding of political activity
because
of the "sort

of knowledge and sort of education"
it proposes as

sufficient for political activity. "For
it suggests that
a knowledge of the chosen political
ideology can take
t]Te_£l3ce_of understanding a tradition of
political

behavior. "220 in terms of the framework of
concepts

I

have developed here, we can see that Oakeshott
is at
least arguing against an understanding of political

education which fails to recognize the essential

connection with the prerequisite political socialization
that

reflective thinking about politics requires that

one should have already grasped the accepted practices of

ongoing political society.
What sort of knowledge is appropriate to this

ideological style of politics, according to Oakeshott?
"VVhat is

required in the first place, is knowledge of the

chosen political ideology

- a

knowledge of the ends to be

pursued, a knowledge of v;hat we want to do." And what
sort of education is appropriate?
Moreover, the appropriate
an education in which the
is taught and learned, in
necessary for success are
so unfortunate as to find

sort of education will be
chosen political ideology
which the techniques
acquired, and if we are
ourselves emoty-handed in
(
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~^-^^^^^^-2l-^IlAaool^ an education in the skin
of abstract thought and
premeditation necessarv to
compose one for ourselves.
The education we shaU
ideology?22r^

'""^^'^'^ ^-^^"^^^ ^ political

Cur critique of Oakeshotfs
interpretation of
political education begins with his
understanding of
ideoloaical politics. We are particularly
concerned now
with the cognitive criterion of education
associated with
an ideological style of politics. Part
of the thrust of
3.

Oakeshotfs critique

is against those who advocate

political activity based on a reflective grasp
on principes
- and this latter is the position taken in
this
paper. The

point

I

want to develop is that our understanding
of

reflective political thought is not equivalent to his

characterization of "ideology": our understanding of
principles is not subject to the criticisms implied in

Oakeshott*s discussion.

A central point of the notion of critical reflection
is to move away from an understanding of our wants and

purposes as immutable givens in our lives, taken on once
and for all in our initiation into social life.

But

adopting an ideology is represented by Oakeshott as merely
learning and being taught what we want to do. Only if
we happen not to have an ideology conveniently at hand

does a "skill of abstract thought and premeditation" enter
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the picture, 223 Rathp-r
« v
4
father t->.=
than
being
central to an understanding Of ideological
thouaht, sKill in
abstract
aeliberation is required only
through the accident
of
special Circumstances.
Reflective thinking, as
we understand it, does require
sRill in abstract thought.
But

this sKill is seen as an
aspect of a capacity to
put
thinas in persepctive - the
perspecitve necessary to the
formulation and reformulation
of coherent and satisfyina
goals. This type of formulation
of the cognitive achievement
of education is omitted from
Oakeshotfs analysis of an
"ideological style of politics'\
Since on
his

vi,
-ew a

capacity for abstract thought is
not_.2ssential to
ideoxogical politics, his critique

might be taken as a

warning that political

s ocialization

ought not to be

narrow, confining and rigidly held
to an explicit manifesto
or summary of a society's political
practices. Without a
further specification of what is implied by
the discovery,
cultivation and use of our talents and aptitudes
(see his

definition of education, pp. 176-177), it is
hard to see
that a more profound and thorough knowledge
of traditional
practices would actually be an educational achievement.
Oakeshott sees principles as abridgments of

tradition which are erroneously treated as independent of
the practices of the society. But we have not treated

principles in this way (although Kohlberg's interpretation
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Of principles .ay be subject
to this critique).
Principles
are ^nerely second order
rules which are appealed
to
in

justifying the rules embodied
in social practices 224
^^.^
do indeed grow out of a society's
way of life, and are
.

not

independent in the sense of being
given fro. heaven, or
merely thought up in no context
whatever. But they do
give to those persons capable of
principled thought
a

certain potential independence from
particular rules or
practices.
Ultimately, the difficulty might be
traced to

Cakeshotfs ambiguous notion of tradition. On
this, we
can note

J.

G.

Pocock's perceptive comment that "if the

abridgement of tradition is ideology, the
criticism ot
tradition may be history. "225 it is the principled

criticism of tradition which the capacity for
reflective
political thought holds open as a possibility. In a world
so clearly beset with social changes, men can only make

history by developing this capacity.
Oakeshott offers a critique of ideology as an
"abstract" abridgement of the "flow of sympathy" bound

up in a traditional manner of doing things. We are reminded
here of our own critique of a conception of "formal thought"
in the social sphere which does not recognize the partici-

pative character of many social concepts, bound up as

they are in our important social relationships. We can
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also note our own critique
of Kohlberg^s
conception of
mature .oral thought as a
'.Justice structure,''
abstracted
from a principle such as
"benevolence.' which picKs
out
a "flow of sympathy" to
other persons.

Whether or not we share Oakeshotfs
evaluations of
these "abridgements of tradition"
is in one sense
irrelevant, then. For it is a somewhat
different notion
of a capacity for reflective
political thought -

necessary to effective and critical
participation in
modern political life, I will be arguing
presently that has been our main concern. But it
is

instructive

to use Oakeshotfs views on ideology as

a

jumping off

point in our evaluation of reflective
political thought.
Oakeshott grants the possible virtues of
ideology in

specific contexts.
In certain circumstances an abridgement
of this
kind may be valuable; it gives sharpness of outline
and precision to a political tradition v/hich the
occasion may make seem appropriate. When a manner of
attending to arrangements is to be transplanted
from the society in which it has grown up into
another society (always a questionable enterprise),
the simplification of an ideology may appear as an
asset. 226

4.

In what circumstances would

v^e

count the capacity

for reflective thinking about society and politics an

asset?

I

would like to argue that some degree of achieve-

ment in reflective reasoning is essential to all

183

participants in the political life of
modern industrial
societies. And the highest possible degree
of development
in reflective political thought is
essential
for a

democratic society in which all citizens can
participate
in shaping the course of social change toward
the creation
of desirable and satisfying forms of life.
To preface this argument, we can note first that

men can and do take up images of ideal forms of life
for
themselves. 227 These ideals may be taken whole and crudely

from various given patterns of life

- in

the way one might

acquire the habit of repeating a maxim on personal

behavior to children. Or they may be developed reflectively
in the course of one's experiences. They may be pursued

vigorously or left on the sidelines of life. A person
may have only one or many such ideals. And for one person,
various ideals may be persistent or fleeting, consistent
or conflicitng.

I

have in mind ideals v;hich pick out

forms of character in a social context

such as a life

given over to relentless devotion to duty, or personal
honor, or steadfast courage, or integrity, or personal

autonomy. All of these notions of an
I

ideal form of life

have mentioned pick out personal achievements. The

higher achievements of reason enter into some of these
ideals - autonomy, for example. The notion of autonomy

pulls the capacity for reflective reason into a vision of
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a satisfying ideal of individual
life, other ideals may

be connected in different ways
with various achievements
of reason.
The justification for the
promotion of reflective

political thought could be pursued in the
context of a
justification for the pursuit of an ideal
such as personal
autonomy. My analysis has, in fact, drawn
on the
notion

of autonomy at various points. At the
outset of this essay,
we introduced C. Wright Mills' idea that the
development

of substantive reason is essential to personal
freedom
in the modern world. And the notion of freedom
advanced

by mils and other in the critical tradition draws on the
ideal of autonomy. Choice of these ideals is ultimately
a

matter of personal committment.
But

V7e

need not be committed only to one ideal of

life. Consistently or coherently or not, we can draw on
a number of these visions in shaping our lives.

And it is

possible to place positive value on a society v;hich
permits and encourages adherence to many different ideals
of life.

And this latter position is consistent with

personally promoting

a single ideal.

I

want to direct

my comments here to the role of reflective reason in

a

complex and changing society in which

a

number of such

ideals have persistent adherents. And

I

would suggest

that most modern industrial societies meet this description.
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We can ask what the
social consequences might be
if
important social practices were
engaged in ..erely out of
habit, in a wholly unreflective
and uncritical manner. 2^0
Social practices and institutions
allow members of a
society to have their needs met, and
facilitate the

accomplishment of their purposes. These
practices might
in fact be important in establishing
a framework in which
the needs and wants of individuals may
be met, and satisfying forms of life shaped. But these
practices may be
engaged in without the understanding necessary
to get a
sense of their social importance. They may be
thought

unimportant merely because they are not thought about.
The manner of practice is habitual and unreflective.

Practices may become insulated from whatever capacities
for reflection that may develop, and the effect on the

development of these capacities in the sphere of social
thought may be stultifying. In certain circumstances,
however, the rigidity of the unreflective manner of

acting may be revealed, with potentially harmful
consequences for the individuals and the society.
In the first place, conflict between generations

may develop when the older generation can no longer convey
the sense of importance of these practices. The younger

generation may tend to discard them easily or resist their
adoption. And the rigidity of the practice of the older
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generation, and its inability to
justify what it •las
never reflected on, may be taken
as evidence that the
practice is not merely irrelevant, but
stupid and without
value.

Technological and other types of changes
may also
threaten a society's capacity to provide
satisfying forms
of life for its members. These changes
may alter or eliminate
the rationale of certain social practices
or institutions.

With the loss of inclination or ability to
understand and
reflect on the socially important purposes of certain

behavior patterns, practices may fail to adapt to new
circumstances.

^\nd

without this guidance and control,

there may be recurrent crises.

My purpose is not to describe modern industrial
societies, nor to predict eventual catastrophe. The

purpose of these comments is to point out certain social

tendencies which can be illuminated by the distinction

between the conformist potential of conventional-instrumental social thought and the potential for understanding

through the development of the capacity for reflective
thought. Once illuminated,

I

think these possibilities

for conflict and crisis constitute a persuasive argument

for promoting reflective political thought.

Conflict -and crisis may indeed jar some out of

habitual modes of behavior. But crises are hardly the
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way in which capacities for
reflective thought ^ay be
developed to the fullest possible

extent. Only in stable

contexts can a refined and regularized
inclination to
reflection be developed 231 s^^i^i ^^^^^^
^p^^
.

possibilities; but precisely because they
are extraordinary
circun:istances,

their potentials may be lost. The
loss may

be accounted again in terms of the
capacity of men to
connect the problems and troubles of their
ordinary lives

with larger social developments. The possibilities
for
formulating ways of achieving a satisfying pattern
of

life through reflection connect in this way with the

possibilities for understanding and shaping social life

through initiation of

a

-

younger generation and through

acting on issues of social change.
If.

the n, we can take the "reflectiveness" of social

thought as a valuable achievement of in the development
of men'

s

reasonincr capacities, we are

justi fied in taking

it as a specification of the cognitive criterion of

political education . And we can conclude that political

education ought to be prom.oted; for it is

a

conceptual

truth that political education is the development of
desirable qualities in someone. The question about whether
political education ought to be promoted has sense only
in particular contexts where the promotion of political

education could conflict with the realization of other
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values.

Before

make a few concluding speculations
on how
political education might be promoted,
i want to comment
on the framework for research
set out by this notion of
political education.
I

Toward a Theory of Political Education
There are two quite general ways of
approaching
the research problems of a theory
of political education.
(I include the prerequisite
political socialization in
1.

my reference to research toward a theory of
political
education.

)

The first is straightforward empirical

research. This research would be geared to the
formulation

and testing of hypotheses about the social
practices,

institutions and policies which promote political

socialization and political education. Developmental

psychology may, as

I

have suggested, be a useful framework

for posing these empirical questions. But other theoretical

formulations should be drawn on to complement, enrich or

modify the Piaget-Kohlberg developmental framework.
Conceptual analysis can also be an important

complement to developmental research on political education.
The key concepts of political life can be analyzed

developmentally in order to clarify the achievements of
political socialization and political education. What types
of concepts are available at different levels of sociali-
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nation an. education, ana what
are the logical
prerequisites
for use Of political ter.s
at different conceptual
levels.
Our analysis leads us to expect
that certain types of
uses of the ter..n "interest",
for example, would be
available to a politically educated
person, but not to

someone who was only socialized to
a passive citizen
role.
These studies will move toward
an explanation of
the successes and failures of
political socialization
and political education in different
social
contexts.

We must diagnose the type of
political thinking which

prevails at different age levels

and among different

segments of the population. People live their
political
lives within a particular conjunction of
institutions
and traditions. As we begin to refine our
characterizations
and classifications of different types of political

thought we will find that they indicate varying levels
of thought and also varying challenges and opportunities
to engage in politics. A diagnosis of types of political

thinking is then both

a

characterization of a level of

political thought and a description of the institutions

which have shaped it. The way in which

a

child deals

with the political opinions of his parents, for example
reveals the type of thinking of which he is capable, as

well as the type of family which has fostered his capacities.
But we must at some point get outside of the given
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dimensions of a person's thought in order
to develop an
explanatory theory of political education.

There must be

an^nterplav between fhe

diaannr.i^ of ooii tir..1

and a theory of structure in

s ocial

and o olitir^l

lif^.

The flow from past to future in social
life is not just a
fluid transmission of traditions. There are
changes in the

structure of social life. Some are gradual, some
abrupt.
But in the midst of these changes people's lives
may

become filled with discontents, anxieities, or "troubles"

whose source they cannot locate in their own narrow
milieu. The diagnosis of political thought of these

individuals may point to a deficiency in political socialization or a failure of political education. The former
type of deficiency might be seen where the political

traditions of an ethnic group impinge in new ways on
national political practices. And a failure of the latter
sort might be the diagnosis v/hen a local community's

political practices seem unable to comprehend new issues

thrust on it by suburbanization. But v;hatever the

diagnosis of individual political thought, we can have

a

full explanatory theory only by appealing to the

categories of a social theory which can help us see the
connections among different institutions and practices,
and the sources of change.
The theory of social structure v/ould be a critical
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theory, in the sense that we want
to view social conditions
in terms of the promotion of
citizen development throuqh
political socialization and political
education. A critical
theory of social structure opens up
questions about
whether the interests of citizens become
policy issues in Mills* terms, whether "personal
troubles of milieubecome translated into "public issues of
social structure".
In this way it connects with a theory
of political education
'

which opens up questions about the capacity of

a

citizen

to formulate and conceptualize policy alternatives
in
terms of what is in his interest. Even if crucial issues
are raised, citizens may be unable to grasp their scope
and their implications for his life.

But even so, the

raising of important issues of social change may be seen
as an essential dimension of the political education of
a society.
2,

I

want to conclude this section with an analysis

of a recent research effort which may prove to mark a

significant step toward a theory of political socialization.
I

am referring Robert W. Connellys book. The Child*s

Construct^ nn of Politi cs.

Connellys book is based on

interviews v/ith 119 children, aged

5

to 16, from the

suburbs of Sydney, Australia. He is concerned with

portraying the political ideas of these children, and

interpreting the social bases of their political commit-
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tments. But the primary thrust of the
work is developmental,
drawing on the Piagetian framework in
investigating
"the

development of the child's relationships with
the large
scale social world and his reasoning about

it." He asks:

"How do children construct interpretations
of the political
world as they grow up, and how do they come to
adopt

stances towards it?"233

j

cannot do justice to this book

by a full review of its findings. Instead,

I v/ant

to give

an example from Connell's work to show how this
perspective

on the development of political thought can elucidate

problems in other areas of political research. And then
I v/ill

discuss the relationship of this work to the

framework for research on political education proposed
here.

Divergent interpretations of the relationship

between a voter and his party choice have been offered

by political scientists in recent years. On the one hand,
there has been an effort to identify those social and

psychological variables which most clearly predict

a

voter's party choice. One of the strongest predictors
of party choice has been found to be the party choice

of one's family, and particularly his parents.

^-^^

One

Interpretation of this finding has portrayed party
allegiance as an unthinking reaction to external pressures,
a

non-rational (or possibly irrational) impulse to
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conformity. Others, such as V. c Key,
have surveyed the
data on party realignments for support
of the argument
"that voters are not fools," and that
party allegience is
a fairly rational alignment of votes

with the voters'

interests ,235
A recent article by Arthur Goldberg2 36

attempted

to combine elements of both positions, with the
argument

that "certain sociological determinants, specifically

group norms regarding party identification, may upon
examination, prove to be rational guides to action. "237
But Goldberg's argument, as Connell points out, does not

account for the first formation of party preferences;
and it is here that Connell 's inquiry enters the debate.

Connell points out that the first indication of

party preference is usually made before the child is
capable of making means-end calculations about social
groupings.

^-^^

It is necessary for the child to have a

view of party choice as open to reasoning before he can
see a political party as a means. The path to successful

political socialization is toward the reasoning capacities

necessary to see

a

connection between a party as

a

means

and policy as a goal,

Connell finds three types of cases where family

influence enters into the party preference of the child.
And although Connell does not put the matter this way,

I
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believe these cases can be laid out in a
pattern according
to the degree of success in political
socialization
to a

system of party competition. The first type of
case is
"simple correspondence", where

a

"child mentions a family

preference, and gives his own as the same, but does not

give family choice as

a

reason for his own. •239 The

interviews show that the child is not making independent

calculations on grounds for party preference. He is
taking the name of a party from his parents along with
other attitudes and opinions, in a rather unthinking
manner. The second type of case points to family loyalty
as a basis for party choice. The children may "counsciously

pick the same party to express their solidarity with
their parents. "240 we see here the beginning of a type of
political thought where it is relevant to give some sort
of reason for party preference, even though it is

grounded socially only in the narrow sphere of family
ties. In a third group of cases, parental opinion is

given as

a

reason for party choice, and thus as a ground

for the child's own judgment.
In these cases, we may say, the children adopt
a party preference on the authority of their parents'
opinions. But it is authority of a particular kind,
the kind C. J. Friedrich had in mind when he defined
authoritative communications as those "which are

capable of reasoned elaborations." Indeed the way
these children talk is precisely described by the
quotation which Friedrich uses as the epigraph for

195

ise

likely to think correctly'on the'^ub
ject!

•

24l'''''

The point here is that, while the child
is not yet capable
of connecting parties with policies in
a reasoned manner,
he is aware that his parents are capable
of giving the
types of reasons that are relevant to party
choice. The

next step in the processes leading to socialization
would

involve the ability to handle for himself the type
of

discourse that connects reasons for policies with reasons
for party choice. The path is open for this development
in a way that it is not yet open for the children in the

first or second group cases.
How, then, are

v;e

to explain the formation of the

child's first party preference? Connell rejects

a

general explanation that party preference has an
unconscious, emotional basis, rooted in the psychological

process of identification.

Identification cannot in more than a few cases
be regarded as the main base of party preference;
diffuse faraily loyalty as a motive is probably
widespread and accords better with the character of
the children's committments; considering what grounds
the children have for judgment, v/e can explain their
agreement with their parents as the result of quite
reasonable acts of political choice. These last two
explanations are compatible with each other
,
but they need not apply together. 242
.

.

.
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Adapting this line of argument to our own framework,
we can
see why explanation in terms of family loyalty
does not

conflict with the latter explanation.

IJhat

we have in

Connell's three types of cases are diagnoses of the types
of political thought available to children; diagnoses
which

draw on the idea that there is a possible pattern of

development in political socialization towards a capacity
to reason about party choice in terms of policy preferences,
A,

full explanation of the successes, lack of success and

failures involved in each diagnosis would require a broad,

er investigation of the social life of the child. For ex-

ample, if a child says that he prefers one party because

"it's just sort of a family thing", ^^"^ an explanation
in terms of family loyalty is incomplete without an

account of her parent's level of political thought. If
the parents are themselves incapable of reasoning about

party choice, if they too see it as

a

"family thing",

we may begin to suspect a failure to socialize the child
to the norms embodied in the ongoing political institutions.

But if this is not the case, and the child is rather

young and at a low level of general mental development,
then our diagnosis would more likely fit into an

explanation of lack of success in terms of the level of
thought available to the child. My point is that we must

distinguish a diagnosis of political thought from an
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explanation of party com:nittments

;

and the latter

explanatory endeavor is intimately connected with
an
explanation of the development of political thought,
in
that in both

v/e

are led into an investigation of the

specific features of the social world of the child.
Connell sums up the implications of his findings
for the interpretation of party choice, as follows:
The 'reaction' interpretations of party choice
represent the child's adoption of a party as
politically irrational, in essence not a political
act at all. But the discussion of children's party
preferences has not faced the question of rationality
squarely, for it has not included an analysis of what
the children think parties are and what grounds they
might have for choosina between them. We may well
ask whether their expressed preferences are not
reasonable acts of political choice, given the grounds
for choice available to them. 244
.

I

.

.

would now like to make a few more general

comments on Connell 's work, and how it relates to the

framework for study of political socialization and
political education presented here. His evaluation of

research carried on under the rubric of "political socialization" is similar to the critique of the conformity inter-

pretation of socialization offered here.
Studies of children's political beliefs that have
been preoccupied with problems of "political socialization" have produced distorted accounts of the
development largely because they have failed to
recognize and account for the conscious creative
activity of the children themselves in the development
of their own beliefs .... The basic approach has
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been to think of the developTient of beliefs
as a
matter of induction into certain social norms^
cornmon patterns of beliefs or shared attitudes,
which are necessary for the well-beinq or stability
of the political systen that the children are
entering. This two-fold oreoccupation with induction
into nornis and the stability of systems runs through
most of the "political socialization" studies. 245
The alternative put forward by Connell is to treat

the development of political beliefs "not as a mechanical

function or input of a system, but as a contingent,
historical process. "246 This is exactly the view presented
in this paper ~ that the development of political thought

should be treated as "a contingent, historical process",
a

development of the child's reasoning capacities in

interaction with his social and political world.
A fully developed concept of "political socialization"
is not presented by Connell as a framework for his research.

But much of his effort is guided by a notion of the full

development of a child's "political outlook". The notion
of "political outlook" thus serves as an achievement term,
and the criteria of a political outlook resemble closely

the criteria of understanding and committment we have

proposed for "political socialization". A political

outlook has been achieved when

a

child's thinking about

the political world exhibits "a degree of inner coherence
and conviction."

It involves "personal sets of

attitudes and stores of information" and "reasonably
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coherent structures of belief.
WT-iile

"^'^^

Connell does at times hint at a concern for

achieveinents of political thinking beyond political

socialization, his work is less helpful here. ?or one
thing, he interviews no children over the age of sixteen;

and at thin point political socialization would not bo
secured, nor would politically educative influences be

likely to have had a great impact yet. The only development
he discusses which moves beyond what

v/e

would call

political socialization, is ideological thinking. But
on the subject of ideological thinking he is quite

ambivalent,
Connell first of all notes the achievements of

political thought which lay the basis for ideology

-

an

achievement that points beyond instrumental social rationality towards formal reasoning. The two bases of ideology
are "the capacity to wield abstract social concepts, and

the recognition of whole socieites as a subject of
argument"; and th<^se capacities "appear and become common
in adolescence. "2^^ His further comments point to two

developments within this type of thought. The first is
toward a formal and self-co n scious theory of society
which, he says, "is not a regular stage in the develop-

ment of political beliefs. "249 But here he does suggest
that it is an achievement rooted in the stimulation
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provided by specific social contexts,
"it seems that the
emergence of personal ideology in middle
adolescence is
very much a social product, both in the
sense that it

requires a strong stimulus from others and in
the sense
that the content of ideology is derived from
the political
tradition of groups the person moves in. "251 ^^^g
evaluation
of this development is, however, quite disparaging:
there
is no particular reason to promote this type
of thinking,

because

"^^n

informal outlook is quite enough to hold

one's end up in

a

conversation, which, bar voting, is as

far as most adults ever involve themselves in politics "252
.

The second type of development is implicit in the

resounding call for the liberation of political imagination

with which he concludes his book.

... a group representative of the mass of the
people is growing towards adult involvement without
sign of the kind of practical imagination which would
let its members generate plans of action to deal with
the political problems they recognize. Perhaps the
really important means of social control through
influence on the development of political ideas is
exactly this: that the society fails to liberate
because it does not stimulate political imagination.
The children trek around inside the boundaries of
conventional politics; they will not move outside
them without special stimulus; and until they do, the
established political order is safe - for want of
challenge, 253
I v;ould

suggest that this last description be seen

as a developmental step beyond thinking in terms of a
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formal, self-conscious theory of society.
A theory of
society, after all, is presumed by the
capacity to

generate plans to deal with social problems.
How could
one develop a plan to deal with a social
problem without
any notion of the Institutional or structural
causes
of

the problem? And the features of formality and
self-

consciousness which Connell finds distasteful may be
seen as features of an egocentric form of this phase
of

development. Viewed in this way, however, Connell 's

evaluation of ideology v/ould be deficient. For it may be
that political imagination develops within and grows out
of such ideological thinking. Mow, then, could we reject

ideology in favor of an outlook which is sufficient merely
"to hold one's end up in a conversation"? One might, of

course, have qualms about widespread fixation of thought
at this level.

But within the framework of a theory of

polit ical education

,

we would be reminded to pick out the

desirable posstbill ties as well as the potential fixations
in a form of thought.
We can summarize our comments on Connell 's
jsignificant work by saying that he has laid the empirical

basis for a fruitful theory of political socialization.
It is an empirical basis for a theory because his work,

like Piaget's, is largely descriptive. A full explanatory

theory must be rooted in a historical understanding of the
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specific structural features of society
which shape each
child's development. And his argument
goes astray, I
believe, at the critical point where we
would recommend the
study of political education; the point
where the child
recognizes the need for a theory of social
structure
and

social change in order to gain perspective
on the

political world.

Conclusion
We can now rehearse the course of this study,

recapitulate its major points, and draw out some of the
implications for political life of this approach to the

study of political socialization and political education.
We began with the thesis that freedom in the modern

world is constrained by the failure of our institutions to

develop men's social and political imagination. Lacking the
imagination to break out of the conventional formulations
of the issues and alternatives of political life, many

are unable to connect their personal troubles with

possibilities for political action. Such imaginative
achievements are the fruit of

a

capacity to hypothesize,

to see the real world of social beliefs and practices as

one of many possible worlds.
The subject laid out for study was the development
of men's capacity to reason in political life,

looking for

a

'./e

were

conceptual framework which could provide
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the basis for a theory of the development
of political
thinking. Kost of the relevant literature in
contemporary

political science has adopted

a

distinctive framework built

upon the concept of "political socialization". This
framework, however, and even the conceptualization of
political

socialization, has been influenced by a conformity

perspective. This

involves

a

confor'.r.ity

perspective on socialization

way of looking at and talking about human develop-

ment that omits any important reference to the exercise
of judgment or to the growth of the capacity to reason.

Individual social development is the product of molding

forces and pressures.
Our critique of this conformity interpretation was

built upon the idea that the basic point of the tenn

socialization is to pick out those social processes which
lead to the capacity to use reason in social interaction,
to understand and care about others in a social order. A

tacit normative committment to some particular social

order is inevitable unless recognition is given to the
internal connection between socialization and the
developraent of human capacities. It is the social reasoning

capacities of the child which are particularly important

with the concept of socialization. Use of the concept
implies a normative cawnittment to rationality; and it is

this committment which is obscured by social scientists
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who view socialization as the name of a
process of learning
any beliefs whatever. Socialization is not
the name of a

process. Rather, it picks out activities and
processes

which contribute to the achievement of the
capacity to
reason and act rationally in social life. Political
socialization involves bringing people to the point
of
being able to participate intelligently in a society's
political practices. Failure to build upon this point
about the connection between socialization and the use of

reason has led to two related developments in the political
science literature: a potentially harraful focus on

conformist behavior, and a failure to investigate the

character or conditions of the higher development of
political thinking.
We then suggested that the further possible develop-

ment of political reasoning can be understood as political
education. Political education covers those processes by
v/hich citizens develop a capacity for reflective political

thought. There is bound to be controversy about the concept
of education, because of its connection with the develop-

ment of reason. This capacity enters in different ways
into explication of different ideals of personal life,

such as "autonomy" or "duty". And as people choose and

seek to promote different ideals through political
education, the particular understanding of the achievements
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of reason bound up in their ideals will shape the
use of
the notion of political education.
But whatever the personal ideals pursued,
politically

educated citizens will be capable of recognizing others as
persons, as potentially capable of citizenship of the

highest level. Framing a critical view of the public
interest and acting on the basis of self -accepted

principles will involve promoting the equal opportunity
of all to develop their capacities as citizens. The task
at hand then beco'.nes the exploration of those institutional

and structural transformations which will provide the

conditions for political education and

a

fully developed

citizenry. The researches of Piaget, Kohlberg and Connell

provide a basis for understanding and explanation of the
successes of political socialization and political
education. But

V7e

must continue to explore further the

various ways of refining our specifications of these

achievements and of building an explanatory framework
relevant to the ongoing socio-historical process.
V7e

have argued that political education ought to

be promoted in complex and changing modern industrial

societies. Implicit in my discussion of Connellys work

was the idea that political education cannot easily take
hold until the full scope of social life faces the youth

with

social and political responsibilities. The needs and
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possibilities for

politically responsive world can only
be recognized when people are made responsible
for acting
a

in the midst of conflicting demands. It
would seem to me
that the main course of political education
must be in the

world beyond formal schooling. "In an industrial
society,
the school for citizenship can only be in the
midst

of our

industrial edeavors, located wherever we perform our
work
and practice our prof ession.

"^^"^

What we require is insti-

tutions and forms of organization that are open and flexible in the face of reasoned challenges to the habitual

way of doing things. Such institutions can promote,
sustain and provide arenas for the development of the

reflective capacities of the citizenry. And we also need
to press in the larger political world for policies and

policy issues which will highlight this politically
educative potential in our institutional life. To do this

would be to take seriously the challenge of political education.

i
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APPENDIX

I

Definition of Moral Stages^SS
I.

Preconventional Level,

At this level the child is responsive
to cultural
rules and labels of good and bad, right or
wrong, but
interprets these labels in terms of either the
physical or
the hedonistic consequences of action
(punishment; reward^
exchange or favors), or in terms of the physical
^ower of
those v7ho enunciate the rules and labels. The
level is
divided into the following two stages

Stage Ij The punishment and obedien ce orientation.
The physical consequences of action determine
its'^i^^ess
or badness regardless of the human meaning or value of
these consequences. Avoidance of punishment and unquestioning deference to power are valued in their own right, not
in terms of respect for an underlying moral order supported
by punishment and authority (the latter being stage 4),

Stage 2i The instrument-1 relativist orientation .
Right action consists of that which inctrumentaily
satisfies one's own needs and occasionally the needs of
others. Human relations are viewed in terms like those of
the market place. Elements of fairness, of reci.procity,
and of equal sharing are present, but they are always
interpreted in a physical pragmatic way. Reciprocity is a
matter of "you scratch my back and I'll scratch yours," not
of loyalty, gratitude, or justice.
II,

Conventional Level,

At this level, maintaining the expectations of the
individual's family, group, or nation is perceived as
valuable in its own right, regardless of immediate and
and obvious consequences. The attitude is not only one of
conform ity to personal expectations and social order, but
of loyalty to it, of actively maintaining supporting, and
justifying the order, and of identifying with the persons
or group involved in it. At this level, there are the
following two stages:
.

Stage

3

1

The interpersonal concordance or

"crood

boy

- nice girl** orientation . Good behavior is that which
pleases or helps others and is approved by them There is
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much conformity to stereotypical imacres of what is majority or "natural" behavior. Behavior is frequently judaed
by intention - "he means well" becomes important for the
first time. One earns approval by being "nica".
Stage 4: The "law and order" orientation There is
orientation toward authority, fixed rules, and the maintenance of the social order. Right behavior consists of
doing one's duty, showing respect for authority, and maintaining the given social order for its own sake,
.

III. Postconventional,

Autonomous, or Principled Level,

At this level there is a clear effort to define moral
values and principles v/hich have validity and application
apart from the authority of the groups or persons holding
these principles, and apart from the individual's own identification with these groups. This level again has two stages:

Stage 5 T he social-contract legalistic orientation,
generally v/lth utilitarian overtcne So Right action tends
to be defined in terms of general individual rights, and
standards v/hich have been critically examined and agreed
upon by the whole society. There is a clear awareness of
the relativism of personal values and opinions and a corresponding emphasis upon procedural rules for reaching
consensus. Aside from what is constitutionally and
democratically agreed upon, the right is a matter of
personal "valuer" and "opinions". The result is an emphasis
upon the "legal point of view", but with an emphasis
upon the possibility of changing law in terms of rational
considerations of social utility (rather than freezing it
in terms of stage 4 "law and order"). Outside the legal
realm, free agreement and contract is the binding element
of obligation^ This is the ''official" morality of the
American Government and Constitution,
1

The universal ethical principle orientation
Right is defined by the decision of conscience in accord
with self-chosen ethical princioles appealing to loaical
comprehensiveness, universality, and consistency. These
principles are abstract and ethical (the Golden Rule,
the categorical imperative); they are not concrete moral
rules like the Ten Commandments. At heart, these are
universal principles of justice, of the reciprocity and
equality of human rights, and of respect for the dignity
of human beings as individu al persons.
Stage 6

:

.

;

209

APPENDIX II
Relations between Piaget Logical Stages
and Kohlberg Moral 3tages256
(all relations are that attainment of the logical
stages
is necessary, but not sufficient, for attainment
of the
moral stage)

Logical Stage

Moral Stage

gymbolic. intuitive thought

Stage 0

»

Concrete operations. Substage 1

Stage

1

>

Categorical classification
Concrete operations 3ub~
stage 2
Reversible concrete thought

Stage

2

;

Stage

3

:

Stage 4

1

Formal operations Substage 1
Relations involving the
Inverse of the reciprocal
Formal operations, Substaae 2
.

Formal operations. Substage 3

The good is what I
want and like.
Punishment-obedience
orientation.

Instrumental hedonism and concrete
reciprocity.

Orientation to
interpersonal relations of mutuality
Maintenance of social
order, fixed rules,
and authority.

Stage 5A

>

Stage 5B

t

Social contract,
utilitarian lawmaking perspective.
Higher law and
conscience orientation.

Stage 6

Universal ethical
principle orientation.
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Chapter VI
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356,

118, The Moral Judgment of the Child (New York: The Free
Press, 1965),

119, There is some conf usion in the terminology adopted
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"social-emotional" development in these studies. The
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221

provide the framework for action. The
tensions generated
aL^^ii^fl^f
^^r'^" to the sti-ucturereasons! for
experience
or accomthe structure to include new features
introduced
tlf"^
experience. The distinction between
judgments about
tL^^
the physical and social worlds is,
on the
more clear cut. Social judgments, however, face of it ^nuch
conceptions of the self, and the tensions involve
introduced by
new social experiences can make social
thought hiahlv
affective, ^rhere may be a tendency, then,
to see
development of social judgments as distinctively the
tied
affective-emotional lifee These questions are discussedto
further in the next chapter.

^

Z

'

120, A few words should be said about the validity
or
accurateness of these summaries. Piaget's writings are
extremely complex and recalcitrant to attempts at summary
exposition. In addition, the terminology adopted and
specific stage divisions have varied somewhat over the
years, I have drawn heavily on the excellent exoosition
by Flavell The Develop mental PgvchologY_nf_ Je?.^ ^^^rrrf
who also offers a justification for this type of" summary!
"The question arises as to whether the collection of
diverse cognitive traits listed in the proceeding sections
can be pulled together under some sort of unifying
succinct description. As would be anticipated, Piaget
himself considers them as multiple expressions of a
single, cognitive orientation rather than as a string of
unconnected attributes. Actually, one could do a fair job
of conveying this unity by the simple expedient of choosing
almost any one of the characteristics described and
showing how it implies each of the others .... Thus
the choice of a 'unifier* is to a large extent arbitrary."
(pp. 161-62) The purpose of the exposition which follows
is to add some flesh to the skeletal outline of claims
made by cognitive-developmental psychologists.
(

) ^

121, Schemas are approximately equivalent to concepts on
the level of representational intelligence,
122, The Developmental Psychology of Jean Piaget . p. 159.
123, Ibid .

.

p.

206.

124, Kohlberg, "Stage and Sequence," p. 375.
125,

Ibid .

126, Ibid.

,

p.

379.

n

i
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127. For exannple, Stage 2 is referred to one time as
"naive egoist" and another time as "instrumental relativist"
and a recent article divided stage 5 into 5A and 5B.
This
summary draws on a number of Kohlberg's writinas» includina
the following! "Stage and Sequence"; "Education for Justice
A t^odern Statement of the Platonic View," in Nancy F,, and
Theodore R. Sizer (eds.). Moral Education (Cambridge:*
Harvard University Press, 1970); "From Is to Ought," in T,
Mischel {ed,)» Cpcrni tivg Development ?.n d Eoi stf^'^-.n1 or^xr
(New York: Academic'press 1971); "The Child as Moral
Philosopher," in Pnychology Today (September, 1968).
A wide range of the different aspects of moral Judgment
arc used by I\ohlberg in coding the different levels and
stages, (See "Prom Is to Ought," p. 166.) I have given
here only a general summary without distinguishing these
different aspects,
,

128, "Stage and Sequence," p, 391, See also Appendix II,
"Realtions Retv/een Piaget Logical Stages and Kohlberg
Moral Stages,"

Chapter VII
Sssays in the volume Cog n i t i ve D e ve 1 o pme t._ and
Eplstemology, edited by T. Mischel, have been most useful
in this task. This volume compiles papers presented by
philosophers and psvcholosits on common themes relating
to developmental psychology.
129,

.

130, This distinction, as elaborated in Chapter V, hinges
on the achievement of a critical perspective on the norms
of political life with political education,

131, Kohlberg,

"From Is to Ought," pp. 152-53.

132, I am not arguing that the characterizations of
mature thought generated from interviews are self -justifying.
Rather as Kohlberg claims, the descriptions, distinctions,
characterizations and clarifications of both enterprises
will each aid the other at certain points. See Chapter
9

of this work,
133,

"Stage and Sequence," p, 358.

134, Paraphrased from Kohlberg,
pp. 183-84,
135,

Ibid ,

,

p,

195,

"From Is to Ought,"
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135, This is the title of one of the sections of Richard
Peters* assessment of Kohlberg's theorv, "Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive
Development and Spistemoloay p. 273,
.

137,

"From Is to Ought," pp. 195-213,

138, William P, Alston, "Comments on Kohlberg's 'From
Is to Ought'," in T. rdschel (ed,). Cognitive Development
and Epistemology p, 273,
.

139, Kohlberg,

"From Is to Ought,"

p,

215,

140, For recent critique, see Alasdair l^laclntyre, "What
Morality is Not," in Against th^ :f>elf -Images of the Ag e
(New Yorkj Schocken Books, 1971), pp, 9 6-108, ~For a
discussion of whether and how the question might be
decided between this "monarchical" view and other views,
see W. B, Gallie, "Liberal I-iorality and Socialist Morality,"
in Philosophy. Politics and Society 2nd Series (New York:
Barnes and Noble, 1962), pp, 116-133,

Ethics (Englewood Cliffs, N, J,
1963), p. 36,

j

Prentice-Hall,

142. "Education and Human Development," in R, F, Dearden,
H, Hirst, and R, 3, Peters (eds,), Education and the
Developm ent of Reason , p, 509, Peters expands on this
critique in his "Moral Develop'tient A Plea for Pluralism,"
P,

:

143.

"What Morality Is Not,** pp. 99-100.

Peters, "Reason and Habit: The Paradox of
Moral Education," in W. R. Niblett (ed,), Koral Education
in a Changing Society (London: Faber, 1963).
144.

See R,

145.

"Education and Human Development,"

146. Ibid ,

,

S,

p.

p.

511.

512,

147. The connection is elaborated by Peters in Ethics and
Education . He concludes: "To have the concept of a person
is to see an individual as an object of respect in a form
of life which is conducted on the basis of those principles
which are presupposition of the use of practical reason."
(p. 137)

Jean Piaget
148. Reprinted in Six Psycho lo gical Studies by
This
Elkind.
David
by
edited
(New York: Random House, 1967)
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discussion is equally applicable to the interpretation of
Kohlberg's work,
149,

"Editor's Introduction" in Ibid.,

150, Jean Piaqet,
pp. 64-65,

p.

xiv.

"The Mental Development of the Child,"

151, "'A Recognizable PhilOvSophy of Education*: A
Constructive Critique," in Perspectives on Plowde n (New
York: Humanities, 1969), p. 5.
152, Jean Piaqet, P].av, Dre?^'ns and I mitation in Child hood,
p. 207. Quoted in John Flavell, The Developmental Psychology

of Jea n Piacret. p, Bl.
153, Quoted in Flavell, The Developmental Psychology
of Jean Piaget , p, 223,
154, "The Mental Development of the Child," pp. 69-70,
Emphasis mine,

155, The notion of rationality advanced here depends on
a sense of the relative coherence of reasons in a belief

system as compared with previous or subsequent levels,
and not with an absolute standard tied to the truthvalue of beliefs. Dewey, in Human Nature and Conduct
say« that "reasonableness is in fact a quality of an
effective relationship among desires rather than a thing
opposed to desire," (p. 194.) Alasdair I'-acIntyre and Brian
Barry defend similar notions of rationality, put to the
service of different arguments. For Maclntyre, see
"Rationality and the Explanation of Action," and "Is a
Science of Comparative Politics Possible?" in Against the
Self-Imaa es of th e Age For Barry, see Politi cal Argument
(London: "l^out ledge and Kegan Paul, 1965), "Rationality
as Consistency," p. 3.
,

.

156, The characterization of these attitudes is drawn
from P. P. Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment," in P. F,
Strav;son (ed.). Studies in th e Philosoohv of Thought and
Action (New York: Oxford University Press, 1968), pp. 7196.
157, Ibid .

,

p.

75.

158, B. Inhelder and J, Piaqet, The_Growth of logical
Basic
Tl->iniH nq fr om Childhood to Adolescen ce (New York
Psychology
Developmental
The
Books , 1958). Cited in Flavell,
i

of Jean Piaget , p, 223,

I
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159,

Strawson, "Freedom and Resentment,"
p. 84,

160, I leave open here the question of how
adequate
"reversibility" is as a characterization of all
mature
thought about the physical world. Certainly it
apolies
more neatly in this sphere. But in what sense could
Gallileo, his inquisitors aside, simply reverse his
thought and truly arrive at a geocentric frame of
reference?

161, "What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" in T.
Mischel (ed.). Cognitive Development and K oistemnl na^/.

*

p.

412.

162, Ibid ,

.

p.

413,

163, Human Nature and Conduct

,

pp.

215-17,

~

164, See George Kateb, Utopia and Its Enemies (New York:
The Free Press, 1963),
165,

"What is Involved in a Genetic Psychology?" p. 415.

Chapter VI I
166, For example Leonard Berkowitz*s criticism along
these lines of Piaget's theory of moral development in
surely connected with his definition of moral values as
"evaluations of action believed by Members of a given
society to be right'," The Development of Motives and
V alues in the Child (New Yorki Basic Books, 1964), p. 44,
*

167, "The Concept of 'Stages* in Psychological Development,"
in T, i-lischel (ed,). Cogn itive Davelonr^ont and Epj.st emolocrv
p, 31, See also D, W, Hamlyn, "Logical and Psychological
Aspects of Learning," in R, S, Peters (ed, ), Thr> Concent
of Education , pp. 24-43,

168, See R, S, Peters, "Education and Human Development,"
pp, 514-15, This is part of v;hat is presumed by being
able to view oneself and others as persons, as sources of
assertion as to what there are reasons for doing. The
availability of reasons in public discourse presumes also
that agents are capable of using language symbolically
rather than merely instrumentally. On this distinction,
see Toulmin, "Concepts and the Explanation of Behavior,"
in T, Kdschel (ed,). Human Action: Conceptual and
Empirical Issues (New Yorki Academic Press, 1969), p, 81,

.
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169. Peters has argued that most forms
of meni-;,i <n
can be related to failures of rationaUty
at this has?."'
socially required level. See -Mental
Hell?h» as an
Educational Aim." in T. H. B. Hollins
(ed.),
Mms ?n
^* —
—
Education, pp. 71-90,
Piaget emphasizes a particular
life - peer group interaction - while feature of social
Kohlbera of?ers
a generalized notion of "role-taking
opportunities^
as
universal aspects of social life to be
included in in
account of mental development, and moral
in
particular. But it has been sugaested by development
W. P. Alston
that such factors as these may need to be
by the requirement that an internalization suppl^m-nt-d
of
accompanied by a special emotional intensity rules
described by Freud as the establishing of the (such as
sup^reao)
is necessary for moral dsvelooment. I do
not intend to
argue here whether the particular features
identified bv
Piaget and Kohlberg are wholly adequate. See
Alston,
Comments on Kohlberg's 'From Is to Ought*,"
278-79.
pp.

170 For a related argument, see P. H. Hirst, "Liberal
Education and the Nature of Knowledge," in R. F. Dearden,
P. H. Hirst, and R. 3. Peters (eds.). Edu
cation and the
Development of Reason .
The Developmental Psycholo gy of jean Piaget,
p. 36.
172.

Ibid., p. 420.

173. See "Conclusion: Factors in Mental Development," in
The Psvc holoQv of the Child by Jean Piaget and Baerbel
Inhelder
,

174. Ibid., pp. 154-56.

175. The fourth factor, "equilibration", is also of interest
and merits treatment I cannot give it here. T, Mischel suggests it is a distinct type of theoretical notion, without
empirical content, which can be translated in logical terms
as something like a "desire to know". Alasdair Maclntyre
has discussed an asy.nmetry between the explanation offered
for rational and for irrational beliefs which might bear
on the status of "equilibrium" as an explanatory notion.
He says that an explanation of rational beliefs ends with
clarification of the norms of reasoning which governed
formation of the belief; and the history of those norms
can reveal only preconditions for their adoption, not
necessary and sufficient conditions. In any case, it may
be important to differentiate the status of "equilibration"

i
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in relation to the other factors cited in an explanation
See T'laclntyre, "Rationalitv and the Explanation
of JVction "
and T. Mischel, "Piageti Cognitive Conflict and l^otivation
of Thought," in T. Mischel (ed.), Cognitive Developrnent-.
and Eplstomoloav .
176, The Psvcholocrv of the Child , p. 156,
177. Ibid.

,

p,

157,

178.

"Stage and Sequence," p. 199,

179,

Ibid., p. 398. Included, here, would be established

child-rearing practices,
180. There are, of course, other conditions, such as
maturation, physical experience, etc., and perhaps
linguistic capacity. And role-taking opportunities would
figure, likewise, in the development of thought about the
physical world,

181, "Stage and Sequence," p. 397. The attribution of
functional meaning to institutions hinges, it seems to me,
on the part they play in deveT oping and maintaining
minimal capacities for social life in a population. The
interpretation of functionalists like Marion Levy seems
to support this position. See Alex Inkeles, "Society,
Social Structure, and Child Socialization," in Clausen
(ed,), Socialization and Society , The task of reducing
all institutions to this "common functional meaning" has
not, however, been successfully carried through. And the
example Kohlberg chooses is ill-suited to his purpose
"As an example, while the detailed prescriptions of law
vary from nation to nation, the form of 'law* and the
functional value of its importance and regular maintenance
are much the same. in all nations with formal law." Ibid ,
Besides the obvious point that the class of "nations with
formal law" is not inclusive of all societies, it should
be noted that it is the principled level of morality, not
the minimal conventional level, which Kohlberg terms a
"law-making" perspective,
182,

"Stage and Sequence," p, 388,

183. Ibid ,

,

p,

384,

184, D. I<uhn, J. Langer, and
of Formal-Operational Thought

Kohlberg, "The Development
Its Relation to Moral

L.
j
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Judgment," unpublished paper, 1971. citPrJ in t v
and C. GllUge.n, "The Adolef^ent
a Phllosop^e^ Th^'
" ^°3tconventlonal iorldf-'SleSLs

iilytT:i:lotl]'
185.

"Stage and Sequence," pp. 399-400,

196. Ibid., p. 398.
187. Part of the problem with Kohlberg's (and
other
developmental psychologists') explanatory proqram
is his
almost exclusive focus on successful mental
development.
This may be partly due to the mode of
cross-sectional
research on agG-qroups desiqned to elucidate
achievements
rather than diagnose failures. It has been commented
that
quite opposite to the Piaget-Kohlbarcr aooroach, Freud's
theory of mental life is primarily helpful in elucidating
the character of failure in social and moral development.
Perhaps a s-^mthesis of these two theories would mitigate*
the weaknesses and bolster the strengths of each approach.
See David H, Jones, "Freud's Theory of Moral Conscience,"

'

Ellio^JSllY (1966), pp. 34-57; and R. S. Peters, "Freud's
Development in Relation to that of Piaget."
188.

"Stage and Sequence," p. 399.

189. h slave, while limited as to the types of communication permissible with significant others in his environment,
has sufficient opportunity to grasp the idea of others. It
is in fact the mark of extreme oppression and degradation
that slaves may come to view themselves as their masters'
do-as objects, worthless in themselves, to be manipulated
by others,
190. See Turner, "Role-Taking Process Versus Conformity,"
in A, Rose (ed.). Huma n Behavior and Social Processes
(Boston: Houghton Miff lin Co., 1962), pp. 20-40.
i

191. On "real wants" and want-probing institutions, see
John R, Champlin, "On the Study of Power," Politics and
Society (November, 1970), pp. 91-111.
.

192. It seems also that the conceptual coherence attained
in the development of reason and the rationality of
social-institutional life would be interrelated.

"Concepts and Society," in S ociolocfical Theory and
Philosophical Analysis D, Emmet and A. Maclntyre (eds.),
(New York The Macmillan Co., 1970), p. 115.
193.

,

I

»
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194, Ibid^, footnote 1,

i-i?c\l^r
of

'^^ historical parallel elucidated
bv
"^"'""^
in Place"^
^"^^^"^

^*

'b^™'

196.

Ibid.

.

p.

141.

197. Ibid_.

,

p.

140.

198. Ibid. Presumably "better" means here at least in
part - more coherent or consistent,
199.

Ibid .

200.

"Stage and Sequence," p. 402.

.

p.

146.

201. Any appearance of a distinctively conservative
argument here ought to be dispelled by Pocock's reminder
". . . in confrontations between conservatives
and
the awareness of history is by no means all on one radicals
side.
If the abridgement of tradition is ideoloay, the
criticism
of tradition may be present more complex than mere
transmission." "Time, Institutions, knd Action: An Essay
on Traditions and their Understanding," in P. King and
B. C. Parekh (eds.). Politics and S^^oerience
(London:
Cambridge University Press, 1968), p. 223. On this account,
Piaget's use of the term transmission to suggest an
historical dimension ought to be questioned.

202. "Stage and Sequence," p. 402.
203. Ibid.

204,

"Moral Development: A Plea for Pluralism," p. 244.

205,

"Stage and Sequence," pp. 396-97.

206, Ibid. , p. 395. Another interesting experimental
situation is the Milgram obedience test, in which "the
subject is faced with disobeying the rules formulated by
an authority fiaure who is seen as violating the rights
of another individual." "In this situation the experimenter
orders the subject to give an increasingly severe
electrical shock to a stooge 'learner' who has agreed to
participate in a nonsense-syllable learning experiment.
In this study, only the Stage 6 subjects would be expected
to question the authority's moral right to ask them to

"
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inflict pain on another. Stage 5, "social
contract"
subjects, would tend to feel the victim* s
voluntary
participation with foreknowledge released them from
responsibility to him while their agreement to
particioate
committed them to comply. As expected, 75 per cent
of
a small group (6) of Stage 6 subjects quit
as compared
to only 13 per cent of the remaining 24 subjects
at the
lower moral stages." Ibid .
207, N. Haan, M. B, Smith, and J, Block, "The floral
Reasoning of Young Adults Political-Social Behavior,
Family Background and Personality Correlates," Journ al
gf_Person alitv and Social Psycholoav (November. 196817
pp. 183-201.
»

*

208, e.g. Gerhard I^nski, Po wer and Privilege (New York:
McGraw-Hill, 1966); Irving Goffman, "Status Consistency and
Preference for Change in Power Distribution, " Ame rican
Soci ological Review 22 (1957), pp. 275-81; S. M, Li^t,
PQ^iticQl J^an (Garden City, New York: Anchor Books, 1963),
209, Po wer and Privilege p. 87, Emphasis mine. This is
similar to the example of "good" sociological theory
presented by Ralf Dahrendorf « n his essay "Sociology and
f^uman Nature," discussed above in Chapter 2, pp. 54-56,
,

210,

"Stage and 3eq\ience," p. 396,

211, An example of the latter case, the igurramen among
Moraccan Berbers, is discussed by Gellner in "Concepts and
Society,
212, v;e have not considered the more specifically sociological side of developmental theory - phylogenetic
development. For a suggestion in this regard, see I, Copi,
"The Growth of Concepts," in P, Henle (ed,). Language
ITiought and Culture (Ann Arbor, Mich,
The University of
25-48,
Michigan Press, 1958), pp,
,

j

Chapter IX
213. See Peters, "Education and the Educated l^n," in
H. Hirst, R. F. Dearden, and R. S. Peters (eds.).
Education and the Development of Reason .

P.

Strictly speaking, it is a conceptual truth that
education is desirable. But this is not to say that in all
214,

T
231

circumstances the promotion of
educational actlvih^oo .
desirable. The value criterion of
education estlbU^L^" ^
Rrima facie case that education should
be oromo^ed
.n
^^%<^--i-^ility of promoting'thrd:v;iop.nent
ofTJll ^''^ political thought is called for
becluse
SLf
want to argue that political education
is desirable for
niost people in modern indnr. trial socijrM^.

P

^

caealinq hare with Oakeshotfs essav,
"Political
Education," in rj^ona lism in._Pnlj^P.,
For the Umited
purposes of this section it~;:7iri~t~e
necessary to
consider Oakeshotfs other writings,

216. "The Study of Politics in a University."
in
Ration aliser in PoH^.'r^e>^ p, 304,

217. Oakeshott, "Political Education,"
p. 128.
218.

Ibid .

.

p.

133.

219.

Ibid .

.

p.

122.

220.

Ibid

.

.

p.

122, Emphasis added,

221.

Ibid .

.

p.

117.

222,

Ibid

.

Emphasis added.

223. The peculiar way in v^hich Oakeshott inserts the term
"premeditation" into his discussion of ideology might
lead one to believe he has in mind an analogy with the
legal definition of murder: ideology is the wrongful
killing of tradition with knowledge" aforethought "The
contnetion we are investigating is that attending to the
arrangements of a society can begin with a premeditated
ideology
("Political Education", p. 118.)
.

See Richard Peters, "Michael Oakeshotfs Philosophy
of Education," in P. King and B, C, Parekh (eds,).
Politics and Experience pp. 60-61,
224.

,

225. "Time, Institutions and Action: An Essay on Traditions
and their Understanding," p, 223,
226. Oakeshott,

"Political Education," p. 122.

227. This discussion draws on P, F, Strawson's treatment
of individual ideals in "Social Morality and Individual

Ideal."

232

Strawson does not restrict himself
in this way.
229. Cf. Strawson, "Social Morality and
Individual Ideal."
228.

argument is developed from a readina
l^l: 'T'^^ i^"^""
"^^li^^tion, ideals and ^Ui?v,"
•
fn
J R.
R^'p.
^"i^^^r"'
in J.
Pinnock
and J. W. Chapman (eds.). Political
and
Legal QhllHation (New York, Atherton,
1970) ; pp. 89-1 i ff231. By "stable contexts" I do not mean to imply
an
absence of political conflict. ^,^at I intend to
conv^v
is that one's pattern of life cannot be
constantly und^r
threat i:rom outside and uncontrolled forces; and
that
at a minimum one's life and physical well-being
cannot be
in constant danger.
232. Melbourne: Melbourne University press, 1971, The
title was "chosen for the analogy with Piaget's celebrated
works on the child's construction of the physical world "
(p.

1

3)

233. Connell, The Child's Construction" of P olitlr?^. po.

and

~

3.

See A. Campbell et al . The
1964); and M, K. Jennings
Transmission of Political Values
Aturican Political Science Review
234.

V/iley,

American Voter (New Yorkt
and R. Miemi, "The
from Parent to Child,"
63 (March, 1969), pp. 5-25,

237.

Ibid., p. 5.

238.

See The Child's Construction of Politics

239.

Ibid.

240.

Ibid., p, 81.

,

p.

,

pp.

65-84.

67.

241. Ibid
p. 72, Citation from C. J, Friedrich, Man and
Kls Cover nra ent (Mew York, 1963), p. 218,
,

,

242.

Ibid., p. 83.

243.

Ibid.

.

p.

72.

244.

Ibid .

,

p.

81.

245.

Ibid.

,

pp.

233 and 234.

,,

233

246.

Ibid.

p.

235.

P*

90,

p.

89.

p.

91.

p.

93.

251. Ibid,

p.

91.

252.

p.

91.

p.

240.

247. Ibid.
248.

Ibid.

249.

Ibid.

250. Ibid.

253,

Ibid,

f

*

-

•

254, Kariel, The Promise of Politics

,

p.

63,

Appendices
255, Kohlberg,

"Fronn Is to

Ought," pp. 164-65.

256, L. Kohlberg and C. Gilligan, "The Adolescent as a
Philosopher," p. 1072.

•
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